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NEGATION

JANAKI BALLABHA BHATTACHARYYA

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Dedicated to my revered teacher

S. RADHAKRISHNAN

PREFACE

I beg to be excused at the very outset for the delay in publishing my thesis which was completed long ago. The simple reason for this is that the publication of the book was beyond the reach of my financial capacity. I have made several desparate attempts at publishing it. But chill penury has always frozen the current of my zeal. In the post-war period commercial motive gets the upperhand of the publishers who always think in terms of good return of their investment. Academic interest is at a discount. The press of the University of Calcutta is overworked. A book undertaken by it for publication may or may not see the light during the life-time of the author. Consequently, I have had to wait for an opportunity.

After years of patient waiting I have fortunately found in Professor Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya a great friend and patron of learning. He has gladly undertaken the publication of 'Negation' out of his largeness of heart. I shall remain ever indebted to him.

The book under publication does not embody my personal views on the subject under discussion. It reflects the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika point of view. The problem of negation has been discussed from the logical stand-point. There is wide scope of discussing the problem from philosophical and other points of view also.
I have not also discussed the bearing of the law of contradiction on the body of Law nor evaluated its importance and utility therein.

I have not made an improvement upon my thesis since it was adjudicated by the great savants of learning.

I am also grateful to Professor Chattopadhyaya and to my student Professor Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya for the pains they have taken in seeing the book through the press.

I shall fail in my duty if I do not acknowledge my indebtedness to my parents. I cannot express in so many words the load of debt to my father. I used to sit at his feet to learn the A B C of Indian Logic and Philosophy. I remember with gratitude his ungrudgingly constant help to me whenever asked. My beloved late mother always protected me during the period of crisis by stretching the wings of her affection like a bird. I cannot but recall the great services rendered to me by late Professor Dr. P. N. Banerjea who kept an eye on me like a father and always encouraged me to complete my work. I shall never be able to repay their debts.

I express my gratefullness to my teachers who have kindled the spirit of research in me.

I also owe much to my late uncle Pandit Kumud Chandra Vidyabinoda due to whose constant encouragement this book took its final shape.

I also remember with a sense of gratitude the encouragement and help which I dereived from my maternal uncles Professor Batuk Nath Bhattacharyya, M.A., and Pandit Srijib Nyayatirtha, M.A.

I also give my thanks from the core of my heart to the printers and office assistants who have taken pains to publish the work within a very short time.

I am alone to blame for the mistakes which may creep into this book in spite of the vigilant eyes and eager assistance of my friends.

Janaki Ballabha Bhattacharyya.

INTRODUCTION

I shall offer an explanation at the outset why the problem of negation has been selected for discussion. It is one of those problems the solution of which gives a definite shape to a system of thought. H. Bergson says about the idea of the nought thus, 'And yet it is often the hidden spring, the invisible mover of philosophical thinking.' Hegel holds that negativity is the soul of the universe. We all experience that change signifies the coming into being and passing away of an object. The problem of change is a metaphysical problem *par excellence*. We are to explain why an object comes into being at all and passes away. With this problem, the problem of negation is connected. The Naiyāyikas hold that before the creation of an effect, an effect does not exist in its cause and that it is a new beginning. The doctrine of the new beginning of an effect presupposes pre-nonexistence of the effect in its cause. The pre-negation of an effect determines why a particular inherent cause produces a particular effect to the exclusion of others. It stands between the inherent cause and its effect. It seems like a hyphen which touches a particular word but without touching another word connects the second word with the first one. This pre-nonexistence is related to the inherent cause by one relation, to the effect by another relation. It is determined by the effect only i.e. its opposite. Though it is related to the effect yet it is opposed to it at the same time. The pre-nonexistence of an effect and the effect do not co-exist in the inherent cause at the same time. The appearance of an effect synchronises with the destruction of its pre-nonexistence. Thus the pre-nonexistence of an effect is not a relation, though it discharges the function of a connecting link. The gap between the pre-nonexistence of an effect and the appearance of an effect is infinitely small. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that the pre-nonexistence of effect is objectively real. They further hold that it is directly perceived. This preception is, of course, a determinate perception. They established the validity of such perception. According to their epistemological theory perception points to reality which is beyond the act of perception. The perceptual judgment that a jar will come into being points to the pre-nonexistence of an individual jar. Thus is also implied that it (the pre-nonexistence of a jar) is objectively real.

Similarly, when an object passes away it does not return to its inherent cause. It leaves a negative counterpart behind it. It is called the post-negation of an object. All objects of this universe do not pass away. Our experience only determines which objects pass away. The post-negation is also perceived by us. Our true experience of the post-negation is expressed in the form that the destruction of an object has now come into being. Thus an effect is prefixed by pre-nonexistence and suffixed by post-negation. Pre-nonexistence is beginningless and post-negation is endless. These two individual negations which precede and follow an effect suggest unfailingly the short duration of an effect to which they are related. The *atyanta-abhāva* of an object is the negation of an object in its relational character. An effect which inheres in its inherent cause does not inhere in some other cause. Therefore the absolute negation of an effect points to its spatial limitation. It is also objectively real. The perceptual judgment that a jar does not inhere in the ground points to its objective reality. The pre-nonexistence and the post-negation of an effect are not identical with the effect itself. They too are not identical with the inherent cause of the effect. The absolute negation of an effect is not identical with its own locus. In the above example of absolute negation, the negation of a jar is not identical with its inherent cause. An effect is perceived to be different from its inherent cause. The perception of difference is expressed in the form *A is not B.* This judgment is opposed to the judgment *A is B.* If the negative judgment is valid then it suggests that A and B are never identical. The implication of this categorical negative judgment is that the difference between these two terms is absolute. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that the difference is eternal. The difference of an effect from its cause is perceived by us directly. This difference of an effect is explained by its pre-negation, post-negation and its absolute negation. The evidence of the perception of difference of an effect from its cause is corroborated by the evidence of the acts of perception of other forms of its negation i.e., pre-nonexistence, post-negation and absolute negation. Let us take a concrete example to illustrate the above point. A jar is an effect. Clay-substance is its inherent cause. A jar is different from clay-substance. We have direct experience of this difference. This difference is not logical but real. The reality of it is also proved by the perceptions of the pre-nonexistence, the post-negation and the absolute negation of a jar as inhering in clay-substance. A jar is opposed to its pre-negation and post-negation. The clay-substance, the inherent cause of a jar, contains its pre-negation and post-negation. A jar inheres in the clay-substance. But the clay-substance does not inhere in itself. A jar does not inhere in the inherent cause of the clay-substance but inheres in the clay-substance. Thus it is clear that the difference of a jar from its inherent cause is explained by the three other forms of its negation. These four types of negation are an interconnected system of negation in the effect world. They all point to the important doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas that an effect is really different from its cause. Thus they explain change by means of their theory of negation. The name *asat* is synonymous with *abhāva* in Kaṇāda's *Sūtras.*

In the ontological sphere Kaṇāda holds that pre-negation and post-negation do not play an important part. Pre-negation and post-negation do not explain difference. Let us take an example. An earthly dyad consists of two earth atoms. These two atoms are different from each other. But both of them contain the pre-negation and the post-negation of the above dyad since it inheres in both of them. The absolute negation of the effect i.e. the dyad does not explain their difference. Kaṇāda has tried to explain everything ontological and phenomenal. Therefore, Kaṇāda has postulated the category of *Viśeṣa* (exclusive particularity) in order to explain the mutual exclusion of two atoms. The assumption of *viśeṣa* has conferred ontological status on the absolute negation. Each eternal substance has its own *viśeṣa* i.e. the exclusive particularity of each substance is its unique property. The group of the absolute negation of all *viśeṣas* other than a particular *viśeṣa* belongs to the container of the particular *viśeṣa* i.e. to a particular substance. The group of such absolute negations explain the difference of a particular substance i.e. the container of this group of negations from other realities. Therefore, absolute negation and mutual exclusion have ontological significance. In the ontological sphere negation plays the important part of negativing the all inclusive identity of a reality. Kaṇāda thus repudiates the theories of the bare unity of Being or of the Absolute (*brahman*). Kaṇāda's *asat* is not the void or empty space of the atomists of Greece though they split up the unity of Being of Parmenides by means of it as a second principle. They have split up the one undivided whole of Infinite Space full of being by means of empty spaces and have explained change and movements. Kaṇāda preserves the unity of being of the *sattādvaitins* and the unity of consciousness of the Absolutists but gives a new meaning to them and explains diversity, change, and movement. Kaṇāda draws a distinction between unity and infinity. He preserves the inflinity of Space, Time, Soul and Ether and defines their identity or unity in such a manner as makes room for real difference. But the Greek atomists accept the unity of the Infinite Space and divide the One into many units, i.e. atoms, by means of the void as a second principle. Kaṇāda's negation is reality and admits of division. The void of the Greek Philosophy is unreal and admits of no division. This theory of negation is an antidote to the theory of evolution of the Sāṃkhya system. The Sāṃkhyists hold that the effect exists in its cause from which it cannot be differentiated. Causality is a continuous process in which the effect becomes manifest and distinguished from its cause. Differentiation is preceded by undifferentiation. The undifferentiated state of an effect is called the potential form. The effect is not absolutely different from its cause. Their relation is identity in difference. The effect returns to its cause and becomes identical with it. The theory of evolution pre-supposes teleology. *Prakṛti* is unconscious. Therefore it must be admitted that the *Sāṃkhya* theory points to subconscious teleology. But such teleology involves contradiction. Unconscious Primordial Matter (*prakṛti*) cannot move towards an end since she is not conscious of it. The theory of negation, advanced by Kaṇāda, repudiates such a theory of causality.

The Buddhist doctrine of transitoriness holds that creation and destruction are identical. Destruction is not a form of negation super-added to a substance. It is identical with a point instant of reality. The concept of pre-negation is a pseudo-idea in the Buddhist system. The objectivity and distinction of post-negation, i.e. destruction, contribute to the rejection of the Buddhist theory of Instantaneous being.

The Jains repudiate the doctrine of the bare potentiality of the Sāṃkhyists. They have tried to improve upon the Sāṃkhya theory of evolution. It is a synthesis of the Sāṃkhya and the Buddhist theories of causality. The substance, the real cause, is the principle of continuity. The surface of it is represented by an infinite series of transitory modes. In this series each mode is followed by another. Each mode is an actuality. The immediate antecedent mode is called pre-negation of its immediate succeeding mode.

Its successor is called the destruction of its immediate predecessor. The second mode is the effect of the first one and is also the pre-negation of the third mode. Thus the Jains mean to say that in the infinite series of modes each mode is both actual and potential. It is potential with regard to its immediate successor but is actual with regard to its immediate predecessor. Each mode is pre-negation, post-negation and existent. They also hold that in a series all the modes preceding a particular mode constitute the pre-negation of that particular mode. This is their theory of negation from the standpoint of modes. From the standpoint of substance and mode the pre-negation of a mode is represented by the substance as qualified by the modes preceding it. The essence of this theory is that change is real, the continuity of a principle behind change is also real and change is distinct from it as well as identical with the principle of continuity behind the series of changes. According to them negation is positive reality. The terms pre-negation and destruction are only relative. The doctrine of pre-negation and destruction from the standpoint of modes is the critical representation of the Buddhist doctrine of flux, since it explains potentiality and actuality. The idea of teleology implicit in the Buddhist system has become explicit in the Jain System. The doctrine of interdependent causality and plurality of causes leads on to determinism which comes into conflict with their theory of final liberty. The rigid law of causality gives some concessions unwittingly to the freedom of will. It gives the series of consciousness a direction. It moves towards the ideal of final emancipation. A series of changes cannot explain itself. In a series, a point-instant is followed by another. There must be some gap of time, however small, between them. This empty time which divides two point-instants must be a reality since it is efficient. It must be produced by another point-instant and so on *ad infinitum*. The gap — the empty time-instant — requires an infinite series of empty time-instants since the gap itself is not contiguous with two point-instants ; the second gap is also such and so on *ad infinitum*. These empty time-instants should have gradually shorter durations. If such a series intervenes between a cause and an effect then they are not causally connected. If it does not intervene between them then they are contiguous. Therefore a series of changes cannot explain causality. The Jains borrow the principle of continuity of the early thinkers, They synthesize the dynamic world of the Buddhists with the static unity of the Hindus. It is also an improvement upon the Sāṃkhya theory of Evolution. The idea of the bare potential has been replaced by the idea of the potential-actual. But this theory does not take notice of not-being as distinct from positive being. If not-being is proved to be a distinct term then it must be admitted that the Jain view does not represent the true synthesis.

The Prābhākaras hold that an effect is different from its cause. They hold that negation is identical with its locus. The pre-negation and the post-negation of an effect are identical with the inherent cause of it. If negation is proved to be distinct from its locus then the Prābhākara view is surely wrong. There is divergence of opinions regarding the nature of negation among the different sections of the Prābhākara school. A section of them agrees with the Vaiśeṣikas on the point that pre-negation and post-negation are objectively real.

Kumārila holds that an effect is distinct from its cause but is not absolutely different from it. The relation of identity-in-difference (*tādātmya*) holds between them. He admits that the four different types of negation are objectively real. The Vaiśeṣikas refute the theory of Kumārila on the ground that the relation of identity-in-difference is not based upon sound experience.

The Advaitins of the Śaṃkara school hold that change is only an appearance. They have denied reality to all changes. They hold that some changes enjoy empirical reality. They are independent of our thinking process. But others are mental facts. They are determined by our thinking process. They are not identical with our thinking processes. These changes are identical with the beginningless continuous process of *māyā*. *Māyā* is beginningless cosmic process but is terminable. It is related to the unity of Consciousness-Existence-and-Bliss i.e. to the Absolute by means of an indefinable relation. *Māyā* consists of two elements viz. (i) *āvaraṇaśakti*—an energy which resists the illumination of the identity of the Absolute and (ii) *vikṣepaśakti*—an energy which imposes limitation upon the Absolute and makes It appear as many. Thus the locus of all appearances is the Absolute. *Māyā* is their material cause i. e. the very stuff of these appearances. The different phases of the same *āvaraṇaśakti* represent the four types of negation. This theory of negation has been put forward by Nārāyaṇa Sarasvatī. This view seems to us to be the most original theory of negation of this school. Other theories of negation are also met with. But most of these are simply based upon negative criticism of the rival theories of negation. Citsukha borrows the theory of negation of the Prābhākaras. His view stands and falls with the Prābhākara view. Madhusūdana holds that negation is a transformation of *māyā* but is a mental fact. Dharmarājadhvarīndra and Mahādeva Sarasvatī hold that the four types of negation of the Vaiśeṣikas have only empirical existence. They are independent of our thinking process. But reality has been denied to them. According to this last theory, pre-negation is not to be connected with the theory of causation of this school. The post-negation of an effect represents a terminable series of post-negations of an effect. But such a theory of post-negation violates the law of logical economy. According to the theory of negation of Nārāyaṇa Sarasvatī negation is an element of the cosmic process. But all these theories may be resolved into one of the two ideal types of negation viz. that (i) negation has a distinct ontological status of its own and (ii) negation is identical with its locus. The ultimate negation of the cosmic process and its transformations is neither an element nor a transformation of the cosmic process. The negation of negation is not identical with negation. It is either identical with the Absolute or distinct from It. In the *Iṣṭasiddhi* it has been asserted that the ultimate negation is the most approximate image of the Absolute. This image is identical with the Absolute. This view, if logically followed, is consistent with the Prābhākara theory of negation. Some pre-Maṇḍana Advaitins hold that negation is distinct from the Absolute. This view has been revived by Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa in his *Advaita-*

cintāmaṇi. According to them, Advaitism means the unity of all positive beings (*bhāvādvaita*). The concluding period of the Advaita thought recognises negation as a distinct type of reality.

These *Bhāvādvaitins* mean to say that the central experience is not only positive but also negative. The negative mystic experience is expressed in the form that the diverse objects do not exist on the Absolute. It cannot be reduced to the positive mystic experience that all is One. The truth of this ultimate negative experience is unimpeachable. It cannot contradict itself. It points to an ultimate negation of the whole universe full of diversity. It cannot but be real. Therefore this ultimate negation is co-eternal with the Absolute.

The other two types of negation, viz. mutual exclusion and absolute negation, which are eternal accorning to the Vaiśeṣikas, will not be discussed in the introduction. We shall only mention the different types of theories of negation. The different theories of negation are as follows :—

(1) Unreality is negation. (2) Negation is real but distinct from the positive reals. (3) Negation is real. It admits of two types (i) Negation is distinct from positive reals and (ii) Negation is identical with the positive reals. The first type admits of two types. (a) Negation is determined by real objects and (b) Negation is determined by unreal objects. (4) Negation is real but identical with positive reals. (5) Negation is merely subjective. (a) Negation is an idea which points to reality. (b) Negation is a floating idea. (6) Negation is neither real or unreal. (a) Negation is a mental fact. (b) Negation is an empirical object. (c) Negation is an element of cosmic process. (d) Negation is identical with the Absolute. The explanation of unreality has been offered by different theories. The early philosophers take no notice of unreality. They think that unreality is unknown and unknowable. They take reality as the exclusive subject matter of their systems. They do not explain how the idea of unreality crops up in one's mind. An element of Agnosticism is contained in every system of thought of the first period.

In the second period unreality does not transcend the human mind. The human mind takes notice of it. It becomes a floating idea which anchors at no meaning. It is a product of our imagination.

In the third period it becomes a mental fact. It is produced by our subjective process but is not identical with the process itself. It lies beyond the act of awareness. When it is sublated it becomes identical with the locus of it. The Absolute is the only locus of all objects. Therefore unreality is identical with the Absolute.

In the latest phase, it has become a distinct type of reality. Sondoḍa is the propounder of such a theory. It does not inhabit a separate universe of discourse but pervades the whole universe. It is a *kevalānvayī abhāva.* It is directly experienced. The negation of an imaginary object has been termed by the realists as the negation of an object having incordinate features (*vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinna abhāva*). Such a doctrine represents a type of ultra realism. When realism settles down it takes a sane view of reality. Mathurānātha explains unreality in terms of reality. According to him, unreality is not objectively real. It is an object of illusory experience. It is a case of wrong reference. We connect subjectively one reality with another reality and interpret this relation to be their actual relation. A predicate is wrongly ascribed to a subject and is taken as its true predicate. The awareness of unreality is always a judgment. The terms which constitute this judgment point to real objects. The subjective relation does not correspond to the actual relation which holds between these two terms. Let us take an example. A hare-horn does not belong to a cow. This judgement refers to a negation which is determined by the horn and by the property of belonging to a hare. The horn and the property belonging to a hare do not co-exist in a hare. They are incoordinate features of negation. The terms of this judgement are all real. But their connection is merely subjective.

The last phase of Indian Philosophy records its protest against the bare identity of the Absolute of the Śaṃkara School. The ultimate conclusion of this school is that the Absolute is the negation of the empirical world. The empirical counterpart of this metaphysical doctrine that the Absolute is the negation of the universe is the Prābhākara theory of negation. It points to unity-in-difference, but not to the bare identity of the Absolute. The different Vaiṣṇava schools of thought, the Śaiva school of thought, the Śākta school of thought and Vijñānabhikṣu have preached the doctrine of Īśvara which does not exclude difference. But they do not underestimate the value of our thinking process. The revival of epistemology takes place. The doctrine of the centrality of mystic experience that all is one has been given up in this period. The followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools of this period, the Navya Naiyāyikas, revive the common sense theory of knowledge and establish its validity. Reality is knowable according to them.

The last phase of Indian thought lays stress upon logical and epistemological issues. They do not neglect metaphysical problems but only correct their traditional views and defend the broad ones against the criticisms of the rival schools. At present our only concern is the problem of negation. They discuss all aspects of this problem. They hold that negation is a distinct type of reality. It is not identical with the positive reals since it is determined by a co-relative term. They also solve the problem of relation holding between negation and its locus and between itself and the negatum. They prove that this relation is not that of identity-in-difference or that this relation is not constituted by one of them or by both of them (*svarūpa-sambandha*). Negation is directly perceived, according to them. But it is an object of transcendental perception. In logic they hold that a negative judgment can never be reduced to a positive judgment. In metaphysics they hold that the universe is governed by the law of contradiction. This law is not known *a priori* but *a posteriori*. The ultimate conclusion of this school is pluralism. But it is not a radical pluralism of the Buddhist type. The centre of their pluralistic universe is occupied by the *summum genus*,—being,—which is connected with all the elements of this universe. Their pluralism represents an interconnected system of ultimate realities.

The neo-logicians have discarded the hypothesis of the earlier Vaiśeṣikas. They hold that God occupies the central position of the universe. This new thesis constitutes a land-mark in the history of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

PART I

HISTORICAL

1. Asat.

In Indian Philosophy we come across such words as *asat*, *alīka*, *tuccha*, *nirupākhya*, and *niḥsvabhāvaḥ*. They are all synonymous words. Are they mere words ? Is the idea corresponding to these words a self-destructive idea, a pseudo-idea ? The majority of Indian Philosophers hold that it is unknowable (*asataḥ bhānānabhyupagamaḥ*). It transcends our knowledge. No predicate, no character can be ascribed to it. It is absolutely featureless. The denial of character or predicates does not disprove it. It may not be known in terms of reality, But this denial is not pointless. It suggests that unreality. is one of the ultimate elements of the universe. It is opposed to reality in every respect. It may be reduced to its extremest poverty but cannot be got rid of.

An unreal object, these philosophers suppose, plays a wholly negative part in our thought. In spite of the very recognition of our limits we refer beyond them to this unreality under the cover of a new garb. The Mādhvas hold that *asat* is cognised by us as an object to be negated. It is not cognised as an unreal object but as one to which reality is ascribed (*tacca śaśaviṣāṇādeḥ sattvavaiśiṣṭyena āropitasattāvaiśiṣṭyena eva anubhavasiddham*) (*Sudhā* on the *Asadadhikaraṇa*). Meinong subscribes to a similar view. "Object in this generalised sense includes not only that which exists, like a physical thing, and that which merely "subsists" (Bestchen), such as qualities, numbers, or propositions ; but even that which, like the "round square" can neither exist nor subsist, although it can be referred to and thought about". (*Philosophy of the Recent Past pp. 206-7*). In the *Tattvaviveka* commentary of the Mādhva school the same view has been endorsed. An unreal object is also an object of valid cognition (*sammatam eva ṭīkākārāṇām api asato'pi prameyatvam*). They give a convincing example that the son of a barren lady is not an orator. In the first period of Indian Philosophy the problem of *asat* was not solved. All the ancient philosophers hold that it is transcendental to our consciousness. If unreality denotes what is featureless and devoid of causality then it cannot be cognised. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī has subjected the view of the Madhvas to a severe criticism. According to the Vedānta Epistemology an object of perception is represented by the mode of our intellect. Unreality, if it is cognised at all, should be an object of direct awareness. How can it be represented at all ? A real mode cannot be translated into an unreal X. It cannot also be indirectly known since it is difficult to find out a connecting link which is the invariable mark of unreality. He concludes that unreality lies outside the range of our consciousness (*Advaitasiddhi*).

The Buddhists hold that words such as the horn of a hare, crow's teeth, the fur of a tortoise etc. point to certain concepts. These concepts are not constructed out of sensuous materials by our imagination. They are purely imaginary. These ideas refer to no meaning. They are floating ideas. The *vikalpa* of the *Yogasūtra* is similar to a floating idea.

The Naiyāyikas contest this hypothesis of the Buddhists. Udayana points out that an objectless cognition is never experienced. Hallucination is impossible. It is nothing but an illusory experience. According to him the experience of the hare-horn is always perceptual. But it is invariably illusory. It is due to an assemblage of defects. The collocation of conditions including defects conditions illusory experience. The invariable object of such an illusory experience is what is denoted by the words e.g. the horn of a hare etc. Udayana means to say that unreality is not a type by itself. It is not also transcendental to consciousness. The so-called unreality is constituted by reality. The consciousness which corresponds to unreality is a judgment. The terms of this judgment are real. The relation which holds between the subject and the predicate of the judgment is merely subjective. It does not correspond to the actual relation. Thus we see that the problem of unreality has been solved by the Naiyāyikas (*Kusumāñjali* 3/3).

2. *The Concept of Abhāva in the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya Literature*

In the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* of Kaṇāda *asat* is synonymous with *abhāva*. It is one of the seven categories of his system. It is a mode of reality. Kaṇāda does not define *asat*. He classifies it under four different types. In his *sūtra* (9. 1. 6) the definition of *asat* has been suggested as that which is opposed to its corresponding positive being. *Asat* may be defined as that which is opposed to positive being. Śrīdhara in his *Nyāyakandalī* has developed this point. He holds that *abhāva* is *avastu*. The term *avastu* does not signify unreality. It is what is excluded from the positive reals. The exclusion from the positive reals constitutes the essence of *abhāva*. Thus it has only relative being. It depends upon its opposite for its determinate nature. Vācaspati Miśra in his *Nyāyakaṇikā* commentary holds the same view. Negation is experienced as other than positive reals and lacks a definite character of its own (*sadvyāvṛttirūpasya tasya pratīyamānatvāt svato avāntaraviśeṣānupalabdheḥ—Nyāyakaṇikā* p. 72). The philosophers mean to say that negation has no absolute existence but is determined by being. Being is its correlate and its opposite at the same time. It cannot be held to be absolutely featureless since it is determined by being. It is neither *alīka* nor *tuccha*. It has neither existence nor is existence in itself (*svarūpa sattā*). It must be admitted to be consistent that it has relative being. Like the Advaitins the Vaiśeṣikas hold that negation is neither reality nor unreality. Unlike them they assert that it is definable. It is not an indefinable object (*anirvācya*). The younger Vācaspati Miśra has made the point clear how negation is opposed to positive reals. He holds that a positive object is presented to consciousness in the form that it exists whereas negation is presented to consciousness that it does not exist. The import of the affirmative proposition that it exists is that it has existence. The import of the corresponding negative proposition is that it does not possess existence. In other words, the predicate 'existence' is denied to the subject by means of this proposition (*sattāsambandhabhānavirodhiprakāravattā abhāvānām—Khaṇḍanoddhāra* p. 133). Thus, the contradiction of existence is predicated of negation. A definition of negation is thus suggested. Vardhamāna Upādhyāya and Śaśadhara Ācāryya define it accordingly. The former holds that negation is such as contains the absolute negation of the group of the six positive categories of the Vaiśeṣika system. He avoids the circularity of this definition with the remark that the awareness of negation does not involve a reference to positivity i.e. the abstract common character of all positive reals. He points out that the cognition of the individual negation (absolute) of the group of six categories does not contain a reference to negativity, the common form of all individual negations. He is indebted to a section of logicians for this definition. (*dravyatvādiṣaṭkātyantābhāvavattvasya bhāvatvajñānaṃ vināpi nirūpaṇāt atyantābhāvavyaktiśca abhāvatvajñāne api avagataiva iti sampradāyavidaḥ. Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa* p. 216). The latter defines *bhāvatva* (positivity) independently of negativity. Thus he defines negation as the absolute negation of positivity (*sattāsambandhitvaṃ bhāvatvam/tadatyantābhāvatvam abhāvatvam eṣā dik—Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* p. 601). Viśvanātha Pañcānana in his Nyāyasiddhānta Muktāvalī defiines negativity as the property of one which contains the mutual exclusion of the six categories such as substance etc. Of these three philosophers Vardhamāna Upādhyāya cautions about the exactness of his definition. He anticipates the defects from which it may suffer. He holds that the individual negation is grasped by a person who is ignorant of negativity or positivity. He tries to avoid the problem that the concept of negativity is a glaring instance of circular reasoning. He foresees the problem but fails to solve it. Dinakara Bhaṭṭa posits that the concept of of negativity as involving a reference to an individual negation is an instance of circular reasoning. The awareness of an individual negation contains a reference to negativity but if the consciousness of negativity involves a reference to that individual negation then it must be admitted that they imply each other for their consciousness. In other words, it is a glaring instance of circular reasoning. (*Dinakarī* p. 86). Dinakara Bhaṭṭa has subjected the last definition to a severe criticism. We shall not discuss all the points of his criticism. Rāmarudra Bhaṭṭa holds that all objections, raised by the critics, may be met but there is an insurmountable objection to the first and the last definitions—that negation is even cognised by a person who is ignorant of six categories viz. substance, attribute etc. (*dravyādīnāṃ ṣaṇṇāṃ padārthānām ajñānépi abhāvatvapratītesca tadupekṣitam —Rāmarudrī* p. 86). The second definition is also wrong since the negation of a jar is not cognised as the negation of an object having pure existence.

Let us now understand critically the nature of negation as opposed to an existent object i.e. a positive object. The relation of opposition holds between negation and an existent object (*sadvastu*). Negation is determined by being. Thus it is related to being. But it excludes being. It has relation to being in the sense that it is determined by being. Being in the Vaiśeṣika literature is synonymous with positivity. Being and existence are not synonymous with the reality of other systems. Reality in the Vaiśeṣika system consists of being and not-being. The Bhāṭṭas subscribe to the same view. But they hold that the relation of unity-in-difference holds between being and not-being. Not-being is not unreality though it is non-existence.

Citsukha subjects this view to a severe criticism. If the Vaiśeṣikas define negation as other than positive being then this definition is too wide since a positive being is also other than another positive being. They may hold that negation is not the locus of positivity. But such a definition is an instance of *petitio principii* since the definition involves a reference to the negation of locus. They may hold that not-being is opposed to being. But this definition is too wide since a positive being is also other than another positive being. If it is held that an individual negation is opposed to all positive beings then this definition becomes impossible since if the negation of a jar is opposed to all positive beings then this individual negation will amount to the negation of all objects of the universe. Let us find out the meaning of the relation of opposition. Does it mean the dynamical opposition that not-being drives away the positive being from its locus ? Such a relation of opposition also holds between positive objects. Does it mean that negation does not co-exist with a positive being in the same locus at the same time ? If this be the meaning then the definition of negation based on such a relation is too wide since this relation of opposition also holds between two positive objects. If this relation signifies the non-identity of a positive being then this definition is too wide since a positive being is not identical with another positive object. If a not-being is defined to be devoid of the characteristics of all positive beings then it is a case of begging the question since not-being is defined in terms of not-being. If not-being is reality then a great gulf cannot be fixed between being and not-being. This criticism of Citsukha prepares the ground for the view that negation is identical with its locus. He intends to mean that negation is another name for positive reality. Thus we see that a cleavage between positivity and negativity cannot be consistently maintained.

The criticism, offered by the rival schools, is not so damaging as is offered by the followers of this school. The definition offered by Viśvanātha Pañcānana is the best of the Vaiśeṣika school. According to him negation is other than the group of six categories. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī points out defects in this definition. He holds that the category of substance contains such difference and that this definition is consequently too wide. Rāmarudra meets this objection thus : The differences of the group of six categories belong to negation by the relation of *paryāpti* like the number 'two'. The number 'two' belongs to two units. Each unit has the number 'one' as well as the number 'two'. But it is not held that one unit has the number 'two'. Similarly, the differences of the six categories belong only to negation by means of the relation of *paryāpti*. He means to say that the differences of six categories collectively belong to negation but do not belong to any one of the six categories. Difference is not cognised as an individual of the class of negation. It is characterized by the universal of differenceness. It is an universal which does not inhere in its particulars but unifies them. It is an *akhaṇḍa-upādhi*. They mean to say that it is neither an abstraction nor a mental construction but a fact which is directly experienced. Therefore, the Vaiśeṣikas do not beg the question to define negation. They do not define negation in terms of negation. Thus we see that the criticisms offered by Citsukha, Madhusūdana and others are superficial. But the real criticism comes from the hands of the philosophers of this school. This definition does not obey the law of logical economy. Moreover, this definition is not based upon sound experience since a person who is ignorant of the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika system experiences negation. In spite of these defects the definition of negation framed by Viśvanātha is superior to those of Vardhamāna and Śaśadhara since an individual absolute negation involves necessarily a reference to negation. It is cognised as an individual of the class of negativity. Therefore, they define negation only in terms of negation. In other words, they beg the question to define negation. But an important point is to be noted that this criticism presupposes the experience of negation. The category of negation is not repudiated by it.

In the Nyāya school of thought the Naiyāyikas have tried to prove negation as a distinct category by a different path. According to them the analysis of our experience reveals it directly. We are indebted to Vātsyāyana for this new approach. He holds that negative consciousness points to it directly. Negative consciousness is true. It is a piece of uncontradicted experience. The object referred to by it is objectively real. Negation is thus a mode of reality. The positive reals are objects of positive consciousness whereas negation is the object of negative consciousness only. Difference in the nature of consciousness explains difference in the nature of reality (*asaccāsaditi gṛhyamāṇaṃ yathābhūtam aviparītaṃ tattvaṃ bhavati—Bhāṣya* 1-1.). The ontological problem gets the epistemological foundation at the hands of Vātsyāyana.

Vātsyāyana does not discuss whether there is a real difference between positive and negative awarenesses. Is this difference real or formal ? Uddyotakara takes the problem seriously and solves it. He holds that a negative judgment denies whereas a positive judgment asserts. Moreover, a negative judgment presupposes affirmation whereas an affirmative judgment does not presuppose negation. Therefore they are not co-ordinate. Negation has no absolute reality. It depends upon positive reals for its own existence. It negates but does not assert something. The positive judgment 'The Earth has scent' asserts scent of the subject 'the Earth'. The negative judgment 'Water has no scent' contains a bare denial of scent. Scent is denied to water. The negation of scent has no meaning if it is not determined by scent. It has only conditional existence. (*asattu paratantraṃ pratiṣedhamukhena pratipadyate pradīpavat*—N. V. p. 10). He holds that negative awareness is direct. The object of it is an extramental object.

We have not yet got a definition of negation from the epistemological stand-point. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa supplies us with a defiinition of negation from this stand-point. He defines negation to be an object of negative awareness (*nāstītijñānagamyatvam*). He also holds that negation is not devoid of all causalefficiency but is capable of producing consciousness (*abhāvaḥ api jñānajananasamartha iṣyate*). Jayanta holds that negation and its negatum do not exist in the same locus at the same time. The opposition between negation and its corresponding positive object contrasted means non-coexistence in the same locus. Vācaspati Miśra introduces the Buddhist conception of contradiction into the Nyāya System. This type of opposition is called *paraspara-parihāra* (mutual negation). A negates not-A. Not-A negates A. The conception of double negation is based upon it. Accordingly A is not not-A. A=not-not-A. A is both negative and positive. The law of contradiction and the law of excluded middle have been elaborately discussed in the *Kusumāñjali* of Udayana. Thus the distinction between negation and positive being breaks down. Therefore it is very difficult to maintain the gulf fixed between positive being and negation by the Vaiśeṣikas. Udayana has tried his level best to preserve this distinction. But the Prābhākaras have raised serious problems against the conclusion of Udayana. They hold that negative awareness is not the sure index of negation which is objectively real. The negative judgment that A is not not-A does not point to a negative fact. It refers to A—a positive fact.

Citsukha and Ānandajñāna criticise the definition of negation, framed by Jayanta. This definition has two forms positive and negative. Negation is the object of negative awareness. Negatively it may be defined as that which is not the object of positive consciousness. These two definitions like the two sides of a shield point to the same object. These definitions are not exact. The first one is too wide. Negation is not the sole object of negative awareness. A negative judgment consists of positive terms as well. Positive objects are also referred to by a negative judgment. The negative judgment that a jar does not exist on the ground refers to a jar and the ground. They are admitted by all to be positive objects. The negative definition is too narrow. The positive judgment that the negation of a jar belongs to the ground points to the negation of a jar. Therefore, it is not a truism that the negation of an object is not referred to by a positive judgment i.e. positive awareness. We have also shown before that negative awareness points to a positive fact.

Śivāditya Miśra pays his attention to the second feature of negation that it depends upon the object contrasted and is determined by it. He defines it thus :— Negation is what depends upon the awareness of the object contrasted by it for its determination (*pratiyogijñānādhīnajñānaḥ abhāvaḥ—Saptapadārthī* p. 40). Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya accepts the same definition in his *Abhāva-vāda*. The dependent being of negation is replaced by the dependent nature of consciousness of negation. According to the Vaiśeṣikas it is difficult to maintain the ontological status of negation. If it depends upon positive being for its very existence then it becomes only an article of faith to believe in their assertion that it has metaphysical existence. Śivāditya has done a great service to the realists of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools of thought by sifting the dependent nature of negation from the side of existence to the side of consciousness.

This definition has been criticised by Citsukha and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Citsukha holds that this definition is too wide. The positive concepts such as long, short, etc., are not also independently known. They depend upon their correlative terms for their determination. An object is short or long with reference to another object. If it is compared and contrasted with another object then only it is known to be short or long. Thus the awareness of all positive objects is not necessarily independent. Gaṅgeśa meets this objection of Citsukha. He points out that an object which is short or long with reference to another object is directly grasped by us. He means to say that the awareness of the object itself is direct and independent of the consciousness of other objects but its size has certain features which are not independently known. These are conventional features. Negation always depends upon its negatum for its awareness. This dependent nature of negative consciousness constitutes its differentia. He suggests that negative awareness is essentially dependent. Madhusūdana dives deep into the matter. He examines the definition of a *pratiyogin* (negatum). Udayana defines it to be the negation of itself (*svabhāvavirahātmatva*). This definition of negatum has been accepted by his successors since it has not been refuted. Madhusūdana points out that this definition is a glaring instance of *petitio principii* since negation has been defined in terms of negatum and a negatum has been defined in terms of negation, since negation has been defined in terms of negation. If the definition of *pratiyogitā* (the abstract character of negatum) as given by Udayana be accepted then there is no escape out of the fallacy pointed out by Madhusūdana. The later logicians have given a new meaning to *pratiyogitā*. According to them *pratiyogitā* is a universal. It admits of no analysis. It is an ultimate fact experienced by us directly. Udayana enters into a wrong path—the path chalked out by the Buddhists. It is well connected with the subjective view of negation. Udayana thinks that this road also leads to the realistic view of negation. The later logicians realise the mistake of Udayana and depend upon their own experience for the solution of this problem. They also try to establish that this experience is not the exclusive property of their mind but is universal. The modern Prābhākaras and others accept *pratiyogitā* as an ultimate fact. They all hold that it is an *akhaṇḍa upādhi* (an unanalysable common form). They mean to say that it is a universal but not a mental construction.

An answer may be given to the critics of the definition of negation. But this represents only the formal aspect of the problem. The real problem beneath this definition is whether negation is a distinct mode of reality. Vācaspati and Udayana have invited this problem since they hold that the negation of the negation of a positive object is the positive theory object itself. This is the blind imitation of the Buddhist contradictory negation. The theory of double negation really digs its own grave. *A is both positive and negative.* Is it identical with negation ? Two answers to this question are possible. The Prābhākaras give the first answer that negation is identical with positive being. In other words, positive being is the only reality. The second answer has been given by a section of the Naiyāyikas. They hold that negation is the all inclusive reality. It leads to the monism of negation. According to them negativity is the *summum genus*. They hold that *A is not-not-A*. Similarly, every positive object is the negation of its negation. The theory of double negation pre-supposes the reality of negation. The negation of an object cannot, therefore, be reduced to a positive object. The negation of its negation is a positive object. But it is negative at the same time. Therefore a positive object may be equated with the negation of its negation. The first and second negations are identical with the negation of an object and the object itself. Thus the whole universe may be rendered into a series of negations. These negations have a common form since they all are called negation. This common form is negativity (*abhāvatva*). This is a universal. It subsumes all particulars (individual negations) under it. According to them, negativity is the *summum genus*. Thus they formulate a different type of monism. They bridge the gulf fixed between being and not-being by the Vaiśeṣikas.

This is a reactionary view. The law of contradiction and the law of excluded middle as understood by Udayana lead to the law of double negation according to which a positive object is identical with the negation of its negation. The epistemological conclusion of it is that negation is not the sole object of negative awareness. The negation of the negation of a positive object is an object of negative awareness. But it is virtually a positive object. Therefore, the argument of the Naiyāyikas for the distinct character of negation on the basis of negative awareness becomes inconclusive. The Prābhākaras take advantage of this weak situation and hold that positive being is the sole reality. These logicians point out the fallacy of the Prābhākara argument. If the Prābhākaras admit the validity of the principle of double negation then they are in a position to criticise the Naiyāyikas. The acceptance of this principle implies the admission of negation. If negation is admitted as a mode of reality then negation becomes the absolute reality since a positive entity is reducible to a negative one. If we accept the laws of contradiction and excluded middle then the logical conclusion of them is the monism of negation.

The Naiyāyikas should think twice before accepting the hypothesis of the monism of negativity. The law of contradiction and that of excluded middle should be scrutinised thoroughly. The Naiyāyikas build this metaphysics upon the conclusion of their epistemology. They rely upon their experience. They stick to the view that the difference in the nature of consciousness is invariably explained by the difference in the nature of its object. This fundamental assumption leads to the hypothesis of a real negative fact. The experience of *A* is not the same as the experience of *not-not-A*. The awareness of *A* is immediate and independent of some other experience. The directness of this experience constitutes its differentia. The awareness of *not-not-A* is indirect. It presupposes the experience of *not-A* as its invariable condition. The difference in the nature of these two experiences should prove the difference in the nature of their objects. Therefore, *A* cannot be identical with *not-not-A*. Thus owing to the pressure of the fundamental assumption of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas the law of contradiction in the sense of the mutual negation of *A* and *not-A* and the law of excluded middle, its corollary, breaks down. The introduction of the Buddhist laws of thought into the world of reality is untenable. Gaṅgeśa has grasped the true implication of the fundamental assumption of Nyāya empricism but has failed to give effect to it. He has failed to solve the problem: "If two objects occupy the same space then they should be numerically identical" (*samaniya* *tānām aikātmyam*). If a generalisation comes into conflict with the fundamental assumption i. e. the higher generalisation then some restriction should be imposed upon the scope of the first one. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi holds that the experience of *not-not-A* is a piece of uncontradicted experience. It points to a negative fact. Therefore, this negative fact cannot be equivalent to a positive fact, viz., *A*. *Not-not-A* is a negative fact. It is spatially identical with *A*. But it is not existentially identical with *A*. *A* and *not-not-A* are not numerically identical. In logic, a negative judgment cannot be reduced to a positive one by some device. This hypothesis of Raghunātha follows from the highest generalisation of Nyāya-epistemology. This generalisation constitutes the foundation of this metaphysics. This hypothesis cannot be repudiated by generalisations of limited scope. If this hypothesis is accepted then the law of contradiction of Vācaspati and Udayana falls to the ground. Moreover, this law of contradiction has a very limited scope in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. This law does not hold good between an effect and its pre-negation, between an effect and its post-negation and between an object and its mutual exclusion. Mathurānātha has pointed out that even if this law is accepted then it holds good only between an object and its absolute negation. In the world of ultimate realities it is impossible to prove the numerical identity between an object and the negation of its negation. The sky and not-not-sky, space and not-not-space, an atom and not-not-atom etc. cannot be proved to be identical on the ground that they occupy the same space. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, the ultimate substances do not occupy space (*avṛttipadārtha*). The law of contradiction cannot be empirically proved. The proposition *A is not-not-A* is another name for the proposition *A is not-not-A*. The argument that *A is not-not-A* because *not-A is not-A* is a glaring instance of *petitio principii*. There is no logical deduction. It is simply the re-statement of the same thing. The laws of contradiction and of excluded middle have been misplaced in the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. The law of contradiction in the sense of mutual negation is a misleading metaphysical law. Therefore negativity is not the *summum genus*. The doctrine of monism of negation, being based upon a pseudo-law of contradiction is not tenable. Moreover, a negative proposition cannot be reduced to a positive proposition since *A* and *not-not A* are two distinct facts. Therefore, the criticism of the Prābhākaras is wide of the mark. Negation cannot be reduced to affirmation. Reality does not consist of positive being alone.

Raghunātha popularises the view that the universal of negativity is directly experienced by us. It is a universal. It is neither an abstraction nor a mental construction. It is an ultimate fact. It is a datum of our experience. All individual negations are unified by it. It does not inhere in its particulars. He calls it an *akhaṇḍa-upādhi*. He means to say that this universal lives in and through its particulars. It has no separate existence. Unlike the *jāti-s* of the Vaiśeṣikas it does not live apart from its particulars. It has got a concrete existence of its own. But it can be differentiated from the particulars. This type of universals is very akin to the universals of Aristotle's system. The inseparable relation between an *upādhi* and its particulars is not one-sided like the relation of inherence. An *upādhi* is inseparably connected with its particular in the same manner as a particular is indissolubly connected with *upādhi*. Thus an *upādhi* is distinct from a *jāti*. A *jāti* can exist apart from its particular. At the time of dissolution the effect-world is destroyed. All the born individuals such as cows, horses, lions etc., die but cowness, horseness, lionness etc., survive their individuals. *Upādhis*, on the other hand, cannot exist apart from their particulars.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī has subjected the new hypothesis that negativity is an *upādhi* to a severe criticism. If an *upādhi* is to be admitted then it should be a new category. It cannot be included in one of the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣikas. They may hold that it is a type of generality. But this answer is not tenable. An *upādhi* is distinct from a *jāti*. If an *upādhi* is accepted as a mode of reality then the hypothesis of a *jāti* becomes superfluous since the function of unifying particulars, i.e. imposing the same form upon the individuals, may be discharged by one of them equally. Raghunātha, or the framer of the hypothesis of an *upādhi*, to be a consistent follower of the Vaiśeṣika school should give up the hypothesis of an *upādhi*, otherwise the abandonment of the hypothesis of a *jāti* becomes inevitable (*jātyapalāpāpatteḥ*). A follower of the Vaiśeṣika school may contend that a *jati* inheres in its particulars but an *upādhi* does not. The Advaitins have refuted this defence. But this issue should not be at present dragged to its final conclusion since it is a separate problem. But it is an undeniable fact that negativity is experienced by us and that it imposes its form upon all individual negations and unifies them.

Let us now find out the true nature of negation in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism. Negation cannot be held to be other than positive being. Its conditional existence goes against its ontological status. A dependent object cannot be an ultimate reality. The Vaiśeṣikas have selected a wrong path to solve the problem of negation. Vātsyāyana is the pioneer of the new path. He holds that the negative awareness is relational. It is a judgment. It presupposes previous affirmation. The implication of the theory of Vātsyāyana has been worked out by Uddyotakara. Jayanta establishes the reality of negation, having developed the ideas of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara. Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana introduce the Buddhist law of logical contradiction into the realm of ontology. Udayana is influenced by the criticism of the Prābhākaras and endorses the conclusion of his critics to some extent. The Vaiśeṣikas have had to pay their penalty for this weakness of their great teachers. Śaṃkara Miśra, Vācaspati Miśra the junior, Viśvanātha Pañcānana and others teach an eclectic view of negation. According to them *saṃsargābhāva* is a distinct mode of reality but mutual exclusion may not be a distinct mode of reality. Difference is in the nature of each object. The attributive view of difference has not been abandoned but has been half-heartedly maintained. The later works display a chaos and disorder of views. They have engaged themselves in the negative work, viz, the refutation of Advaitism. They are prepared to sacrifice their traditional view, if the greater mission of philosophy viz., the defence of pluralism is fulfilled. But they do not realise the fact that such an admission weakens the evidence of negative awareness — the only authority on negation. The Prābhākaras take advantage of Udayana's weakness and prove that negation is a positive entity. The successors of Udayana observe an expiatory rite and reduce all positive beings to negation. They fail to find out the real folly of their master. But regarding them it may be said that an ass that carries us is better than a horse that throws us. Gaṅgeśa suggests a new path. But he himself does not follow it far enough. Raghunātha utilises this pregnant suggestion and defends the Vaiśeṣika theory of negation. He maintains the gulf fixed between positive being and negation. The true nature of the law of contradiction has been discovered by his successors e.g. Mathurānātha etc. According to them negation has a distinct nature of its own, though its awareness is invariably relative.

3. *The Concept of Negation in Buddhist System.*

(*Subjective view*)

The Buddhists pay special attention to the problem of negation. The negative criticism of the realistic view of negation prepares the ground for the subjective view of negation. The Buddhists hold that reality is existence. It is not split up into two elements viz. existence and non-existence. They criticise the Vaiśeṣika category of negation. Negation is determined by the positive object contrasted. Thus the negatum becomes an adjective of its corresponding negation. The negatum is also opposed to its negatum. The negatum and its negation do not occupy the same locus at the same time. The pre-negation and post-negation of an effect belong to the inherent cause of the effect. But they do not belong to the inherent cause of the effect when the effect inheres in its inherent cause. The absolute negation of an object and the object have co-existence in time but they do not belong to the same locus. The mutual exclusion of an object and the object itself may co-exist on the same locus. This is the earlier view of mutual exclusion. It is called a *samānādhikaraṇaḥ abhāvaḥ*. Therefore the nature of opposition varies in accordance with the nature of the type of negation. In cases of pre-negation and post-negation the object negated cannot determine its negation. According to the Buddhists, the object negated should qualify negation in order to determine it. The qualifier should exist in order to qualify another object. A non-existent object can never qualify another object. The gap of time intervening between negation and negatum stands in the way of the fact of being qualified by the negatum. In case of an absolute negation the gap of space should not allow the negation to be qualified by its negatum. The Vaiśeṣikas have taken a wrong view of mutual exclusion. A jar which stands upon the ground is different from the ground. A jar and its difference from the ground (its mutual exclusion) stand upon the same ground. But the ground does not stand upon the jar. The difference of the ground from a jar belongs to a jar. Therefore, mutual exclusion and its negatum do not necessarily co-exist on the same locus. Therefore, there is a spatial gulf or some other gulf between mutual exclusion and its negatum. Mutual exclusion cannot be determined by its negatum. According to the Buddhists negation and the object negated are contradictorily opposed to each other. There is an unbridgable gulf fixed between them. They cannot be predicated of the same thing at the same time. Thus, negation should not be qualified by the object negated. An indetermined non-existence is unreal. It can never be cognised. Negation cannot, therefore, be a mode of reality. Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjarī* gives a sketch of the negative criticisms of the red-clothed Buddhists.

This negative criticism constitutes the introductory part of their true view of negation. The criticism of the Vaiśeṣika concept of negation leads to the view that negation is not reality. The experience of negation is an undeniable fact. It is to be explained. The problem of negation. according to the Buddhists, is not an ontological one. It is purely an epistemological problem. We shall discuss the details of this problem later on in its proper place. But only a brief outline of the Buddhist view will be sketched here.

What is negation ? Is it a mode of reality i.e. existence ? Or, is it a mode of cognition ? In the Buddhist system existence means the ultimate reality of a point-instant. Negation is static. Therefore, negation is not reality. Cognition which corresponds to a point-instant is pure sensation. It is an indirect cognition. It is a cognition of something. It is not non-cognition of bare nothing. An absent thing, according to the Buddhists, is imagination. It cannot produce sensation. A positive object which produces sensation may be interpreted by our intellect as containing the absence of another inter-connected sensibilium, the imagined presence of which is repelled by us. Negation cannot be thus an original attitude of the mind. It is the work of the understanding which interprets a pure sensation with the aid of memory on its negative side. Let us take a typical negative judgment 'there is no jar here'. The empty place which is denoted by the word 'here' produces sensation. The absent jar is never visualised. It produces no sensation. An image of a jar is constructed by the intellect out of the materials supplied by the memory. The Buddhists draw a sharp line of distinction between sensation and imagination. Hence, reality and ideality remain for ever distinct. Thus they consistently maintain the pure ideality of the absent thing. Negation is the pure ideality. Next, they discuss whether negation is perceptual or inferential. In Buddhist Logic the difference between a perceptual judgment and an inferential one is one of degree since both of them consist of a sensuous part and an imagined part i.e. a non-constructed and a constructed part. The Buddhists hold that negation belongs to the class of inference since imagination plays a prominent part in the construction of a single conception. The Buddhists explain how the perceptibility of an absent sensibilium (*dṛśya*) is imagined. An imagined perceptibility is bestowed upon an object. The non-cognition of a hypothetically perceptible object is called negation. But the real source of a negative judgment is the empty spot as well as its cognition. Negation, if it is ontologically taken, means the bare substratum. But if it is logically taken, it means the cognition of the bare substratum.

Negation is an idea. It is trustworthy. It is productive imagination. It guides our purposive actions. But if negation is nothing but a baffled suggestion then why should a person be interested in an indirect way of cognizing reality and why should a logician devote some space in his work to it ? The answer to this question is that the perception of a perceptible object does not always take place. It is constantly interrupted by the non-perception of a visible object. Non-perception is not the absence of knowledge. It means a possible perception since knowledge cannot transcend the limits of sensuous experience. For this reason every variety of negation is a simple negation of the hypothetically perceptible. Other varieties of negation are founded either on the law of contradiction or on the law of causation. Dr.Stcherbatsky discusses the importance of negation thus : If something contradicts the established extension and comprehension of a concept, or if something contradicts the cause or the effect of a thing, we pronounce a judgment of negation.

The conclusion of the Buddhist Logic on negation is clear. Negation is nothing but an indirect way of cognizing sensible objects. The basis of negation is sensibilia. All varieties of negation are also based upon the laws of Identity and Casuality. Now, the conclusion follows from it that these two laws, the source of our knowledge of all relations, apply only to the realm of experience. Negation and contradiction have no place in the sphere of the Absolute. It is non-relative Existence. Dharmakīrtti and Dharmottara clearly point out that the laws of contradiction and causality are restricted only to the field of experience. Their argument is quite clear. The contradicting facts, the causes and the effects are ascertained on the basis of positive and negative observation. Contradiction is grasped when one is present and the other is absent. The incompatible facts are denied. But they are merely sensibilia. Causal relation is established if the cause is absent, on the absence of the effect. The subalternation of concepts is established if the included concept is absent on the absence of the inclusive term. Thus we see that the knowledge of the instances of contradiction, of casuality and of diverse extension greater and lesser is inseparably connected with negative experience. Therefore the conclusion follows that negation is at the root of the laws of contradiction, causation and subalternation. Negation is always the negation of sensibilia. Therefore, these laws and negation are not applicable to the sphere of pure absolute existence.

Dharmakīrtti raises another question of much importance whether the negation of super-sensuous objecst is a source of right knowledge. He points out that negation is the negation of such objects as are imagined to be present. Supersensuous objects such as a ghost etc. are never perceived. Such an object has no visible form. It is a non-sensibilium. The negation of such an object is not a source of knowledge since it does not lead on to successful action. But in the *Brahmasiddhi* the view of a section of the Buddhists has been represented that the negation of supersensuous objects in some cases leads on to successful action. The negative judgment that a post is not a ghost is a source of right knowledge. (*Tarak-Kāṇḍa* p. 46). This is a special case. He does not contradict the theory of negation of the Buddhists. If a ghost were identical with a post then it would have been a sensible object like a post. But a ghost does not occupy the space and time of a post. Similarly, metaphysical objects can be neither asserted nor denied.

Our knowledge about them is neither direct nor indirect. They remain always problems to us. Now, a question arises if cognition proves the existence of the object cognized then it is natural to expect that the absence of cognition should prove the non-existence of an object. Dharmakīrtti answers this question. He holds that if there is no means of cognizing an object then a negative judgment cannot be pronounced upon such an object. Negation is after all a form of cognition. Such an object cannot be indirectly known i.e. negatively known since negative consciousness is not the absence of consciousness. Dr. Stcherbatsky goes a very bold step farther in explaining the Buddhist theory. He holds that Negation is a positive cognition of something i.e., of an indefinite moment of reality. The basis of his conclusion is that negation, being a form of cognition, is a mental fact which must have a cause in external reality. Dr. Stcherbatsky's thesis is not tenable since a moment of reality is never indefinite. Indefiniteness is always subjective. The subjective character is super-imposed upon the object of cognition. Cognition, corresponding to a moment of reality, is assertory. Objective indefiniteness should produce such cognition as will lead to indecision. Such an explanation comes into conflict with the fundamental epistemological theory of the Buddhists. The weak point in the Buddhist theory of negation is how the bare substratum produces the negative consciousness of a sensible object. The adjectives 'bare', 'empty' etc., have negative meaning though they have positive form. The polemic of the realists against it will be discussed later on.

The Buddhist theory of negation may be put in a nut-shell thus : The Buddhists have established that Reality does not consist of existence and non-existence but consists of existence only, that negation is an indirect way of cognizing reality, that it is inferential since imagination is predominant in it, that non-perception which is such cognition as repels an attempted perception of a sensible object is the logical reason in this inference and that negation as a form of cognition has objective validity since it is capable of leading on to successful purposive actions.

We shall now discuss whether this theory of negation is consistent with the ultimate philosophical conclusion of radical pluralism. Difference is not reality. It is subjective since it is negation. If difference lacks reality, being a figment of imagination, then reality cannot but be one. Difference is not real. Imaginary differnce cannot explain metaphysical pluralism. Pluralism presupposes real difference. If difference is not real then the pluralism of the Buddhists can have no metaphysical significance. They may contend that if the ultimate identity of reality be non-difference then it is equally imaginary. Thus they arrive at an absurd metaphysical conclusion that Reality is neither one nor many. Reality becomes thus something inexplicable (*Brahmasiddhi* p. 48). [Cf. Wilson—For, if we make it (distinction) merely subjective, we should take all variety out of the real and end in a sort of Eleatic paradox, that being is one without any manner of difference. (*Statement and Inference* Vol. I. p. 266).]

The Buddhist may contend that the difference in the nature of causal efficiency will explain the diversity of reality. Maṇḍana Misra's polemic against this contention is that the real difference is relative not-being and that the difference of causal efficiency cannot explain the real difference of points of reality. The fire burns and cooks. The burning and the cooking of fire are instances of its different causal efficiencies. Is fire different from itself since it is possessed of these two different causal efficieneies ? The fire as burning is nominally different from the fire as cooking. Thus the difference in causal efficiency proves only nominal difference (*vyapadeśabhedamātram*). Now, if difference is denied, how will the diversity of effects be explained ? They hold that different effects are produced by different causes. The Buddhists contend that an effect, say oil, is not produced by a cow and milk is not produced by sesamum-seed. A cause produces its own effect but does not produce the effect of another cause. The non-perception of an effect by another cause explains the real distinction in the natute of causes. Thus they prove the real distinction in this universe. The real distinction in the universe is an inference. The logical reason in this inference is the non-perception of the effectuation by a cause of different effects. But this argument of the Buddhists is a glaring instance of circular reasoning. If the real distinction of causes is established then it may be argued that the effect of a particular cause is not produced by another cause. On the contrary, they argue that there is real distinction among causes because there is non-perception of the production of an effect by a cause other than its own and that there is such non-perception because there is real distinction among causes. Therefore the diversity of effects does not explain real distinction in Reality. (*Brahmasiddhivyākhyā* p. 146). The succession of effects does not contradict the real identity of Reality since the assumption of different specific conditions explains the succession of effects.

The Advaitins contend that these specific conditions are not really different. They hold that imaginary specific conditions are capable of producing different effects. The Buddhists also admit such an assumption. According to them point-instants are exclusively particular. Similar effects are produced by point-instants. They are, *ex-hypothesi*, absolutely different. How will this similarity of effects be explained ? To solve this problem it should be assumed that some point-instants have imaginary identity. If imaginary identity explains the similarity of effects then there is no bar to assuming that imaginary difference explains the diversity of effects of the same cause. Therefore, the diversity of the effect-world does not account for the real distinction of Reality.

The Buddhist may now contend that the contrary opposition subsisting between causal efficiencies explains the real distinction of causes. A cow produces milk. A seed of barley produces a barley-plant. Milk is other than a barley-plant. Such a plant is included in the negation of milk. Such effects as are opposed to each other cannot be produced by the same cause without violating the law of contradiction. The law of contradiction does not establish radical pluralism since a point-instance of fire burns or cooks a tuft of grass or some quantity of rice but does not burn water. It burns and does not burn at the same time. It has efficiency and non-efficiency at the same ·time. But the identity of the point-instant of fire is not contradicted by the law of contradiction. Similarly, if the single cause produces diverse objects then the identity of that cause will not be contradicted by the law of contradiction. Now, Buddhists may contend that efficiency and non-efficiency are not opposed to each other since the efficiency of one object is not opposed to non-efficiency of another object. The objector may argue that a point-instant should produce all similar effects. But it does not. It cannot produce a similar effect which is past or future. Therefore the law of contradiction does not establish their thesis. The Buddhists may answer that a cause does not produce all similar effects at the same time since the collocation of all concomitant auxliliary conditions constitutes some distinction in the nature of the cause. This distinction is not real since if it were real then the cause would be other than what it is. Therefore the distinction brought about by the collocation of concomitant auxiliary conditions to the real cause is merely an apearance (*aupādhika*). It is experienced but does not effect reality (*yaśca aupādhikaḥ sa pratīyate param, na vastu saṃspṛśati*). This distinction is unreal. All distinction of Reality is similarly unreal. The doctrine of the universal flux does not lead to radical pluralism.

The Advaitins have proved conclusively that the law of contradiction, the law of otherness, the law of efficient opposition and the relation of destroyer and the destroyed do not establish real distinction in the real universe. Negation, being subjective, does not prove the manyship of reality. The opposition between A and not-A is confined within the field of logic but has no metaphysical implication. The law of otherness is not incompatible with the continuity and identity of Reality. A fact has many natures (*nānādharmatva*). They are mutually exclusive. They do not contradict the identity of a fact. The point-instant of fire has, for example, colour and touch. The law of efficient opposition makes a term negative. Pleasure is the negation of pain, joy is the negation of dejection. These are facts and as such cannot be negative. This law is reducible to the law of otherness. The relation of the destroyer and the destroyed presupposes the co-existence of two opposites on the same locus. Therefore this relation cannot imply that there is real distinction.

The subjective view of negation has undergone a considerable change under the pressure of criticism. Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattvasaṃgraha* mentions ontological negation unambiguously in the following line (*dvividhaḥ paryudāso'pi buddhyātmārthātma bhedataḥ* p. 316). He holds that a point of reality possessess real difference from its dissimilars (*svalakṣaṇe'pi ... anyaviśleṣābhāvataḥ*). Kamalaśila explains *viśleṣa* as *vyāvṛtti*. Therefore, real difference belongs to point-instants. Maṇḍana Miśra in his *Brahmasiddhi* alludes to the view of a section of the Buddhists according to whom Reality is infected with real difference.

The view does not prove the thesis of radical pluralism. Our sense-perception is assertory. If difference is the nature of reality then it should be grasped along with the real object. Sense-perception should be, in that case, an act of denial. Intuition grasps reality, grasps the basic identity. If the Buddhists deny this then they ignore facts and misrepresent intuition. Difference involves reference beyond itself. If the objects referred to are not grasped then difference will not be cognised at all. The relative character of difference is an undeniable fact. If its relativity is not grasped then we miss it simply.

Difference as involving reference to other objects cannot be sensed since these objects lie beyond the range of our sense-organs. Therefore we cannot have sense-perception of difference along with reality.

Moreover, the theory of radical pluralism cannot explain one and the same form pervasive through many objects. Similarity or non-apprehension of difference or the theory of neglected difference cannot explain a common idea in a universe of absolutely dissimilar objects. The subjective Idealists cannot explain it by means of beginningless *vāsanā* (habit-energy). Why only are some particulars unified ? This question remains unanswerable to them. If *vāsanā* is the cause of unification then it can unify only a few particulars which are already experienced. In order to explain it they should assume that the point-instants which are different by nature have a property by means of which they are cognised as identical. This power of producing awareness of identity is opposed to their real nature i.e. difference. If the law of logical economy is followed strictly then the radical pluralism of the Buddhists should yield place to non-dualism of the Śaṃkara school. The Buddhists assume an infinite number of point-instants, their real difference and their special power of producing the awareness of identity. But, on the contrary, the Advaitins hold that the ultimate reality is the One. It appears to be many by its special power, (*ekasya vā astu māhātmyaṃ yadeko'pi nāenva bhāsate, laghutvāt kalpanāyāḥ*). Difference implies identity. According to the pluralists identity is only an appearance whereas reality is difference. But the Absolutist holds that Reality is Identity and difference is an appearance. They mean to say that if Identity of reality is an appearance then difference remains inexplicable since reality does not depend upon an appearance for its existence. Reality is self-sufficient. If difference is admitted to be an appearance then there arises no contradiction since an appearance is ultimately sublated in the ultimate Identity. Nāgārjuna proves the relativity (śūnyatā) of the empirical world. He holds that the Absolute is the negation of the empirical world. His view will be discussed later on. Dharmottara holds that the term 'non-perception' also denotes ontological reality viz. the bare substratum i.e. the substratum devoid of a sensible object. The ground, devoid of a perceptible jar is the non-perception of a perceptible jar (*tato dṛśyaghaṭa-rahitaḥ pradeśaḥ tajjnānaṃ ca vacanasāmarthyādeva dṛśyānupalambharūpam uktaṃ draṣṭavyam — Nyāyabindutīkā* p. 36). Thus we see that the hold of the doctrine of the subjectivity of negation on the mind of the Buddhists is becoming relaxed and that the Buddhists are not opposed to the view that negation is identical with existence. They are decidedly opposed to the view that there is a split in Reality and that Reality consists of two elements viz. existence and non-existence.

4. *Introduction to Ontological Negation*

The passage from the subjective view of negation to the objective view of negation is not very difficult. In this passage negation has been deprived of its distinction. It is no more a distinct term. It becomes identical with its locus. The gulf between negativity and positivity has been set up by the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. But it cannot be logically maintained. The foundation of this new theory is based upon the negative criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of negation. A section of the Prābhākaras has put forward this thesis. The Jains support this thesis. The followers of Rāmānuja lend their mighty support to this thesis. Vijñānabhikṣu adopts this theory. The Mādhvas partially agree with the Prābhākaras in it. Udayana could not ignore the claim of the Prābhākaras in some cases. Śaṃkara Miśra, the later Vācaspati Miśra and Viśvanātha Pañcānana join their hands with the Prābhākaras and hold that difference is in the nature of reality. The Vaiṣṇavas such as the followers of Vallabha and others welcome it unreservedly. M. M. Pancānana Tarkaratna accepts this theory of negation. Amongst the Advaitins Citsukha subscribes to the Prābhākara view of negation but draws a diametrically opposite metaphysical conclusion from it. (The problem of negation lays its stress upon the most important aspect of it viz., the problem of difference. This problem is *par excellence* a metaphysical problem. The dualists and the pluralists find in this theory an easy road to non-dualism. If difference belongs to the nature of reality i.e. if Reality is saturated with difference then the metaphysical conclusion of the abstract identity of the Absolute cannot be proved. The Absolute cannot swallow up all differences, since if difference is real then the true experience of real difference must convert the experience of an all-embracing abstract identity of the Absolute into a mere futile conception, an unreal happy dream. But a critical examination of this theory will reveal that the reality of difference is not incompatible with concrete unity. The conclusion of unity-in-difference becomes the highest philosophical moment of this thought.)

This problem of negation represents two aspects, metaphysical and epistemological. The epistemological side of the problem will be discussed later on. The special problem of difference is more important than the general problem of negation. (But if their main thesis of negation is established then the problem of difference will become very easy for us to handle.) The history of Indian Philosophy shows that the special problem of negation viz., difference may be independently proved. In other words, there is no contradiction in the statement that even if some forms of negation are distinct modes of reality then difference may be held to be the nature of reality. A large section of philosophers subscribes to this view. The most important metaphysical import is conveyed by the problem of difference. In European Philosophy the problem of difference is the problem of negation in most cases. We shall discuss the general as well as the special problem of negation.

5. *Prābhākara Theory of Negation and its Allied Theories.*

At the outset we shall give a short outline of two main types of negation. Prabhākara

Bhaṭṭa's view of negation is not very clear. He has refuted negation as a distinct mode of reality. He has not explained it. Śālikanātha holds that negation is subjective. He borrows the view of Dharmakīrtti. Śrīharṣa rightly calls Prabhākara a friend of the Buddhists. But this epithet should legitimately go to Śālikanātha. This type of view about negation will be discussed later on.

Another type of view about negation is prior to that of Śālikanātha. Śālikanātha refers to this view in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (p. 118.). This view is more widely known as the Prābhākara view of negation. Maṇḍana Miśra refers to this view in his *Vidhiviveka* (p. 67.). Vācaspati Miśra alludes to it in his *Nyāyakaṇikā* (p. 68.). Jayanta Bhaṭṭa mentions this view as Buddhist. Dharmottara holds that negation is the bare substratum. Gaṅgeśa says that the subjective view of negation is logically superior to the view that negation is identical with its locus. In his opinion, too, these two views of negation have been adopted by the Prābhākaras (*Abhāvavāda* p. 697, 700, 707 and 712). Bhavanātha in his *Nyāyaviveka* holds that the isolated condition of a locus is distinct from the locus. Ravideva, in his commentary on *Nyāyaviveka*, has explained the position of Bhavanātha. He asserts that the isolated state of the locus is a positive condition of the locus and that negation is not something distinct from this isolated state (*tanmātramapi taddhīvedyatvavidhayā meyāntaram // Nyāyaviveka* p. 164. *bhāvarūpakevalāvasthādhikam abbāvākhyaṃ meyaṃ durlabhameva ityarthaḥ // Vivekatattva* p. 164.). Therefore, we may safely conclude that according to the Prābhākaras negation is not something super-added to its locus, but is identical with its locus.

Śālikanātha's classical argument against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of negation is as follows :—He holds that the awareness of the positive locus of negation is one of the invariable conditions of the negative awareness of negation located upon it. Does this locus contain the negatum corresponding to the negation under ? Or, does it contain the negation itself ? Or, is it a neutral substratum, i.e. does it contain neither the negatum mentioned above nor the negation at issue ? The upholders of negation as a distinct term cannot subscribe to the first two alternatives since the acceptance of the first alternative leads on to contradiction and if the second alternative, is adopted, it is a glaring instance of *petitio principii*. The locus which is known as containing the object negated cannot be cognised as having negation corresponding to the object negated. In order to know the locus as qualified by negation, negation should be cognised at first. Then on the basis of this negative consciousness they should prove that negation is a distinct term. Thus they explain negation in terms of negation. If the third alternative is accepted then there is no justification for the thesis that negation is a distinct term. The neutral substratum, being a distinct object, is capable of explaining negative consciousness. The implication of the argument of Śālikanātha has been worked out by Bhavanātha. According to him, negation is not mere consciousness. It has objective counterpart. But it is not a distinct term. It is a positive object.

Vijñānabhikṣu defends this view against the critics and hence lends his support to this thesis. According to him, the absolute negation and the mutual exclusion of the

Vaiśeṣikas are identical with their locus. This view may be objected to on the ground that the locus should produce negative consciousness even when it contains the object negated, since the nature of the locus remains always the same whether it is possessed of negation or the object negated. He holds that this argument is not convincing, since the objector also holds that the object negated and the corresponding negation co-exist on the same locus. The conjunction of a jar and its negation rests upon the same locus. Even when an object exists on a locus the past or the future relation of the object to the locus does not exist on that locus. Therefore, it must be admitted that the temporary absolute negation and the object negated co-exist on the locus. (*Pravacana-bhāṣya* on I, 113). Aniruddha Bhaṭṭa has criticised this view. According to him negation is a distinct evolute of *prakṛti*. But it is hard to conceive how negation evolves out of *prakṛti*.

In the early works of the Jaina School the problem of negation has not been explicitly discussed. The philosophers of the later period have discussed this problem exactly. Śāntyācāryya in his *Jaina-Vārttika-Vṛtti* has discussed metaphysical aspect of this problem. He holds that negation is cognised in time and space. If it is bare denial then it cannot be located upon space and time, since negation cannot qualify space and time and if an object does not qualify space and time it cannot be located upon space and time. Moreover, the relation between negatum and its corresponding negation cannot take place since they do not belong to the same time. The post-negation of a jar arises when a jar ceases to exist. Therefore, the post-negation of a jar should not be qualified by the jar which has become non-existent. He concludes that negation as a distinct term is unreal. (*Jaina-Vārttika-Vṛtti* pp. 81-82). The arguments advanced by Abhayadevasūri are epistemological. The epistemological arguments will be discussed later on. Vimaladāsa refers to the view that negation is identical with its locus (*Saptabhaṅgītaraṅgiṇī* p. 45). Prabhācandrasūri in his *Prameyakamalamārttaṇḍa* criticises the view that negation is a distinct mode of reality. He gives a reply to the objection raised by the critics that if negation is not a distinct term a negative proposition or a negative judgment becomes meaningless since a distinct mode of reality is not referred to. His answer is that the locus of negation qualified by some unique property is called negation. It is the positive locus qualified by some unique property. Let us take a familiar example to follow his argument. The negative proposition that a jar does not exist on the ground points to the ground as qualified by an uncommon property which does not belong to it when a jar stands upon it (*ghaṭāsaṃbhavibhūtalagatā-sādhāraṇa-dharmopalakṣitaṃ hi bhūtalaṃ ghaṭābhāvaḥ vyapadiśyate* // p. 55. P. K. M). He holds that the mutual exclusion of the Vaiśeṣikas is not a distinct mode of reality. But earlier Jaina thinkers such as Samantabhadra Svāmin, Vidyānanda Svāmin, Akalaṅka Deva etc. hold that negation cannot be denied. *Prāgabhāva* and *pradhvaṃsābhāva* are not distinct from positive being. They are modes of reality. Or, they are reality as qualified by modes. *Anyāpoha* and *atyantābhāva* cannot be denied. But what is the metaphysical nature of them ? Vidyāṇandi in his *Aṣṭasāhasrī* approves of the criticism of the Vaiśeṣika theory of negation as offered by the Cārvākas. They also criticise the Buddhist view, according to which positive being is the only object of true consciousness. He refutes the Sāṃkhya view which denies *atyantābhāva*. He also refutes the Bhāṭṭa view, according to which negation is distinct from positive being. Such a series of criticisms creates confusion only. The positive side of his theory rests upon a single line. He holds that the moment of reality is negation (*Vastudharmasya eva abhāvasya pratipattiḥ abhyupagantavyā || Aṣṭasāhasrī* p. 115). Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka are silent on the metaphysical nature of negation. Now, the question arises whether this moment is positive or negative. The only possible answer is that the moment is positive by its own nature but negative with reference to another reality or moment. He holds that absolute negation is eternal (*kālatrayāpekṣe atyantābhāve* etc., *A. S.* p. 109). How is it that the moment of reality is co-eternal with reality? If it is admitted, then he fails to explain the negation of a jar on the ground as a case of absolute negation, since this negation has merely temporary existence. He explains mutual exclusion as the exclusion of one positive being from another positive being (*svabhāvāntarāt svabhāva-vyāvṛttir anyāpohaḥ*). He holds that mutual exclusion is not absolute. If it is not absolute then matter should sometimes become mind. He answers this objection with the remarks that they are two irreducible realities. But this answer makes the situation more complex. The distinction between mutual exclusion and absolute negation disappears since both of them become eternal. The serious objection to this theory of negation is that if negation belongs to the surface of reality but not to its core then the doctrine of the abstract identity of all realities is enforced on them. Prabhācandrasūri does not solve the problem satisfactorily, since negation, in his opinion, constitutes the outer coating of reality but cannot oppose the inner essence viz., the identity of reality. Now the Jains may contend that reality is concrete but not an abstract one. The essence of reality is not divorced from its moments which constitute the outer layer of reality. But such a theory of negation cannot establish the plurality of ultimate realities. Vimaladāsa has taken the right step. Negation is identical with reality. Difference thus constitutes the essence of reality. Both identity and difference cannot be held to be constitutive of reality. If the reality of difference is established then identity becomes a fiction. But such a theory of negation comes into conflict with the concept of the relation of unity-in-difference holding between moments, states, qualities etc., and the principle of continuity. The Prābhākaras have held their doctrine of negation consistently. The imitators of the Prābhākaras are not consistent. We shall discuss this point later on.

The followers of Vallabha Ācāryya are indebted to the Prābhākaras for their theory of negation. The problem of negation has been discussed in the Śuddhādvaita system. The theory of negation of this system bears a close resemblance to that of the Prābhākara system. Pre-negation is according to them a state of the cause. They do not agree with the Sāṃkhyists on the point that an effect stands in its cause before its manifestation. An effect has no distinct metaphysical existence of its own. It is identical with its cause. An effect which is an aspect of its cause is only logically distinguished from its cause. They say, "*tatra prāgabhāvaḥ kāraṇāvasthāto nātiricyate*" (*Śuddhādvaitamārtaṇḍa* p. 13). The post-negation of an object is identical with its cause. The post-negation of an object denotes merely its disappearance. The merging of an effect into its cause means the disappearance of an effect. Both these views of post-negation imply that post-negation is no other than the efficient or the material cause of an effect (*ubhayathāpi nimittopādānānyatara svarūpātirikto dhvaṃso na nirūpayituṃ śakyaḥ*). Thus they conclude that the condition of a cause which is unfavourable to the appearance of an effect is called the post-negation of an effect.

The mutual negation of a jar from a cloth means the disappearance of a cloth on a jar in accordance with the desire of God. This law holds good in every case of mutual negation. Though every object is identical with God in the system of Suddhādvaitins yet the function of each object is different from that of another, owing to God's desire. Thus the denial of mutual negation does not lead on to a chaos (*bhagavatastathecchātaḥ sarvamanavadyam*). Similarly, absolute negation is not a distinct term since it denotes the disappearance of an object on its locus. Thus this theory of negation of the Suddhādvaitins is somewhat different from that of the Prābhākaras. But the followers of Vallabha viz. Giridhara and others hold that negation is identical with its locus. Thus they adopt the Prābhākara theory of negation (*abhāvasya adhikaraṇarūpatvam iti anyatra vistaraḥ. Śuddhādvitamārtaṇḍa* // p. 14).

Mm. Pañcānana Tarkaratna has accepted the Prābhākara theory of negation in his *Śaktibhāṣya*. The Mādhva theory of negation will be discussed in a separate chapter. Rāmānuja and his followers have made an original contribution to the epistemological side of this problem. Rāmānuja has developed the idea of the ultimate unity of the whole in the midst of the manyship of realities viz. individual souls, God and Matter. Rāmānuja's philosophical position with regard to his theory of negation will be discussed in the concluding chapter of this work.

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, his illustrious commentator, have modified the Prābhākara theory of negation to a certain extent but the spirit of their theory of negation is the same as is that of the Prābhākara theory of negation. They hold emphatically that negation has no distinct reality of its own and that the negation of a positive object is another positive object (*iha bhāva eva bhāvāntarasya abhāva iti vyavaharttavyaḥ—Īsvarapratyabhiññā* with *Vimarśinī* p. 301). According to them negation is presented to our consciousness in two ways. Sometimes negation is presented to our consciousness as identical with its locus. In the negative judgment that this ground is not a jar, the negation of a jar i.e. not-jar is not apprehended as a distinct term. Not-jar is identical with this ground. But when we say that there is no jar on this ground the negation of a jar is presented to us as a distinct term. This ground is the container of this negation. The object contained and the locus which contains are not identical. If negation is not identical with its locus how can it be identical with a positive object ? The Prābhākaras have really avoided this problem with an evasive answer. The Śaivas of the Kashmir school try to solve it. They hold that a slab of stone or a mass of pencils of rays is called the negation of a jar. Such a negation belongs to the ground. A visible object which is other than a jar is called the negation of a jar. The relation between negation and its locus is the same as is between a positive object contained and its container (*tatra bhāvasya bhāvāntareṇa ya ādhāryādhārabhāvaḥ sa eva bhāvatadabhāvayoḥ*). But the main issue of this theory is epistemological. If a positive object is capable of producing negative awareness then this theory stands. In this respect it is in no way superior to the Prābhākara theory but on the other hand presupposes it. If it is established that negative consciousness points to positive objects then a bare spot is competent enough to arouse negative awareness of a jar under certain conditions. Thus the suggestion of an intermediate positive object is superfluous.

Let us now discuss the Prābhākara theory of difference. Amongst the followers of Prābhākara two types of views are noticed by us. The one is subjective. The other is objective. Gaṅgeśa refers to this subjective view in his *Abhāva-vāda*. If difference is a mode of negation then according to Śālikanatha difference is a form of cognition. But the later Prābhākaras hold that difference is objective. The subjective view of difference is not a serviceable hypothesis to their ultimate philosophical conclusion of pluralism. Nandīśvara establishes the Prābhākara view that difference is not ideality but reality. The ideality of difference has yielded its place to the reality of difference. The Buddhists have ultimately given up the ideality of difference. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have subscribed to the view that an exclusive particular—a point-instant is an ontological negation. *Anyavyāvṛtti* (an exclusion from other particulars) is objectively real. The subjective view of difference is a wrong hypothesis of the early Prābhākaras. The Prābhākaras who hold that difference belongs to the nature of reality are on the right line of thinking. The Advaitins have paid special attention to refuting the theory of the objective reality of difference. The criticism of the Advaitins will be discussed later on.

The Prābhākaras prove their hypothesis that difference is identical with its locus, refuting the attributive view of negation held by the Vaiśeṣikas. According to the Vaiśeṣikas difference is different from the objects differing. Let us take an example that A is not B. The difference of B belongs to A. The difference of B is obviously distinct from B though it is determined by B. It is also different from A, the locus of this difference. Difference itself, like an attribute, differs from its substratum. This is a short statement of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of mutual exclusion, i.e. difference.

This hypothesis does not imply that difference belongs to the care of reality. It is external to Reality. Maṇḍana Miśra has rightly observed that such a theory of difference does not contradict the abstract identity of the Absolute since as difference stands outside it cannot affect the identity of the Absolute.

The followers of Prābhākara take up the cause of pluralistic realism. According to them the heart of reality is saturated with real difference. They assert that the bare identity of the Absolute is a myth. The hypothesis of this identity may be useful in some respects and especially in promoting the religious life of a worshipper but is philosophically untenable.

The Prābhākaras have refuted the Vaiśeṣika theory of difference independently. We shall not only discuss the metaphysical aspect of the problem but the epistemological side of the problem will also be discussed here since the epistemological problem is connected intimately with the evolution of the concept of negation in other systems.

The metaphysical objection to the theory of difference is as follows: If difference itself is different from two objects differing then a second difference is to be assumed. This second difference is also similarly different from the two terms and the first difference and consequently a third difference is to be postulated and so on *ad infinitum*. This metaphysical regressus *ad infinitum* is forced on the Vaiśeṣikas who hold that difference is a distinct term. This objection is irrefutable. The followers of the Vaiśeṣika school could not give a reply to this objection. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, Gadādhara Bhaṭṭāchāryya and other celebrated logicians could not solve the problem of an infinite regressus. But they have taken a new line of defence. They hold that this regressus *ad infinitum* is not a vicious one. The very fact of difference as a distinct term implies an infinite series of differences. There is no logical fallacy in such an assumption (*prāmāṇikī anavasthā*).

John Cook Wilson in his *Statement and Inference*, makes mention of the same metaphysical fallacy contained in the theory that difference itself is a distinct quality. He says, "The mistake committed in making *not-A*-ness a universal (or a 'concept') is the fallacy of treating the difference of one quality from another as if it were itself a quality, like the qualities which differ, and belongs to a familiar class of mere verbal fallacies in which things are put in impossible relations to themselves. Relations more especially are treated in effect as if the same in kind as the terms related, with the general result producing impossible unending series (pp. 254-55)." But the Naiyāyikas do not hold that *not-A-ness* is a universal or a concept. The argument of Wilson which criticises this view is pointless with regard to the Naiyāyikas.

The second argument of the Prābhākaras against the Vaiśeṣika theory of mutual exclusion is epistemological. This is an old argument of the Advaitins. It has been utilised by the Prābhākaras. If difference is a distinct term then it can never be cognised. Let us take an example to grasp it thoroughly. X is different from Y. Let us represent the difference by Z. Z is different from X and Y. Now, this second difference must also be known in order to grasp fully the nature of Z. This second difference presupposes a third difference and so on *ad infinitum*. An infinite series of differences must be apprehended in order to apprehend a single fact of difference as a distinct quality. The second epistemological argument against the attributive view of difference may be mentioned in this connection. In order to cognise the difference of X from Y, X and Y should be cognised as different. Thus the awareness of difference presupposes the awareness of difference. Thus it is a glaring instance of the fallacy of *petitio principii*. The third epistemological argument, against this view is that difference cannot be perceived since the sense-object-contact holding between the sense-organ and difference can not be established. The relation of the qualifier to the qualified is not a relation at all.

If difference constitutes the very nature of every object, i.e. if it is not a distinct quality of an object then why does not the consciousness of the difference of an object from all others arise in our mind along with the perception of the object? Nandīśvara solves the problem. He says in reply that though difference is nothing but the individuality of an object (*asādhāraṇarūpa*) yet the presentative consciousness of an object cannot be communicated by means of a negative proposition to others since difference which is the content of such a proposition is something more than mere difference. The content difference is determined by its correlative term. Difference which is an object of presentative consciousness is simple difference. Simple difference is ontological whereas specific difference is logical. Thus the mutual exclusion of the Vaiśeṣikas is merely logical from the Prābhākara standpoint. The Prābhākaras hold that ontological difference has absolute existence since it does not depend upon the positive object contrasted for its very existence. Now, a problem arises that if difference is identical with the individuality of an object then they become synonymous. In this case, we cannot use a proposition like this that a jar is different from a cloth. In answering this objection Nandīśvara clears the Prābhākara position and states more logically that it is an aspect of individuality but not the whole of it. He means to state that *svarūpa* and *bheda* are not two synonymous terms, difference being logically determined by individuality (*bhedastu svarūpatantraṁ eva na hi svarūpamātraṃ bhedaḥ*). The import of this defensive argument is that difference and individuality are ontologically the same but are logically distinct. He cites an example to bring home the point at issue. Devadatta is a son of Yajñadatta. Devadatta, the son is not different from Devadatta, the man. But the individuality of Devadatta does not reveal necessarily his character as a son. He is cognised as a son when he is grasped as involving a reference to his father.

The Naiyāyikas urge another objection against the Prābhākaras that in a negative judgment—"A jar is different from a cloth", difference is presented to our consciousness as an adjective but if it is the same as its locus then how can it be presented to our consciousness as an adjective? If it is at all cognised as identical with its locus then our knowledge of it should be expressed in the form that the jar itself is the difference. Therefore this theory of difference cannot explain the consciousness of difference.

Nandīśvara defends the Prābhākara position in an able manner. He holds that there is distinction between significant difference and simple difference. Significant difference qualifies simple difference. He cites an example in support of his view viz. difference is different from the objects differing. In this example significant difference qualifies simple difference as an adjective. These two differences are identical in their essence. In this case, as significant difference qualifies simple difference so everywhere significant difference should qualify simple difference (*bhedamātram*) as an adjective. Therefore, he concludes that no discrepancy exists in the Prābhākara theory.

The real significance of the Prābhākara theory of difference is that simple difference is the ontological basis of a negative judgment which points to significant difference. Significant difference is a combination of subjective and objective elements. The subjective element is constituted by a reference to a term beyond itself. This reference beyond itself is a distinct term according to the modern followers of the Prābhākara school. This reference is connected by our imaginative mind with ontological difference. Thus ontological difference involving reference beyond itself becomes subjective by means of its acquired qualification. It has only logical existence. Thus the Prābhākaras construct a logical structure upon the metaphysical foundation. The logical difference of the Prābhākaras corresponds to the objectively real mutual exclusion of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools. The Prābhākaras also hold that simple difference divides Reality into innumerable real units of this universe. They do not subscribe to the view of radical pluralism. They unify the diverse objects of this universe by means of different universals and the relation of inherence. The universal of substance occupies the central position in their system.

The Prābhākara theory of difference bears resemblance to some theories of negation of European Philosophy. Let us compare and contrast this theory of the East with those of the West.

(1) Plato has made a contribution to the theory of negation in the *Sophist*. According to him not-being means relative not-being. An object has some kind of being of its own but does not possess the being of object other than itself. One kind of being is the not-being of another kind. Thus there is no gulf between being and not-being. According to Plato the not-being of another is the being of an object. The not-being is thus identical with a positive object (*Statement and Inference* p. 248.). In this respect Plato's theory of negation corresponds to that of negation of the Prābhākara school. But there is a good deal of difference between these two theories. The not-being of Plato involves a reference beyond itself. It is determined by another. It is not the simple difference of the Prābhākara school. The not-being of Plato has only logical existence in the Prābhākara system. But Plato holds that the relative not-being belongs to an object objectively. Plato's theory of negation is exposed to the epistemological criticism that the relative not-being cannot be perceived along with an object since a reference to another object involved in the not-being cannot be directly grasped. If such not-being were perceived then every body would have been omniscient. Moreover, the relative not-being is determined by another. Another becomes an element of not-being. The not-being of another is identical with the being of an object. Thus another becomes identical with an object. The identity of an object with another being established, the relative not-being becomes an appearance only. Plato has been forced to revise his theory of negation in the *Republic*. In the *Republic*, not-being is the extreme opposite of being. We shall discuss this theory of negation later on.

(2) John Cook Wilson draws his inspiration from Plato's theory of negation discussed in the *Sophist*. He acknowledges his debt in a foot-note. He says, 'This is in effect the Platonic doctrine, in the *Sophist*, that negation is 'otherness', but with the addition that there can be no conception of otherness in abstraction from positives which are 'other' than one another (Statement and Inference foot-note I.). The Platonic theory of negation as presented in the *Sophist* holds that the not-being of another is identical with

the being of an object. J. C. Wilson holds that difference belongs to the nature of two objects differing.

According to him negation is difference. He holds that 'the negative itself depends for any definiteness it can have upon the positive definite charactcr of the contrasted positive elements. It holds at the same time that difference is not a quality. If it were a distinct quality then an unending series of differences would have been assumed. He proves that *not-A-ness* is not a concept or a universal. He says, "If a universal is a differentiation of two different universals, either these two are related themselves as true genus and species or they mutually involve one another so that each necessitates the other. Thus though *not-A-ness* and *not-B-ness* exclude one another, either one is a species of the other, or each involves the other ; but both these alternatives are self-contradictory." (S. and I. p. 254)

He holds that the mere absence or mere negation of any object cannot be comprehended. Those who hold that it is apprehended confuse simply 'the absence of an apprehension with the apprehension of absence ? In his opinion we should apprehend both *A-ness* and *B-ness* in order to apprehend the difference of *B-ness* from *A-ness*. 'Thus there is no apprehension of the difference of A-ness and B-ness other than the apprehension of both A-ness and B-ness together'. Though not-A-ness can only be apprehended in the apprehension of A-ness and *B-ness* yet the awareness of this difference may be distinguished from these two objects differing. It can be cognised in abstraction as a unity in the different instances. But negation cannot be absolutely abstracted from all positive objects and perceived in its abstract character because negation is difference of positives. He clearly expresses his position in the following sentence. "To know anything about blue, I must be able to distinguish it from red and so perceive that blue is not red, but this distinction is only real for me, as opposed to the mere empty idea of distinction in general, through the positive character of the elements distinguished." (S. and I. pp. 264-265)

He refutes the subjective view of negation. The negative statement presupposes its corresponding affirmative statement as its prior in the order of time because nobody can begin with mere negation and the negative statement gets its definiteness from the affirmative one without which it gives no determination at all. We make an attempt at saying that A is B. But we faii to do so and hold that A is not B. This failure is prompted by our thinking process. It is subjective. This decision of our mind cannot be held to be absolute. The possibility of their identity cannot be excluded for all future to come. Moreover, in a negative statement non-existencc is attributed to the subject but this attribute can never correspond to reality. But we think that a negative statement extends our knowledge. How can the attribute of non-existence, being subjective, extend our knowledge ? If negation is merely subjective then the real universe would be devoid of all variety.

He quotes many examples of negation and shows that all negative statements express difference. The examples, 'the partnership of A & B is no longer in existence' 'page 40 is not in my book' imply the distinction of one part of reality from another.

The metaphysical import of a negative statement is a real distinction between two realities. If *A-ness* is really different from *B-ness* so that an A cannot be a B, it is also true that it is really impossible for an A to be a B, in other words an *A-B* is a real impossibility.

This distinction is grasped by the awareness of the definite character of an object. To apprehend red as red it must be recognised as a colour and distinguished from other species like green, yellow etc. It is apprehended as distinct from those which are already seen. The apprehension of the definite character of an object is not always expressed in negative statements.

He discusses another question of great importance. Why should we use a negative statement at all ? An affirmative statement gives us a vivid description of reality and is the adequate and faithful representation of our awareness of reality whereas a negative one is inadequate since it gives us no significant information about reality. But we use negative statements because we state what is relevant from our point of view. If anybody asks me 'Do you see the red object' then the most relevant answer will be 'No, Sir' when I do not see the object. But he says that the ground of each negative statement is affirmative one.

The points of similarity between the theory of negation of the Prābhākara school and that of J. C. Wilson are as follows : (1) Difference is not a distinct mode of reality. (2) It is identical with the positive reals. (3) It opposes the identity of all positive reals. (4) In Logic, negation is determined by the positive object contrasted by it. (5) A negative statement presupposes the affirmative statement to which it is directed. (6) All universals are positive. There is no negative universal in the universe. A negative concept is full of contradiction. The Prābhākaras have touched upon the point but J. C. Wilson has discussed it thoroughly.

The points of difference are as follows :—(1) J. C. Wilson does not draw distinction between simple otherness and logical negation. But, on the other hand, he does not clearly state that ontological otherness is determined by the positive object contrasted. If it is so held then otherness should be a distinct quality since a positive real is not determined by another positive real. The failure to draw a distinction between ontological and logical negation leads on to the vagueness of the theory of negation of Wilson.

(2) In Epistemology, there is a great divergence between these two theories. In the Prābhākara system otherness is cognised along with a positive object. According to Wilson the awareness of otherness is the consciousness of the positives which are other than one another. If otherness is not a quality then the metaphysical implication of this epistemological theory is that otherness is identical with the positives other than one another. But such a theory is incompatible with the ultimate philosophical conclusion that there is real distinction in the universe. A and B are two positive reals which are different from each other. If difference is identical with A and B then it cannot be held

that *A-B* is incompatible since difference for its very existence presupposes *A B.* The identity of A and B, being the background of the difference between A and B, cannot be contradicted by its subordinate difference. If Wilson holds that difference is identical with one of these two terms then the consciousness of difference can be in no way other than the presentation of each of these two terms. Thus we see that the metaphysical view of difference of Wilson comes into conflict with his epistemological theory of difference. The Prābhākara theory of negation is consistent on this point. Otherness is represented directly to our consciousness like an object.

(3) J. C. Wilson holds that the awareness of difference may be distinguished from the consciousness of the two objects differing by a process of abstraction. Thus difference may be abstracted from the positive reals and be united with them by the relation of unity-in-difference. He holds that this ideal separation is not always possible. The Prābhākaras deny such a possibility. This epistemological view bears some resemblance to that of the Bhāṭṭas. But the Bhāṭṭas hold that there is a factual separation between difference and the objects differing. The experience of difference as a distinct object is real. It is not a case of abstraction. Difference is united with the objects differing by the relation of unity-in-difference. From the Indian point of view it may be said about the theory of negation of Wilson that it stands between the theories of negation of the Prābhākaras and the Bhāṭṭas.

S. Alexander in his *Space, Time and Deity* has developed a theory of negation in the light of the Platonic ideas of negation. He acknowledges his debt to Plato. Plato speaks in his *Timaeus* of the union of the same and the other. Alexander holds similarly that 'existence or determinate being is therefore identity in its relation to the other.' The occupation of any space-time by a point-instant is its self-identity. Diversity consists in the occupation of another space-time. A point-instant is different from another point-instant because the latter occupies another point-instant. 'The occupation of any space-time, that is self-identity, in distinciton from any other space-time is existence or determinate being. As any space-time is a part of Space-Time, the continuum of space-times which are its parts and is therefore connected with other space-times. So identity, diversity and existence arise out of the internal nature of Space-Time. Time makes space distinct and space makes time distinct. Without time space would be only the blank space and without space time would be a bare now. If we regard space as supplying the element of identity then time will be regarded as supplying the element of diversity or *vice versa.* Therefore the union of identity and diversity is given with space-time itself. A point-instant is intrinsically itself, and other than every other point-instant, or group of other point-instants.

Identity is different from determinate being as the latter communicates with the category of relation'. Further, a point-instant, i.e., all existent occupies its own space-time due to its own intrinsic nature as Space-Time is the primary stuff out of which all things of this universe are made. The very space-time determines non-empirically a point-instant to occupy its own space-time. This occupancy of space-time is another name for the existence of a point-instant. This existence may be analysed into two elements viz. (1) identity and (2) difference. A point-instant, in the first place, is what it is, that is, it is identical with itself and secondly is not an isolated point of Space or Time in as much as a point of space is saturated with time and a point of time is saturated with space. Similarly, a point of Space cannot lead its life of isolation and becomes forced to be related to other point-instants.

The image of creating Being (onsia) as represented in the *Timaeus* should not be taken literally. Being is not a mixture of the same and the other. To be is to occupy a space-time. The exclusion of other space-time is not an integral part of Being. A group of point-instants (at least two) contains within itself internal difference. A point-instant has determinate being when it excludes other space-times. This exclusion is its relation to other space-times, not within itself but within space-time. Therefore identity with its relation of otherness is being. This otherness should not be taken as identical with identity. This otherness is an intrinsic relation of a point-instant to another. Without it the same would not be the same for to occupy one space-time means that it must not occupy another. Sameness and otherness are two aspects of Being. The idea of difference of an object from another involves the other which is external to the object. The identity of a point-instant is not one with its otherness. A point-instant is other than the other but cannot be identical with it (the other). Hegel, on the other hand, teaches that 'being is the same as not-being, and the two are merged into the category of becoming'. Being and nothing have been taken here in an abstract sense and hence being has become indistinguishable from not-being. Hegel says that becoming which is the first concrete notion is a synthesis of being and not-being. But how can abstraction be combined to produce a concrete notion ? Or, how can a concrete notion be analysed into two bare thoughts ? Therefore Being is always concrete and its otherness is always other than its identity. Bare being and not-being are never identical. Bare being is other than not-being.

Not-being is not a privative term. It is not the bare absence of being. It is identical with other-being. It means the occupation of a different space-time. The term 'not-red' means anything which whether coloured or not is not red but within the same universe of discourse it means any colour which excludes red. He clears the meaning of not-being by the following statement, 'But not-being whether numerical or generic is always different being, and remains being'. 'A mere blank negation is nothing at all. The nothing we can think of and experience is not nothing-at-all, but is an object of some kind and is a department of being. This corresponds to the ancient theory of negation taught in Plato's *Sophist*. M. Bergson holds a similar view in his *Creative Evolution*. He interprets disorder as a different order from what we call order, and repudiates the notion of nothing except as something different from the something which constitutes the circle of our experience. But Alexander differs from Bergson in this that negation is not a subjective attitude of mind. Negation is an objectively real character of things which denotes exclusion. Not-white is the character which excludes white. In this sense it is true that all determination is negation. An occupation of space-time in order to be definite must exclude other such occupation.

Let us now compare and contrast the view of S. Alexander with that of the Prābhākaras. The points of agreement consist in this that (1) nothing is a department of being, that nothing is not objectively real and that difference is an aspect of determinate being. The true import of the Prābhākara theory of difference is that the difference of an object is an aspect of another object from which it differs (*bhedastu svarūpatantram eva nahi svarūpamātraṃ bhedaḥ*).

There is a gulf of difference existing between these two theories of negation. Alexander's theory of negation follows from the ultimate metaphysical doctrine that Space-Time is the matrix of all being. It is a metaphysical deduction. Prabhākara bases his theory of negation upon experience. It is an *aposteriori* induction. Alexander translates his difference in terms of space-time but the Prābhākaras think of it in terms of its locus. Alexander gives a technical meaning to the term 'difference' but the Prābhākaras use it in a general sense. Space is not time. The difference of Space from Time cannot be the occupation of another space-time—the common form of all difference. Similarly, the difference of Time from Space cannot possess the common form of difference.

According to Alexander difference involves a reference to the other. He draws a distinction between identity and diversity. These two are independent aspects of determinate being. This view of negation corresponds to the old Jaina view of negation according to which negation is an aspect of reality (*vastudharma*). Bosanquet in his Logic refers to such a view. He holds that positivity and negativity are two aspects of Reality. He also denies a separate existence to negation. The Prābhākaras hold that diversity is logically dependent upon numerical identity. There is no factual separateness between otherness and identity. Alexander holds that otherness involves a reference to the other point-instants. But the epistemological problem concerning difference is conspicuous by its absence in the works of Alexander. The solution of the epistemological problem concerned throws light upon the nature of difference. A positive object is directly grasped by us. If negation is not distinct from a positive object then it should be cognised like a positive object. If the essence of negation consists in involving a reference to an object other than its locus then negation must be something other than a positive object. If it is not itself a determinate being then it should be a distinct quality of a determinate being. In any case it should be a distinct mode of reality. In other words, if otherness involves a reference beyond itself then it should be a distinct term. Alexander overlooks this side of the problem. The Prābhākaras are more consistent in their theory of difference which is simple otherness. They draw a distinction between ontological and logical difference. The logical difference of the Prābhākaras is the real diversity of Alexander. Alexander analyses a determinate being into two elements viz. (1) identity and (2) diversity. If diversity is different from identity then it is difficult for Alexander to define the difference of identity from diversity or the difference of diversity from identity in terms of space-time. An unending series of differences follows logically from such a theory. Moreover, if the distinction between identity and diversity remains ever sharp then a determinate being does not represent a synthesis of identity and diversity but like a mythical man-lion, should admit of two irreconcilable parts. If he agrees to such a bifurcation of reality then diversity becomes a distinct mode of reality.

The influence of the Prābhākara theory of negation upon the rival schools is not negligible. It has roused the mind of these critics to devise a new line of defence. The Philosophers of the rival schools have accepted partially or completely the Prābhākara theory of negation. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla hold that the mutual exclusion of the point-instants is objectively real. But this ontological negation is not a distinct term. It is identical with the point-instants themselves. This is essentially the Prābhākara theory of difference. Udayana and old logicians hold that negation located upon negation is identical with its locus. The view of the old logicians has been referred to by Mathurānātha, Jagadīśa and others. Udayana holds that universals and exclusive particularity (*viśeṣa*) are self-differentiating principles. The concept of positive difference has also been accepted by Udayana. *Pṛthaktva* (a positive quality of difference holding between two substances) and *vaidharmya* (dissimilarity) are illustrations of it. Though Udayana holds that negation is a distinct term yet he has made some concessions to the Prābhākara theory of negation. Śaṃkara Miśra and Viśvanātha Pañcānana have accepted the Prābhākara theory of difference because it serves the purpose of Philosophy. According to the Mādhyamikas the Absolute is the negation of the phenomenal world. Therefore negation is not a distinct term in this system. Negation has the most exalted ontological status. Citsukha adopts the Prābhākara theory of negation in toto. The metaphysical drift of this theory is that the Absolute (*brahman*) is the negation of the universe. The negation of the universe is not a separate term. It is not a phenomenon. But it is identical with the Absolute. There is difference between the meanings of the term negation used in the Mādhyamika school and the Advaita school since the Absolute of the Mādhyamika school is different from that of the Advaita school. But negation is the highest reality in these two schools.

The Bhāṭṭas have subjected the Prābhākara theory of negation to a severe criticism. They have put forth all their energy to criticise the epistemological aspect of the problem. The Naiyāyikas such as Gaṅgeśa and his followers have discussed the epistemological side of the problem of negation in order to refute the Prābhākara theory of negation. We shall discuss it later on. Varadarāja in his *Tārkikarakṣā* has discussed the metaphysical aspect of the problem. He meets the argument of Śālikanātha Miśra. If negation is denied on the ground that its locus cannot be defined without involving the fallacy of *petitio principii* or the fallacy of an unending series of *kaivalyas* (the isolated character of the locus) then they should sacrifice the category of quality at the altar of the same logical argument. Let us discuss this objection elaborately. Varadarāja holds that it is a suicidal criticism. In which substratum (substance) the quality—the colour 'blue' inheres? Does it inhere in the blue substance or not? If it inheres in the blue substance then it inheres in itself. In other words, it is an instance of *petitio principii*. If it does not inhere in the blue substance then it should inhere in a coloured substance which is other than a blue one. In that case, it is an instance of contradiction. Now, the Prābhākaras may hold that the colour 'blue' inheres in a discoloured substance i.e. in a substance to which no colour belongs. But such an argument presupposes the distinct objectivity of negation. But the Prābhākaras may hold that the colour blue belongs to the only substratum. The adjective 'only' has a positive form but a negative meaning. If negation is not accepted as a distinct term them categories like Quality etc. should be discarded (*guṇādipadārtho'pi dattajalāñjaliḥ syāt—Tārkikarakṣā*—p. ·114.). The ·Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas hold that negation is not featureless (*niḥsvabhāvaḥ*). It is not unreal (*tuccha*). The Prābhākaras hold that the negation of the Naiyāyikas is a blank nothing. If it is proved that some definite character belongs to negation then the criticism of the Prābhākaras becomes pointless. The crux of the problem lies in the possibility of the relation existing between negatum and negation and between negation and its locus.

6. The Bhāṭṭas.

The Bhāṭṭas follow the track of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas in defining the category of negation, In the earlier works of the Mīmāṃsā school the problem of negation has not been fairly discussed. In Jaimini's *sūtra* the logical aspect of the problem has been referred to. He admits of two types of logical negation viz. (1) *paryyudāsa* and *prasajyapaatiṣedha*. The epistemological side of the problem has been mentioned by Śabara Svāmin. The metaphysical aspect of the problem has been tackled by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the founder of the Bhāṭṭa school, in his *Ślokavārttika*.

Kumārila's negative criticism of the Buddhist theory of negation throws light on the nature of negation that is is objectively real. Now, it should be ascertained whether negation is a distinct mode of reality. The conclusion of his followers on this point is very clear. Maṇḍana Miśra, Vācaspati Miśra, Umbeka Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathi Miśra, the two Nārāyaṇas, Gāgā Bhaṭṭa and others hold that negation cannot be equated with its substratum. Some hold that Kumārila makes two conflicting statements with regard to the nature of negation, viz. '*bhāvāntaram abhāvo' nyo na kaścid anirūpaṇāt* (*Nirālambanavāda* sl. 118). and '*svarūpapararūpābhyāṃ nityaṃ sadasadātmake vastūni jñāyate kaiścidrūpaṃ kiñcit kadācana*' (*Abhāvavāda*—Sl. 12). He holds that negation is not other than a positive object. But he asserts later on that negation is a distinct object. How is this riddle to be solved ? Bhaṭṭa Umbeka and Sucarita Miśra the commentators of Kumārila have solved this problem. According to them the first statement of Kumārila represents the possible Buddhist answer to the objection that in the Buddhist system all acts of negative consciousness are objectless. The Buddhists hold that the consciousness of a positive object is capable of assuming the form of negative consciousness by the aid of imagination. The second statement of Kumārila points to his true view of negation. Negation has been termed *asat*. This is the old epithet of negation. But he has not defined 'negation'. Vācaspati in his *Nyāyakaṇikā* defines it as other than a positive real (*sadvyāvṛtti*). The Vaiśeṣika definition of negation has been introduced by him into the Mīmāṃsa literature. But it has been pointed out already by the Advaitins that this definition is an instance of *petitio principii*. But the definition of negation has been suggested by Kumārila. He has proved that negative consciousness is generated by a distinct proof. According to him there is a great gulf fixed between positive and negative consciousness. The object of negative consciousness is negation. This definition of negation has been virtually given by Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjarī*. In a sense Kumārila is a great annotator of Vātsyāyana.

Kumārila embraces the position of the realists and defends it against the forceful criticism of the Buddhists. He modifies the Vaiśeṣika principles of metaphysics to some extent though he maintains the general feature of the Vaiśeṣika Philosophy. He establishes the pluralistic universe of the Vaiśeṣikas. His refutation of the category of *samavāya* relation is one of the striking features of his system. It is replaced by the relation of identity-in-difference (*tādātmya*). Now. let us turn our attention to the problem of negation. According to Kumārila every object consists of two elements positive (*sadrūpa*) and negative (*asadrūpa*). The negation of all objects other than the object under discussion (*pararūpa*) constitutes an element of the said object i.e., the negative element. The object itself constitutes its positive aspect (*svarūpa*). These two elements are the essential constituents of every object. This is implied by the phrase (*sadasadātmakaṃ vastu*). The special feature of his thesis is that the relation of identity-in-difference holds between negatum and negation and between negation and its locus. Kumārila gives a reply to the Buddhist objection that a substratum cannot contain negation by means of the relation of *viśeṣaṇatā* (the relation of the qualifier to the qualified) only. Again, he attempts to bridge the gulf fixed between negation and negatum by the Vaiśeṣikas by means of the relation of identity-in-difference. He does not abide by the dictates of the law of contradiction. He solves the problem of negation from the logical standpoint. The identity of the opposites is the basic formula of Kumārila. If we take away the relation of inherence—an inseparable relation from the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics and fill up its vacant place by the relation of identity-in-difference then we have a rough sketch of Kumārila's metaphysics. Kumārila states this relation of identity-in-difference clearly in his chapter on negation. He says '*na hyatyantamabhedo'sti rūpādivadihāpi naḥ./ dharmayor bheda iṣṭohi dharmyabhede'pi naḥ sthite / udbhavābhibhavātmatvāt grahaṇaṃ cāvatiṣṭate.* (Sl. 19-20) Sucarita Miśra in his commentary holds that negation is not absolutely identical with its substratum. In other words, the relation of bare identity does not hold between them as it does not subsist between attributes such as colour etc. and their substance (*abhāvasyāpi rūpādivadatyantābhedābhāvād iti*—p. 201). He also holds that negation is an aspect of concrete reality, that negativity and positivity are two distinct aspects of reality and that though the aspects are identical with their substratum yet they are distinct from it (*bhāvābhāvātmanor dharmayo* *dharmyabhedc'pi sthite bhedo' pīṣṭa ityarthaḥ*). The manifest aspect of concrete reality is sensed by us whereas the unmanifest aspect is not directly grasped but the substratum is intuited by us even when its suppressed aspect is not perceived by us. If the substratum were absolutely identical with its aspects then it would have been both ·manifest and unmanifest at the same time. But reality is never cognised as manifest and otherwise at the sametime (*na hi ekameva tattvam udbhūtam abhibhūtaṃ ceti pratīyate iti*). The next point that the relation of identity-in-difference holds between negation and negatum has been discussed in *Kusumāñjali* and *Laghucandrikā.* Brahmānanda puts the view of the Bhāṭṭas in a nutshell thus : '*abhedasya sambandhatvena kalpitasya pratiyogyanuogibhyāmabhāve sambandhatvasambhave pratiyogitvānuyogitvayoḥ atiriktayoḥ sambandhatve gauravāt* (*Laghucandrikā* p. 548). This view of relation is developed out of the typical form of the judgment of difference that A is not B. If the negative particle 'not' is taken out of the negative proposition 'A is not B' then A is identical with B. Now, if 'not' is inserted into the proposition then the negative proposition also points to the relation of identity—holding between the terms of it. But in a negative proposition the relation of identity is twice applied. Not-B is related to A by means of the relation of identity. The relation of identity also exists between 'Not' and B. The negative particle 'not' denotes negation, difference. Some interpreters of Kumārila assert that negation is a positive object involving some reference to other terms (*hhāvāntaram abhāvo hī kayācittu vyapekṣayā*). But these thinkers do not give a true estimate of the real position of Kumārila. We shall discuss this point in connection with the criticism of Kumārila's theory of negation.

In European Philosophy we come across views parallel to that of Kumārila. Spinoza's well-known proposition "Determinatio est negatio" points to the fact that negation belongs to the nature of things themselves. Thus a negative judgment is the original expression of the knowledge of a real object. A figure is determined because it is not the space which surrounds it. It is comprehended by us as a limitation of the infinite. In other words, it is understood by us by the aid of negation. Thomas Campanella subscribes to a similar view. According to him every object consists in yes and no i.e., being and not-being. Every particular object retains its uniqueness because it is not identical with something else. "Man is" that is his affirmation. But he is man only because he is not stone, not a lion, not a donkey, hence he is at once being, and not-being' (Sigwart's *Logic* p. 126). The implication of these two views is that negation is not absolutely different from their locus. Not-stone, not-lion etc are the elements of the concrete existence of man. Man's existence as man is not the whole of the concrete existence of man. It constitutes only the positive aspect of his concrete reality. The positive and negative aspects of man are not identical. There is a great gulf fixed between them. But these two aspects become absorbed in the concrete whole of man. If these two aspects do not reciprocally pass on to each other and no contradiction arises thereof then there is no need of a synthesis which solves this contradiction and unifies them retaining their mutual distinction. The whole remains inexplicable. Kumārila has foresight enough to visualise this situation. He holds that the object negated and its negation are neither absolutely different nor absolutely identical. In Kumārila's system negation becomes the middle term through the medium of which the two opposites pass on to each other and become identical. But a contradiction does not arise from the identity of two opposites since experience guarantees such an identity. Hegel obeys the law of contradiction at the second step. If the thesis becomes identical with its antithesis then a contradiction arises. A third step is necessary in order to solve this contradiction. But Kumārila holds that the necessity of the synthesis of the the thesis and the antithesis is not a logical demand. The concrete reality is supplied to us by experience. We have proved already that the concrete reality is not abstractly identical with its aspects. Thus there is no room for dialectical movement in Kumārila's empirical system.

Kumārila's theory of negation is not very exhaustive. He makes mention of four types of negation and illustrates them. But he does neither define nor distinguish them. His followers have completed the task of their master. But they have followed the footsteps of the metaphysicians of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools of thought. Whenever a change of view is noticed in these two schools a corresponding change is also noticed in the Mīmāṃsā literature. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi has discarded pre-negation as a distinct type of negation. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa has followed him blindly and done the same. Thus we see that the Mīmkṃsakas lack originality in the matter of definition and classification of negation. They look forward to the metaphysicians of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools for the same. We shall not cite many illustrations viz. the acceptance of two broad divisions of negation etc. to establish the point at issue since it is a minor one.

The metaphysical aspect of this problem has been criticised by Vidyānanda Svāmī, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Gauḍa Brahmānanda. A host of critics have criticised the epistemological aspect of his theory of negation. Vidyānanda in his *Aṣṭasāhasrī* subjects the theory of Kumārila to a severe criticism. He holds that there cannot be an absolute breach between positive and negative beings. Kumārila subscribes to the view that negation is identical with a positive being. In that case, reality should be either positive or negative but cannot be both. This criticism is due to the misunderstanding of the position of Kumārila. Kumārila does not hold that reality is negative. Negative is an aspect of reality. There is concrete identity between negation and its substratum. He draws distinction between negative and positive aspects of reality. Vidyānanda mistakes concrete identity for an abstract one. Therefore, his criticism is based upon confusion.

Madhusūdana points out that the reality of the Bhāṭṭa school is divided into two irreconcilable elements and looks like the mythical man-lion. The affirmative aspect of reality is sharply distinct from its positive aspect. The unbridgable gulf fixed between negation and positive being is implied by his epistemological theory. He makes an attempt at constructing a brigde over this gulf by means of the relation of identity-in-difference. Madhusūdana overlooks this aspect of his theory and draws the metaphysical conclusion himself. His hasty criticism is based upon an imperfect knowledge of Kumārila's system.

Gauḍa Brahmānanda subjects the theory of negation, particularly the concept of difference, to a severe criticism. According to him the concept of difference involves self-contradiction. The knowledge of difference is expressed by a judgment. The form of this judgment is that a pot is not a cloth. It may be reduced to the symbolical form that A is not B. 'Not' denotes difference. Difference is here determined by B. It involves a reference to B. B is related to it by the relation of identity-in-difference. B is non-different from this difference. A, the substratum of this difference, is also non-different from it. Thus, A is non-different from B since both A and B are non-different from difference. Thus, difference presupposes the identity of the differents. Now, Brahmānanda holds that this identity is the abstract identity which admits of no difference. Therefore, he concludes that difference which contradicts its background viz. the fundamental identity lying beneath all difference and explaining them is merely an appearance. There is an element of truth in this criticism. But the whole of it is unjustifiable. Difference is an element of reality because reality is concrete reality which does not exclude its aspects and impoverish itself. Bare identity is as good as non-entity. Empiricism does not point to such reality. To an Absolutist like Brahmānanda concrete identity is unthinkable. He takes the non-difference of Kumārila in the sense of an abstract identity. His criticism is based upon the misapprehension of Kumārila's true position.

Kumārila's theory is open to two serious objections. (1) Kumārila has worked out his thesis under the influence of Vātsyāyana. His epistemology of negation lays much stress upon the uniqueness of negative consciousness. The object of his epistemological theory is to prove the reality of a negative fact. The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas hold that negation is objectively real and is a distinct category. Kumārila tries to reaffirm this conclusion in a better manner—in a more convincing way. The Buddhists have raised an objection to the relation which has been asserted by the Vaiśeṣikas etc. to subsist between negation and the object negated. The objection is a hard nut to crack. No satisfactory answer has been given to it by the early logicians. Kumārila solves this problem by the assumption of the relation of identity-in-difference (*tādātmya*). Similarly, he solves the problem of the relation between negation and its substratum by means of the same relation. Now, let us turn our attention to the fact of difference. Difference is an aspect of reality (*dharma*). Thus reality should be the unity of all differences though it is not exclusive of all differences. Both difference and identity are real but difference should be subordinate to the basic identity. Kumārila should have taught monism. His pluralism comes into conflict with the implied metaphysical meaning of his theory of negation. Moreover, it is impossible for him to reach the monistic conclusion through the avenue of empiricism. He requires the aid of a higher form of knowledge viz. reason. (2) The proposition that the relation of identity-in-difference holds between negation and its substratum should be drawn from experience. Nobody experiences the negation of an object on its locus in the form that the negation of an object is its locus but the locus contains it. The experience of the negation of a jar on the floor is not expressed in the form that the negation of a jar is the floor but the negation of a jar belongs to the floor. The very form of this negative judgment points to their perpetual difference. This difference cannot be neglected. Experience does not supply us with such materials as will constitute a bond of unity in the midst of difference. Let us take the case of difference. Man is not lion, nor a horse. The judgment does not imply that a man himself is the difference from a lion, from a horse but it asserts that a man has such differences. There is a good deal of difference between the meanings of 'is' and 'has'. 'Has' denotes absolute difference. The relation of identity-in-difference cannot hold between negation and the object negated. Negation is always determined by the corresponding object negated. If the negatum becomes identical with its negation then negation becomes featureless. Such a negation cannot be experienced by us. Kumārila also holds that the remembrance of the negatum is one of the conditions of negative awareness. If the distinction between negation and negatum disappears in some cases then negation either turns out to be the featureless void or becomes the very object which it should negate. In either case, negation cannot be cognised as negation. Therefore the solution of Kumārila is not satisfactory since it is not based upon experience. The assumption of the relation of identity-in-difference makes no improvement upon the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of negation but on the contrary it comes into conflict with his pluralism and contradicts the very essence of negation. Thus the fall of Kumārila's theory of negation leads on to a new epoch in the evolution of the concept of negation.

7. *Negation of the Advaita System*

In the Advaita system of Śaṃkara school the problem of negation has been thoroughly discussed. There are many views in the different works of this school. We shall give a sketch of these views in a logical order.

Śaṃkara, Padmapāda, Govindānanda etc. have discussed the logical aspect of the problem only. Śaṃkara holds that the negative particle 'not' denotes the negation of its correlate term (*nañāścaiṣa svabhavo yat sambandhino bhāvaṃ bodhayatīti*). Thus he recognises the distinctive character of negative consciousness and holds that negation is a distinct term. But he does not discuss particularly the ontological status of negation. It follows from his metaphysical conclusion that negation is not real in the sense in which the Absolute is reai.

(1) Sureśvara has elaborately discussed the problem of negation in his *Sambandha-vārttika* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya-vārttika.* He has taken into account the epistemological and metaphysical aspects of the problem. His main thesis is to prove monism viz. that the Absolute is only real. Perception reveals difference and negation. He refutes the category of negation and particularly that of difference.

Sureśvara holds that negation is unreal (*avastu*). Negative consciousness is an instance of hallucination. He takes a negative fact and examining it closely shows that it cannot be real since it involves self-contradiction. His dialectical argument is as follows : Is the negation of a jar self-determined or dependent ? If it is held to be self-sufficient then the accepted hypothesis that negation is determined by its correlate term, i.e., the positive object contrasted is to be abandoned. If it is held to be dependent then it is to be admitted that it depends upon the positive object contrasted for its definiteness. Let us take, for example, the negation of a jar. The negation of a jar to be dependent upon a jar should rest upon it. The pre-negation or the post-negation of a jar cannot rest upon a jar since a jar is absent when one of these two negation is present. The mutual exclusion of a jar is not at all possible since the consciousness of difference is a glaring instance of petitio principii. The absolute negation of a jar is also unreal since this negation is held to be eternal but a jar is transient. The negation of a jar cannot also be held to be determined by some object other than a jar. A positive object in order to determine a negative fact must be related to it. There is no relation between negative and positive objects. One of the three following relations holds between two positive terms. They are (1) conjunction (2) inherence and (3) identity-in-difference. The relata are always independently perceived by us. But a negative object is never independently known. Therefore a negative object cannot enter into relationship with a positive object. A negative object, being itself not self-determined cannot determine another negative object. Therefore, neither the positive object contrasted nor some other positive object nor a negative object other than a particular negative object can determine a particular negative object. If a negative object is not determined by the object contrasted by it then it remains ever indeterminate—an empty blank. If negation does not negate then it becomes devoid of its essence. Moreover, it may be urged that negation is experienced as determined by the object negated. On the strength of this experience it should be acknowledged that negation is determined by the positive object negated by it. But this contention of the upholder of negation is not tenable since the object negated should be related to negation in order to determine it. If the function of negation is to negate an object then the object negated is, *ex hypothesi*, absent on the locus of negation. A relation implies that the relation should hold between two present terms. If one of two relata is absent then relation cannot take place. Therefore negation can in no way be related to the positive object contrasted. Moreover, negation requires a substratum to stand upon. It must be related to its locus in order to be located upon it. This substratum is always positive since negation is never self-sufficient. But we have already pointed out that negation cannot be related to a positive object. Thus negation cannot be determined by the positive object contrasted. It cannot stand upon a locus. He concludes that it is *nirūpa* (devoid of a characteristic feature) and *asadātman* (absolutely unreal). He says that it lacks even subsistence which an illusory object possesses since to have existence means to be positive. Thus Sureśvara ignores the evidence of negative awareness on the ground of logical contradiction.

Sureśvara takes the problem of difference. He holds that difference is not real. It has only an imaginary existence. It does not inhere in the universe and dissects the underlying unity of the universe. If it belongs to Reality in a real sense then a question arises whether difference includes Reality within itself or Reality includes difference within itself. If it is held that difference is more fundamental than Reality itself then difference will surely disintegrate the underlying unity of the universe. But this process of disintegration will know no stop. The numerical identity of every object will be vivisected. The universe will be reduced to a great void. If it is held that Reality is more fundamental than difference then the unity underlying all the objects of this universe becomes irrefutable. Difference presupposes this basic unity. The consciousness of difference which contradicts the implicit awareness of this unity involves self-contradiction since such an awareness undermines the very foundation of difference. It is natural for Sureśvara to conclude that difference has only imaginary existence.

According to Sureśvara difference is a positive object. It is not a sub-class of negation. He is silent on the point whether difference is a mental fact like an illusory object or it has phenomenal existence. The statement that difference has imaginary existence is not clear since every object of this universe is superimposed upon the Absolute according to the Advaitins.

The influence of the Buddhist theory of negation upon that of Sureśvara is undeniable.

He has given a new shape to this theory. In his opinion the Buddhist criticism of the realistic theory of negation is irrefutable. Negation is not objectively real. But the Buddhists have failed to draw out the metaphysical implication of their theory of negation. It points to the monism of the Absolute. A similar view is noticed in Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya.* Bhartṛhari is also a great advocate of monism. Though his monism is different from that of Sureśvara. In his work there is no room for real difference and negation which is objectively real. According to him negation is not objectively real. It is devoid of all characters (*nīrūpa*). It is absolutely unreal (*tuccha*). It is imaginary. The positive and negative reals of the rival systems are all imaginary (*kalpita*). A positive real cannot be supplanted by a negative real because the conception of being makes it exist through all ages. Moreover, negation can be in no case supposed to be opposed to being. Let us take an example and see whether an individual negation can oppose a positive real. The negation of a jar is held to be opposed to a jar. To oppose it negation must have some definite character. The negation of a jar should be qualified by a jar. But negation cannot be qualified by a positive real as the very idea of negation consists in its exclusion from all positive reals. Thus a great gulf has been fixed between negativity and positivity. Now, it will be sheerly impossible for a thinker to give definiteness to negation by superadding a qualification in terms of a positive real to it. If negation exists at all it must be held that it is devoid of all characters and distinctions and is beyond the scope of our knowledge. He concludes that negation is not objectively real. He differs from Sureśvara in one respect. Sureśvara is busy with the negative criticism of the thesis that negation is objectively real but does not explain the experience of negation. Bhartṛhari explains it. His positive theory will be discussed later on.

In Greek Philosophy we come across a parallel view. Parmenides holds that the void is not objectively real but is a mere appearance. The essence of his teaching may be summed up in the following extract from Weber's *History of Philosophy*. "Being can only be conceived as eternal, immutable, immovable, continuous, indivisible, infinite, unique. There is for the thinker but one single being—the All-One, in whom all individual differences are merged. The being that thinks and the being that is thought are the same thing." (p. 28). The proof of his thesis is as follows. An object which has being must come either from being or from not-being. If it comes from being then it is self caused and therefore is eternal. It cannot be held that it comes from not-being. Similarly, an existent object cannot pass into nothing. It passes into being. In that case, change is impossible. He also holds that being is continuous because there is no void—no break between being and being. He supposes that the inter-val between being and being is something real. This something is being. Therefore, this being, in stead of dividing beings unites them together. Thus the single being constitutes this universe. He argues that being depends upon either being or upon that which does not exist. In both cases it is independent. In other words, it is self-sufficient. Thus, the conclusion of the Eleatic system is that Being is only reality. The void or negation has no objective reality. It is only an appearance. It is illusory. It is a creature of imagination. In other words, it is unreal.

In spite of a great divergence regarding the nature of the ultimate reality Parmenides and Sureśvara agree in the point that negation is not objectively real but is, on the contrary, unreal. They also hold that difference is an appearance.

Let us now examine the view of Sureśvara. He has nowhere explicitly stated that negative experience is an instance of hallucination. If a question is put to Sureśvara regarding the nature of negative experience then it seems to me that he will meet challenges on this point by an attitude of prudent obscurity. He remains obscure because he is insolvent. If he were forced to speak whatever answer he would give would be most certainly that negative awareness is an instance of hallucination. A negative idea is nothing but a floating idea. It is attached to no locus. Such a theory comes into conflict with the general position of the Śaṃkarite Advaita school. According to this school *brahman*, the Absolute, is the support of every conceivable object. The concept of a floating idea contradicts the fundamental truth of this school. Moreover, an unreal object is beyond the scope of our knowledge. Our intellect fails to represent an unreal object. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Advaitasiddhi* has conclusively proved that an unreal object transcends our knowledge. If negation is unreal then Sureśvara fails to explain negative experience. Bradley has also proved that every idea qualifies reality and that no idea floats absolutely. He removes at first a false assumption that Reality is identified with the world of actual fact. Bradley says, "The real world on this view is a group and series of actual events, and the test in the end is continuous connexion with my felt waking body". He establishes the existence of diverse worlds. The multiplicity of worlds has been recognized as a fact by Prof. James in his *Psychology*. Bradley holds that 'an idea which floats suspended above one of them is attached to another. 'Every idea on the contrary is an adjective which qualifies a real world, and it is loose only when you take it in relation to another sphere of reality'. 'And hence when an idea floats above, and is even repelled by, one region of the world, there is available always another region in which it inheres and to which as an adjective it is attached.' He defines the imaginary to be such as is excluded by the actual fact or 'falls outside of any kind of world which is taken as actual. Reality is a whole which extends beyond any special world. An idea which is expelled from one sphere qualifies another and is real in that special sphere. Thus Bradley holds that all negation is relative. "Negation, whatever else it is, is repulsion, repulsion not absolute but from a subject formed by distinction within reality. Reality therefore is always wider than the subject which negates, and beyond this subject we have always a region taken in some sense to be real. And the idea, which is repelled from the subject, falls within this other world and qualifies it." This other world is constituted by 'the vague residue which remains after the subject has been selected. Bradley admits, "We cannot have a consistent idea of nothingness if that is made absolute". If Sureśvara means this much only by his repudiation of the theory of negation of the realists then his treatment of the problem of negation is incomplete. Bradley faces the most difficult problem whether the incompatibles, repelled from the real world, are united in one subject in another world since the repulsion from the real world amounts to the removal of the point of identity through which the incompatibles are to collide against these. Bradley's answer to this point is that in an imaginary world the incompatibles are united in one subject. This answer is incomplete and defective. We shall discuss this point later on. In spite of this defect the hypothesis of floating ideas is untenable. In fine, we can safely hold that Sureśvara's theory of negation is either incomplete or inconsistent with the spirit of the Advaita Philosophy of the Śaṃkariṭe school.

The second type of the theory of negation has been represented by Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭārakācāryya in the *Nyāyamakaranda*, Ānandajñāna in his *Tarkasaṃgraha*, Prakāśānanda in his *Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī* and by Kṛṣṇānanda in his *Siddhānta-siddhāñjana*.

(a) Śrī Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭārakācāryya has discussed the problem of difference critically. He draws most of his negative criticisms from Maṇḍana Miśra's *Brahmasiddhi* and Sureśvara's *Sambandhavārttika*. His positive thesis is based upon his negative criticisms of the theses of the rival schools. According to him the negative experience as well as the experience of difference is illusory. The experience of difference involves contradiction. It does not persist till the realisation of the unity of the Absolute. It is contradicted by our inferential knowledge. Therefore difference should be treated like an ordinary illusory object. It is a mental fact. It is not identical with the mental process which contributes to the coming into being of such a fact. A mental fact lies beyond its formative mental process. It is referred to by such a process. He has discussed the problem whether a mutual exclusion constitutes a great gulf fixed between two individual souls. His solution of the problem follows logically from his treatment of the problem of difference. If difference is merely illusory then a mutual exclusion which stands between two individual souls is necessarily illusory. It has no existence but has only subsistence in the language of Neo-realists.

He has subjected the Buddhist theory of difference to a severe criticism. It involves unanswerable epistemological difficulties. The direct result of the dynamic view of the universe is the atomic view of our cognition. An act of cognition reveals only one object. The awareness of difference presupposes the awareness of two objects differing. An act of cognition has no two successive acts of illumination. An act of perception which illuminates its object can reveal neither simultaneously nor successively the difference of its object from another object. Therefore, the difference of an object remains ever unknown and unknowable.

Citsukha, Ānandabodha's commentator, has tackled the problem more intricately. He has paid his attention to all the possible answers which a Buddhist might give and reviewed them carefully. He has pointed out that the awareness of difference is not a piece of knowledge by complication like the visual perception of a piece of sandal as fragrant. I shall not discuss the details of his arguments but only touch upon the central part of his negative criticism.

Ānandabodha and Citsukha admit that there is an element of truth in the Buddhist theory of negation. The relation which is supposed to exist between a contradictory negation and the positive contraries included in it is a great source of trouble to the Buddhists. When an object is perceived its contradictory negation is automatically differentiated from it. A positive object is only intuited. It is an *exparte negatio.* The revelation of an object is equivalent to the illumination of its difference from its contradictory negation. The illumination of an object and its distinction represents one act of intuition. An act of intuition is both positive and negative. There is no logical basis of two distinct kinds of perceptual judgments (positive and negative).

The distinction of an object from its contradictory negation does not necessarily imply its distinction from all its positive contraries which are held to be comprised within the contradictory negation. The Buddhists firmly stick to the point that an invariable relation of concomitance holds between the contradictory negation of an object and the positive contraries of it. If the contradictory negation is held to be revealed then the positive contraries which are necessarily connected with contradictory negation also should be grasped. The difference between an object and its positive contrary cannot be established. It involves a circular reasoning. In order to prove this difference the Buddhists hold that there is a relation of invariable concomitance between the contradictory negation of it and its positive contraries. This knowledge of the invariable relation presupposes their difference. This difference existing between them presupposes the knowledge of the invariable relation holding between them. We observe many a colour simultaneously (rainbow) but observe none of them as excludent of its positive contraries at the same time. The Buddhist theory of difference and negation is based upon the mal-observation of facts. If an object is presented to our consciousness as distinct from its contradictory negation then such a presentation does not necessarily lead up to the conclusion that the awareness of an object involves the awareness of its distinction from all its positive contraries.

Then he subjects the theory of negation of the Prābhākaras to a severe criticism. He has developed the negative criticism of Sureśvara. This point will be discussed later on. The main point of this criticism is that if difference is identical with its substratum then the numerical identity of the locus of difference will vanish from the real world.

The second point of his criticism is that if difference cannot be metaphysically distinguished from its substratum then it must be admitted that every object of this universe has only relative existence (*parasparāpekṣāyāṃ svabhāvavyavasthitau na ekasyāpi ātmalābhaḥ*). The definite knowledge of an object as distinct from others will be impossible since such a knowledge is a glaring instance of circular reasoning. Such a difference is superimposed upon an object by our imagining mind. It turns out to be merely subjective on a careful analysis of its nature. Thus objects by their very nature are devoid of difference.

He has also criticised the Vaiśeṣika theory of mutual negation. According to him the mutual negation of an individual soul from the Supreme soul is uncognizable. The perception of such a negation is out of the question.

He arrives at the conclusion that the awareness of difference is illusory since all sources of the knowledge of difference presuppose the awareness of difference, i.e., they simply beg the question. He asserts his conclusion strongly that the experience of difference like the experience of difference in a dream is illusory since it does not result from a valid source of knowledge.

Citsukha raises a very subtle point which invites our special attention. Is the awareness of this inferential knowledge true ? If it is true then the awareness of difference which is part and parcel of this experience is also true. The experience of difference is not always illusory. It challenges the validity of Ānandabodha's inference that the experience of difference is illusory. If the awarness of the inferential knowledge is untrue then the inference of Ānandabodha carries no conviction since the falsehood of an object explains the untrue character of its awareness. Is an escape from this dilemma possible ? Citsukha tries to solve this difficulty. He asserts that the awareness of this inference is untrue but points to some deep meaning. Every body should agree that the illusory experience produced by defective sense-organs points to the true experience that such a sense-organ is defective and illusory experience i. e. experience in a dream leads on to the real experience of joy (*duṣṭendriyaviṣayapramitijanakatvena...svapnadarśanasya ca satyasukhapramitijanakatvācceti bhāvaḥ*—N. M. Vyākhya p. 55). Citsukha means to say that the mission of the Vedantists is to carry out a destructive programme. They can reach their desired goal viz., the establishment of the illusory character of difference even if the inferential knowledge that the experience of difference is illusory is not truly grasped.

Are we really satisfied with this defence of Citsukha ? The Naiyāyikas have put a serious problem to them. The Vedantins are fully alive to the danger of being inconsistent if they accept the first horn of the above dilemma. The second horn seems to them to be less dangerous. Citsukha's answer represent the second course that the awareness of an inferential knowledge may be false even if the inferential knowledge is true. This assumption is untenable. Citsukha should have answered the Naiyāyikas from their own standpoint. But he goes away from their assumption with regard to this answer. The Naiyāyikas hold that the awareness of an inference is always untrue if the inference itself is wrong. The assumption of Citsukha does not get the support of experience. Therefore, the critics of Citsukha are not satisfied with this answer. The whole edifice of the theory of Ānandabodha depends upon Citsukha's defence for its very existence. But defence of Citsukha is far from being satisfactory. Therefore the illusory character of difference does not stand scrutiny.

Ānandajñāna in his *Tarkasaṃgraha* discusses the problem of negation. His positive thesis is based upon a negative criticism of the Vaiśeṣika theory of negation. He has followed in the foot-steps of Śrīharṣa and Citsukha in his destructive criticism. The distinctive feature of the negative aspect of his thesis consists in the refutation of the argument advanced by the author of *Mānamanohara* in favour of negation as a distinct term. The argument represented in the above work runs thus :

All synthetic propositions contain predicates which are distinct from their subjects.
The proposition that this spot is devoid of a jar is a synthetic proposition.
. ˙ . The proposition that the spot is devoid of a jar contains a predicate which is distinct from its subject.

In other words, the negation of a jar is a distinct term. Ānandajñāna throws light upon his theory of negation in connection with the criticism of this argument. He points out that the nature of the predicate viz. the negation of a jar is not revealed by the above syllogistic argument. He admits that the predicate is distinct from the subject of a synthetic proposition but the reality of the predicate is not guaranteed by the above argument. A negation is an object which is superimposed upon Reality (*ādhyāsika*). Ānandajñāna contends that the reality of a predicate does not logically follow from the above premises (*dṛṣṭānte'pi tathāvidhasādhyasampratipattyā tasya sādhyavikalatvāt*. T. S. p. 133).

The positive aspect of his thesis is a logical development of his criticism. He holds that the concept of negation is riddled with contradictions. Its existence is merely imaginary. it is superimposed upon the Absolute by the begininngless *avidyā*. It is a mental fact which is experienced by us. It has no reality since it involves logical contradiction (*bhāvābhāvavibhāgabhāgi sakalamapī dvaitam...nirvikāracaitanye anādyanirvācyāvidyayā samāropitam*—Ibid p. 133; *Pratītimātrasiddhau bhāvābhāvau na prāmāṇayuktisiddhau* p. 15).

The negative criticism of Ānandajñāna is not fair. He has criticised the view of *Mānamanohara* from the stand-point of Vedānta Metaphysics. He violates the general laws which govern a controversy. He follows blindly the path of Citsukha. The commentator of Citsukha, having realised the unfairness of such a procedure, has advanced counter-arguments in order to refute the hypothesis of *Mānamanohara*.

(c) Prakāśānanda in his *Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī* has discussed the problem of difference minutely. His negative criticism is mainly directed against Udayana's theory of difference. He lacks originality. He follows in the foot-steps of Śrīharṣa like an obedient pupil. On rare occasions his intellect emits sparks of free thinking. His contention against Udayana is that three diverse types of difference cannot be classed under the general idea of difference. The general idea of difference cannot comprise within itself differentia (*vāidharmya*), mutual negation (*anyonyābhāva*) and the difference which constitutes the individuality of all objects (*svarūpabheda*). He makes a passing remark in connection with the review of the rival theories that the Prābhākara theory of difference is the most formidable of all rival theories. Now, he touches the core of the problem of difference. He holds that difference is absolutely colourless since it does not stand upon solid ground. The undifferentiated Absolute is the locus of every object of this universe. Difference which contradicts the Absolute cannot find its locus in the Absolute (Vedānta S. M. p. 238). The commentator of Prakāśānanda makes the position of his master clear. Difference or negation has only imaginary existence since it is an evolute of *māyā*. It is subjective. It does not belong to the external world. Like an illusory object it is a mental fact. It is directly revealed by Transcendental consciousness. Though difference is subjective yet it is not identical with the subjective process of imagination. It is referred to by the mental act as an object which lies beyond the act itself. It is like pleasure, pain etc. an internal object. According to this view, the contradictory nature of difference is realised even when the Absolute is not realised. It has subsistence but no existence, in the language of Holt. It has only *prātibhāsikasattā*.

Kṛṣṇānada Sarasvatī in his *Siddhāntasiddhāñjana* has elaborately discussed the problem of difference. There is nothing new in the negative criticism of the hypotheses of real difference. He does not ignore the universal experience of difference, but, on the contrary, tries to explain it from the Advaita stand-point. The fundamental unity which underlies all objects of this universe is obscured by the beginningless Nescience. With the obscuration of the basic all-embracing unity objects are not presented to our consciousness as self-sufficient objects but they all involve a reference to another object. Consequently, their presentation contains a denial of the positive contrary. A cow is not cognised merely as a cow but it is grasped as a non-horse (*ajñātatādātmyena svarūpasthityapekṣayā tu paropādhinā paryudāsena...idamidaṃ na...iti evam eva bhāsante* etc.—*Siddhāntasiddhāñjana* Vol. III. p. 97). From this statement the nature of negation or of difference is clearly indicated. He holds that the one and the same object, involving reference to another definite object and being thus determined by it, is the source of the awareness of difference (*ekasyaiva paropādhinibandhanarūpabhedapratyayasya loke vahulam upalambhāt*). Thus difference is a construction of our imagination. It is superimposed upon the basic unity which underlies all the objects of the universe. Thus difference is not real but is a mental fact. Similarly, negation has no reality. It is merely an appearance. It does not endure longer than the empirical world exists. Its contradictory nature is reveald to us even when the world of objects persists.

Thus we see that among the Advaitins Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭārakācāryya, Ānandajñāna, Prakāśānanda and Kṛṣṇānanda subscribe to the view that negation or difference is a mental fact. It is superimposed upon the basic unity (*kalpita*). It is endowed with the nature of an illusory object. It is not absolutely featureless. It is presented to our consciousness but involves contradiction.

This view of difference does not satisfy the mind of a critical student of philosophy. Difference, being a mental fact, should be a unique object. It cannot be a common object of many perceiving minds. An illusory snake cannot be perceived by many spectators as the same object since such a snake should vary in accordance with each perceiving mind. Each perceiver's mental process constitutes such a snake. Each perceiver's mental process is peculiar. Therefore an illusory snake should vary as its constituent factor varies. The same man cannot perceive the same difference at different periods of time. A cow is different from a horse. The difference of a cow from a horse is a mental fact. It is constructed by our mind. The mental process is not something static. It flows on continually. Thus it is ever-changing. The object constructed by this mental process should also change as its constituent factor can never be the same. The difference of a cow from a horse should vary according to its constituent factor. The same person cannot perceive the same difference twice in his life, as a person cannot step into the same flowing river twice. Such a view of difference or of negation is hardly convincing. The difference of a cow from a horse remains always the same whether it is perceived by this or that person or by the same person at different periods of life. The experience of difference refers always to the same object. Therefore, difference is not a mental fact which is constructed by our mind. It is a fixed object. It is an endurable object. This theory of negation (difference) which is infected with logical inconsistency cannot be the official theory of negation of the Advaita school.

(3) Now, we shall discuss the third type of the theory of negation. This view has been represented by Yati Sadānanda in his *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*. According to him negation is indefinable (*anirvacanīya*). It is revealed by transcendental consciousness (*sākṣivedya*). It does not belong to the external world. It is internal. It belongs to the inner world. But it is not a mental fact. It is an endurable object. It involves contradiction. Difference vanishes with the realisation of the Absolute. Several passages of the text of the *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* suggest that the negation of the empirical world cannot have absolute reality since the Advaitins assume that negation and its corresponding negatum stand on the same level of existence (*abhāvaḥ pratiyogisamasattākaḥ*). We have experience of negation. Its existence cannot be ignored. The Absolute is only real. The experience of negation is sublated by the realisation of the Absolute (*māyākalpitaprapañcasya yāvad brahmajñānaṃ pratītikasya eva svīkārāt* A. B. p. 136). What is the metaphysical status of negation ? In reply to this question Sadānanda makes his position clear. He asserts that negation is not a distinct term. It is not even identical with its locus. It is not real. It is indefinable something. It is analogous to *māyā*. He does not make this point clear whether negation is an evolute of *māyā*. His discussion of the nature of difference throws light on the nature of negation and on his original view of negation. He holds that the experience of difference is an undeniable fact. Difference is distinct from its locus. The experience of difference is not a piece of uncontradicted experience. Difference is directly revealed by the transcendental consciousness. But the experience of difference is ultimately sublated by the mystic intuition of the Absolute. Difference is not identical with its locus since the experience of difference presupposes the awareness of the objects differing. An external object is not directly revealed by the transcendental consciousness. The modes of our intellect, feelings of pleasure and pain etc. are directly illuminated. From this it is easy to infer that difference does not belong to the external world. Difference is merely a type of negation. Owing to the similarity of the nature of negation and difference it will not be a bold assertion on our part if we assert that negation is also directly revealed by the transcendental consciousness. In that case, negation is subjective. The view that difference is subjective has been directly stated by Sadānanda (*kintu ghaṭādi-*

svarūpapadārthāntarabhūto dharmipratiyogyapekṣaśca bhedaḥ pramāṇena anavaseyo'pi yāvadaikātmyabodhāṃ sākṣivedyatayā avabhāsate etc. p. 133).Sadānanda's view of difference differs from the second type of the theory of difference in this that difference is not a mental fact which is construcred by our mental process. It is an endurable object. But he is silent on the point whether it evolves out of *māyā*. He is very eager to point out that difference is not reality. The experience of difference is ultimately sublated by the true experience of the ultimate unity of consciousness. Negation or difference is similar to *māyā* by its nature. Sadānanda makes an improvement upon the second band of Advaitins. Difference is no more a unique object. It is an endurable common object. It may be cognised alike by many spectators.

This theory of Sadānanda does not stand a thorough criticism. Does difference involve reference to its substratum and negatum ? It is determined by them. It is thus a complex object. Difference is directly revealed by the transcendental consciousness. But the components of difference viz. the substratum and the negatum are not directly illumined by the transcendental consciousness. If this reference falls outside the true nature of difference then difference which is devoid of this reference should be held to be illumined by transcendental consciousness. In that case the experience of difference should be different from that of difference as described by Sadānanda. If difference involving such reference is illumined then the substratum and the negatum should also be directly revealed by the transcendental consciousness. But such an admission comes into conflict with the accepted epistemological theory of the Advaita school. Sadānanda's treatment of this problem is incomplete and therefore unsatisfactory.

(4) (a) Maṇḍana Miśra in his *Brahmasiddhi* has elaborately discussed the problem of negation. He has concentrated his attention upon the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of the problem. The positive aspect of his thesis deserves our special attention. The negative criticisms advanced by him will be treated later on. His main thesis is that perception does not bear evidence of the diversity of perceptible objects, i.e., of the differences belonging to the various perceptible objects of the universe but rather of the unity underlying all objects of this universe. Incidentally the problem how negation or difference is cognised crops up. With this epistemological problem the metaphysical aspect of the problem of negation is intimately connected. The nature of negation is determined by the positive object contrasted. An object which is negated is negated on some real substratum. The negation of an object presupposes the existence of an object negated and that of the substratum of the negation (*yataḥ siddhe viṣaye siddharūpam eva niṣidhyate—Brahmasiddhi*, p. 44). Let us take an example in order to explain the purport of Maṇḍana Miśra. The negation of a jar presupposes the existence of a real jar and that of the spot which is the substratum of the negation of a jar. The negation of a jar does not float in the air. It must have some ground to stand upon. Moreover, if a jar does not exist in the world then the negation of a jar is meaningless. Similarly, when we say that a cow is not a horse we must know for certain that a cow and a horse belong to this universe. Therefore, he says that negation in order to be real must fulfill these two

conditions viz. negation presupposes the existence of its real negatum and its substratum (*na pratiṣedhyāt pratiṣedhaviṣayācca vinā pratiṣedho avakalpate*).

The significance of this theory is worked out fully. He purports to convey the meaning of his theory that all negation is limitation. The negation of a jar does not occupy all space and time. The negation of a jar occupies this spot now. At this very point of time the jar which is negated here occupies another spot. The jar which is negated now on a particular spot may occupy that very spot at the next point of time. Negation is nowhere absolute. An absolute negation is unreal e. g. a flower in the sky is absolutely unreal (*na hi tatra kvacid deśe kāle vā niṣedhaḥ*). Similarly, difference is also of a limited character, i.e. it is limited in time and space. An absolute difference is empty. A real difference belongs to some object and contains a reference to some other object. An object differs from another object by means of it. It is determined by these two objects. Therefore, a real difference conveys a sense of limitation since it is marked off by its sharp outline. Therefore, the true significance of his theory of negation is that all real negation is limitation.

A metaphysical conclusion is to be drawn from this theory. Negation is not a direct object of our intuition. It does not exist like a self-sufficient real object. It requires a positive ground to stand upon. In order to acquire the definite character negation depends upon the positive object which it opposes. In a word, negation depends entirely upon positive objects for its determinate existence. An indeterminate negation is as good as an empty void. Maṇḍana holds that all positive objects are determinations of the all-embracing Existence. When we perceive a positive object we perceive *sattā* (Existence, which comprises within itself the positive individual under discussion). If this positive object is divorced from this *sattā* it becomes a non-entity—a void since *sattā* is the very essence of all objects of this universe. Negation which is based upon positive objects depends upon *sattā* consequently. It is an embroidery upon the canvas of Existence. It presupposes Existence and stands upon it for its very life. Such a negation cannot contradict the all-embracing unity of Existence but on the contrary presupposes it.

According to Maṇḍana Miśra negation is no doubt limitation. It is not the mere qualitative determination of an object. It is something more. Negation finds its enclosure in space and time. It occupies invariably the points of space and time. It does not rise above time and space. It is neither an empty moment of time—Kant's negation as understood by Dr. Paton, nor an opposite positive reality—Kant's negation as understood by Dr. Caird. Maṇḍana holds that negation has got a distinct kind of existence in the phenomenal world. Moreover, negation as defined by Maṇḍana is not opposed to the Absolute. It presupposes the all-embracing unity of the Absolute for its very existence. The Absolute Reality, the Ideal of Pure Reason, according to Kant, excludes all negations whereas the Absolute, according to Maṇḍana, comprises all negations within Itself. All negations become meaningless and unreal if they do not stand upon the Absolute. They cannot impose limitation upon the Absolute inasmuch as an effort to impose limitation upon the Absolute on the part of negation is to undermine the negation itself. Nobody hews down the branch on which he sits. Though the theory of negation as formulated by Maṇḍana bears some superficial resemblance to that of negation as taught by Kant, yet their difference is wide.

Maṇḍana's theory of negation comes into conflict with the conclusion of his Ethics. The attainment of salvation has a negative side to represent. It means negatively that the phenomenal world and its source disappear absolutely from the field of his consciousness. This non-recurring disappearance of *māyā* and its evolutes is nothing but negation. But it is not confined within the limits of space and lime. Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭāraka in his *Nyāyamakaranda* has rightly observed the incompatibility of Maṇḍana's theory of negation with the absolute cessation of the phenomenal world and its material cause taught in his Ethics. He puts down his criticism in a metaphorical language : "You have been injured by the very shaft which has been discharged by your own person".

(b) Vimuktātman in his *Iṣṭasiddhi* has discussed the problem of negation and difference. His epistemological approach to the problem has led him on to his metaphysical conclusion. His main thesis is that the ultimate reality is one and that it is experience (*anubhūti*). The ordinary human experience of difference, i.e., the non-identity of one object with another, stands in the way of his main thesis. So, he discusses the nature of difference and mutual exclusion and points out glaring contradictions involved in these concepts. But he explains the genesis of the ordinary human experience of difference. Difference is not a real object. It is not unreal at the same time. It is an indefinable object. It is an effect of *avidyā*.

The difference of the subject from the object is experienced by all. No body identifies the one with the other. Therefore, nobody can deny the existence of difference which separates the subject from the object. Vimuktātman has subjected this widely current view to a severe criticism. He holds that difference between the subject and the object can be ascertained by nobody since the subject is never an object of experience and the difference existing between two things is grasped only when both of them are cognised. The concept of difference current among the circle of ordinary people has not a solid ground to stand upon (*tasmād dṛṣṭayoreva parasparāpekṣayā bhedadṛṣṭiḥ sambhavati na tu dṛṣṭādṛṣṭayor adṛṣṭayorvā. Iṣṭasiddhi* p. 3).

The opponents of Vimuktātman may argue against him in the following manner. As experience itself is self-luminous i.e., it is not an object of experience, so the experience of difference reveals itself without being an object of another experience. Vimuktātman meets this argument in the following manner. Is difference identical with the substratum of difference ? Or, is it a quality of its locus only ? If the opponents hold that difference is identical with the substratum itself then difference should be a non-relative term and be presented to our consciousness directly like the substratum itself. It should involve no reference to another term. Now if it is held that difference is a relative term though it is identical with the substratum itself then the awareness of difference becomes impossible since such an awareness involves either a *regressus ad infinitum* or moves in a circle. The import of such a theory is that every term is relative. The net result of this theory is that to know a term we should know a second term and to know this second term we should know a third term and so on *ad infinitum.* Thus we should move forward infinitely but a term can never be known. Or, it must be admitted that to know a term a second term should be known and to know the second term the first term should be known. In that case, we should move in a vicious circle but cannot know a term. Moreover, if difference is a relative term then it cannot be identical with its locus since the locus of difference is a non-relative term.

Now, the opponents of Idealistic Monism may hold that difference is a quality of its substratum. A question may be put to them whether difference is identical with its substratum. If it is answered in the affirmative then difference will be a non-relative term and be cognised directly. The essence of difference is that it involves reference to another term. Therefore it is absurd to hold that difference which is a quality of its substratum is identical with it. If it is held that the quality of difference is different from its substratum then such a hypothesis will lead on to a metaphysical assumption of an infinite series of differences. There is nothing new in this criticism. It is essentially the Prābhākara criticism against the attributive view of difference. The hypothesis of mutual negation is in no way an improvement upon the preceding theory. It must be admitted that the mutual negation of an object is other than its substratum.

If it is even admitted that difference exists in this universe then it is difficult to prove that the difference existing between the subject and the object is cognised by us. Does difference belong to Experience ? Experience is self-luminous. Difference is not self-luminous, being a relative term. If difference qualifies Experience as its attribute then Experience will cease to be Experience since the self-luminous character of Experience will be taken away from it. Experience, the subject, will be converted into an object. The assumption of mutual negation as an attribute of Experience will also affect Experience vitally. If it is held that difference is identical with Experience then difference which is an object will be converted into Experience which remains always the subject. Thus, difference will have no separate existence of its own and will be merged into the great ocean of conciousness. If Experience is identical with difference or mutual negation and difference or negation alone survives then there will be no ray of consciousness and the whole universe will be thrown into the bottomless abyss of eternal darkness.

Some philosophers have tried to identify the category of mutual negation with that of difference. Vimuktātman holds that the category of mutual negation presupposes the category of difference. If difference is taken away from this universe then mutual negation becomes ineffective to differentiate one object from another. If we say that A excludes B then there is an implicit belief that A is different from B, since if A and B are identical then the mutual negation of A from B is not possible. If it is held that mutual negation is identical with difference then the terms viz. A and B which exclude each other should be held to be identical since difference is external to them. Thus the hypothesis of mutual negation which is external to the terms is not incompatible with the monistic conclusion.

There is only one reality in the universe. Mutual negation does not contradict the monistic hypothesis. Thus mutual negation and difference are not identical. Neither difference nor mutual negation is identical with Experience. Either of them is not a quality of Experience. Thus difference and Experience can in no way be connected.

Vimuktātman anticipates another objection of his opponents, the upholders of the common-sense view of difference. They may hold that difference does not belong to the subject but belongs to the object. The object excludes the subject from itself. This is the difference of the object from the subject. The subject is negated. This negation rests upon the object. This difference cannot be cognised. Difference is a relative term. To know it the subject should be known. The subject is not an object of our experience. The opponents may urge that difference is determined by the subject i.e. Experience. Experience is self-luminous. Therefore difference is illuminated without much difficulty. Vimuktātman contends this point of his opponents. He points out that though Experience is self-luminous yet it does never reveal itself as a determinant of the negation of the subject. Now, the opponents may argue that the awareness of difference itself supplies us with the awareness of negatum since the experience of difference, being a fact, should be explained somehow. Vimuktātman argues that the awareness of difference presupposes the consciousness of the negatum but cannot be at the same time the condition of the consciousness of difference. The awareness of difference cannot be itself the condition and the conditioned at the same time. Let us examine a familiar instance of difference, viz., the difference of a jar from a cloth. The awareness of the difference itself is not the condition of the awareness of itself. This law is also applicable to negation. (*yanmānau ca yau na tau tat pratiyogikau kintu anyapratiyogikau eva yathā ghaṭapṭayor mitho bhedābhāvau, Iṣṭasiddhi* p. 6).

The opponents may argue that this is a peculiar case and that a exceptional law is to be formulated for it. Vimuktātman accepts this answer and holds that this view reveals serious defects. The awareness of the negation of an object arises only when the object is not cognised. We are aware of the negation of an object only when all the conditions of the perception of an object are fulfilled excepting the presence of the object and its contact with the sense-organ. Experience is self-luminous. Therefore, its non-cognition is absolutely impossible. If the opponents press hard on the point that the non-cognition of Experience is possible then negation is sure to remain a sealed book to us. Such negation will remain ever unknown and unknowable to us.

Vimuktātman raises another point of great importance. The opponents hold that the recollection of an object negated is one of the conditions of the awareness of its corresponding negation. Experience is self-luminous. Hence its recollection is impossible. As the condition of the awareness of negation can never be fulfilled, the awareness of negation should never arise. The awareness of the mere object cannot bring about the awareness of the negation of the subject. Similarly, the experience of the difference of the object from the subject is absurd.

Vimuktātman throws light upon the nature of negation as well as difference in connection with his criticism of the views of his opponents. He holds that neither negation nor difference is identical with its substratum. Thus he draws towards the view of the Vaiśeṣikas so far as the empirical world is concerned. But he mentions clearly the point of difference. He holds that Experience can never be negated—and that Experience admits of no difference. Then he discusses the metaphysical status of negation and difference. According to him negation and difference have only relative existence since they imply each other. As they lack absolute existence so the classification of the phenomenal objects into positive and negative ones is due to the working of Nescience (*bhāvābhāvavibhāgasya avidyāśrayatvāt*). Thus negation and difference are neither absolutely real nor unreal. They are indefinable (*anirvacanīya*). They belong only to the objects of this universe. They are not subjective. They are objective. They are not creatures of our subjective process. He drapes the acceptable portion of the Vaiśeṣika theory of negation in all the new clothes of the Vedānta System.

In the last chapter of his *Iṣṭasiddhi* he discusses the ethical end of human beings. This end is negative to some extent. It is an absolute cessation of *avidyā* (Nescience), which is beginningless. Jñānottama, his commentator, describes it in the form : "I am devoid of *avidyā* (*niravidyo'ham*)." He asserts that it is *exparte negatio*. It being an instance of significant denial points to its identity with the Absolute (*brahman*). He holds that it is not a mode of *avidyā*. It is simply determined by the knowing process. The soul itself assumes the form of a result since it is reflected in the mode of our intellect (*ātmaiva ajaḍatvāt kūṭastho'pi mānameyasambandhāt phalāyate* p. 373). This statement suggests a distinction between real and logical negation. Logical opposition is restricted to the phenomenal world whereas real negation finds a permanent place in the transcendental world. But he holds that strictly speaking it is also an appearance but not a reality. But the drift of his argument is that it is transcendental since it is not effectuated by *avidyā*. This view is the reverse of the Kantian doctrine. According to Kant logical negation holds good in the world of pure thought but real negation belongs to the phenomenal world.

Let us now examine this view. Real negation which is significant denial is *ex parte* negation. The background of it is a positive mode of our intellect. It contains the reflected image of the Absolute. It depends upon *avidyā* for its very existence since it is a mode of Intellect. The reflected image of the Absolute depends upon the mode for its very appearance. An element of *avidyā* is a condition of the manifestation of the reflected image of the Absolute. This image cannot be identical with the Absolute since it depends upon the midium viz., the mode of intellect for its very existence. Vimuktātman and Jñānottama try to establish the identity of this reflected image with the soul (*ātmaiva jñānahānirvā tadāpyātmaiva śiṣyate* p. 317, Sl. 16).—*ātmaiva sadrūpaḥ na tu abhāvatāṃ gacchati* p. 625. *Iṣṭasiddhi* Com.). Now, negation is asserted to be identical with the Absolute. He holds that negation does neither belong to nor is identical with *dṛk*. (Experience—Absolute). Thus in the concluding chapter the view of the first chapter has been contradicted. Moreover, if the reflected image is merely an appearance of the

Absolute then the well-defined distinction between logical and real negation breaks down. The doctrine of significant denial also comes into conflict with his early view that negation is a distinct term and belongs only to the phenomenal objects. Lastly, it is difficult to establish identity between the Absolute and its image since an image is never self-sufficient. If they are supposed to be identical then the act of denial becomes meaningless, since it has a particular date and place in the mental history of an individual. It is not co-eternal with the Absolute. If the identity of the reflected image with the soul is accepted for the sake of argument then Vimuktātman accepts unwillingly the Prābhākara theory of negation and difference.

(c) Śrīharṣa in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* has discussed the theory of negation elaborately. He is noted for his negative criticism. He tries his level best to prove that the concepts of negation and difference of the rival schools involve logical contradiction. The negative criticisms offered by him pave the way for the positive aspect of his thesis. Some of his negative criticisms will be discussed later on. The positive contribution to the theory of negation may be summed up in a nut-shell. He holds that the experience of negation and difference can never be denied. A careful examination of this experience reveals the contradictory nature of these two concepts. An objectless awareness is an absurdity. Negation and difference are neither real nor unreal as they are presented to our consciousness. Therefore only one hypothesis is logically correct that the concepts of negation and difference are constructed by Nescience (*avidyā-kalpita*).

(d) Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Advaitasiddhi* has developed the thesis of Śrīharṣa. He has examined the concept of negation and pronounced his judgement upon it that it involves insoluble contradiction. He submits the concept of difference to closer examination since the establishment of difference as a real fact will lead to the refutation of the Vedānta thesis of Idealistic Monism. He says, "It is a truism that difference is cognised by us all. It enjoys no reality on that account. It has merely phenomenal existence. In a word it is not a real object" (*svarūpeṇa sthairyye'pi tattvato asthiratvasambhavāt*). Difference is an evolute of *māyā*, the source of cosmic appearance since it is riddled with contradictions. An object which is full of contradictions cannot be a reality. If an object which violates all laws of thought is still persistently presented to our consciousness then it must be a creature of *māyā*. Difference violates all laws of thought in order to be perceived. The epistemological difficulty of mutual dependence does not stand in the way of its perception. The metaphysical difficulty of an infinite series of differences takes away all reality from it. But it is a wonder of wonders that it is presented to our consciousness, i.e., it is not sublated by the true knowledge of unity. Hence it is a source of perpetual puzzle to us. This puzzling character is inherited by it from its material cause viz. *māyā*. The disjunctive character of 'yes' or 'no' is not applicable to *māyā*. It is indefinable since it is beyond the reach of human intellect (*bhedaḥ tatpratītiśca yadi māyikī na syāt, sarvavyavasthollaṅghinī na syāt sarvavyavasthollaṅghinī ceyam, tasmān māyikīti : Advaitasiddhi* p. 259).

Now, a question may be put to Madhusūdana whether the concept of difference in the Advaita system is not immune from all these defects. Madhusūdana boldly faces the problem and holds that the contradictory character of difference is its true character (*na ca avidyikabhedapakṣe api anavasthādidoṣaḥ anupapatteralaṅkāratvāt*—A. S. p. 268). Madhusūdana arrives at the conclusion that difference has got only phenomenal existence and that difference does not belong to the Absolute.

Viśvanātha has reviewed this theory of difference in his *Bhedasiddhi*. He, being inspired by Udayana's arguments recorded in the *Ātmatattvaviveka,* subjects the view of Madhusūdana to a severe criticism. He holds that difference is not an effect of *māyā* since it is not an event in time like a magic object but is eternal. The strongest objection against the reality of difference is that the concept of difference involves reference to the category of identity which is only defined in terms of difference. Thus the concept of difference is a glaring instance of *petitio principii*. Viśvanātha meets this objection. He holds that the category of difference is indefinable but is a datum of our experience. It is too familiar to be defined. If the category of identity is established then the line of demarcation between mutual negation and absolute negation does not become vague. And the much talked of Vedānta criticism of the clsssification of negation becomes pointless. In the Vedānta literature we come across the term *abheda* (non-difference). It is not a positive term. It represents the negation of difference. It is a relative term. Like all relative terms the condition of the consciousness of *abheda* is the awareness of difference. The Advaitins hold that two correlative terms stand on the same level of metaphysical existence. If difference be an appearance then non-difference cannot be held to be the Absolute. The term *abheda* denotes the negation of difference. It is not the negation of this or that difference but is the negation of all difference i.e., of the universal of difference. It is thus the negation of what is characterized by the universal of difference (*bhedatvāvacchinnapratiyogitāko abhāvaḥ*). Therefore the universal of difference cannot be ignored by the Advaitins. If the universal of difference be a datum of our experience then the real existence of difference cannot be logically refuted. The facts are given. They are to be accepted. In spite of their defects they should be welcome since they constitute the foundation of our experience. A regressus *ad infinitum* is not necessarily vicious. If a metaphysical *regressus ad infinitum* is coupled with epistemological difficulties then that *regressus* is surely vicious. Madhusūdana has not fairly discussed the problem. He has simply evaded it. With the concept of *māyā*, all problems are solved by the Advaita system. If something is somehow connected with *māyā* then it gets a foot-hold in their system. Their stock answer to a difficult problem is that it is indefinable. Viśvanātha has proved that the concept of difference is not riddled with contradictions. Therefore the hypothesis of Madhusūdana is not tenable.

Nṛsiṃha Āśrama and Nārāyaṇa Āśrama, his disciple, have tried their level best to restore the theory of negation of Śrīharṣa to its former glory. In the *Advaitadīpikā* and *Bhedadhikkāra* they have carried on the tradition of the Advaita school of Vedānta. The theory of negation propounded by them consists of two parts, positive and negative. The negative side of their theory consists of destructive criticisms of the rival theories of negation. The positive aspect of this theory consists of the re-establishment of Śrīharṣa's theory of negation. They have avoided all superfluous exordium and come straight to the pith and marrow of the subject of negation. They have found their place among the classical writers of the Advaita school.

They have paid special attention to the problem of difference. They have subjected the defence of difference offered by Viśvanātha to a severe criticism. The criticism of the category of difference will be elaborately taken up later on.

Nṛsiṃha Āśrama in his *Advaitadīpikā* proves that the concept of negation involves contradiction. Negation is always determined by its negatum. The negatum which determines its corresponding negation is in some cases non-existent. Let us take the examples of pre-negation and post-negation. The objects negated by these two kinds of negation are non-existent. They are unreal inasmuch as the non-existent object cannot be related to negative facts which are asserted to be real objects (*tatkāle satoreva hi svarūpasambandhaḥ na sadasatoḥ niḥsvarūpatvāt. atītādeśca tava mate niḥsvarūpa eva:* A.D. Vol. I. p. 254). If the objects negated are held to be real then they should co-exist with their corresponding negations themselves. In that case, the established law of casuality viz., the doctrine of a new beginning (*ārambhavāda*) is to be given up. The opponents viz. the Naiyāyikas may urge that the object negated is merely absent but is not unreal. But this answer is not satisfactory since reality and existence are synonymous terms in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature. If the object negated is not unreal then it must be existent. The problem remains ever fresh before them that the object negated should co-exist with its negation. The Naiyāyikas may revise their theory and hold that negation and its corresponding non-existent negatum do not oppose each other. This answer is detrimental to their fundamental assumption that negation and its negatum oppose each other (*anyathā bhāvā bhāvayor virodho dattodaka eva syāt*—p. 256). If the Naiyāyikas stick to the answer that a non-existent object is not unreal then a few questions may be put to them. (1) Does a non-existent jar have some attributes ? (2) Has it a locus to stand upon ? (3) Is it perceptible ? (4) Is a non-existent jar eternal ? (5) Is the eternality of a non-existent jar consistent with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causality ? The Naiyāyikas may give a short reply to these that the object negated is not bodily present but its reality cannot be denied (*nanu abhāvakāle pratiyoginaḥ sattvaṃ varttate na svarūpamiti*). This answer is not consistent with their general metaphysical position since the distinction between non-existent reality and concrete reality has nowhere been drawn (*tava mate atiriktapadārthasvarūpātirikta-sattāyāḥ sāmānyādāvabhāvāt svarūpasya eva sattvāt*). In other words, a real object must have concrete existence. A jar is an effect. Before its production it can have no form of existence. Therefore the pre-negation of a jar is a fiction since it cannot be determined by its negatum.

Nṛsiṃha Āśrama in his *Bhedadhikkāra* holds that difference is an evolute of *avidyā*. The awareness of difference does not depend upon that of the two objects differing. Its knowledge is direct (*Śaktibhāṣya*). It is revealed by transcendental consciousness. Thus difference should be subjective. This point has not been fully developed. It has got only relative being (*dharmipratiyogisvarūpanirūpyatvācca*). This difference opposes non-difference (*abheda*). Therefore it pre-supposes the existence of an all-embracing unity.

(5) Nārāyaṇa Sarasvatī in his *Vārttika* commentary upon the Bhāṣya of Śaṃkara has formulated a metaphysical theory of negation. It is highly original. He also tries to prove that this theory gets the support of the tradition of this school.

Like Śrīharṣa and other dialecticians of this school he does not prove that the concepts of negation and difference involve contradictions. He accepts the universality of the concepts of negation and difference. He tries to assign proper place to them in the Advaita metaphysics.

He holds that there is only one type of negation. The universal of negation is not a genus which admits of species. Absolute negation and mutual exclusion are not two distinct species of negation. There is no line of demarcation between absolute negation and mutual negation. Negation is in itself indeterminate. It is an X. Negation does not get its definite shape if it is determined by its negatum (*ata eva abhāvasya svato nirviśeṣatvamāhuḥ* etc. p. 137). The absolute negation of a jar on a cloth and the mutual negation of a jar from a cloth are distinguished from each other by means of external relations and linguistic forms. But this distinction does not touch the very heart of negation. Negation remains unaffected by this distinction. In case of mutual negation the object negated is characterized by the category of identity whereas in the case of absolute negation negatum is determined by one of the relations other than that of identity. The proposition which expresses mutual negation is formally different from that of absolute negation. The negatum and the locus of negation get the same case-ending in the case of mutual negation but they get different case-endings in the case of absolute negation (*yadā hi tādātmyamavacchedakīkṛtya...tadā atyantābhāvavyapadeśaṃ sa-eva labhate*—p. 131). He means to say that the distinction existing between mutual negation and absolute negation is merely formal. But this artificial distinction does not contribute to their essential difference. This difference is really nominal (*tayor vyapadeśa bhedamātraṃ na svarūpabhedaḥ*). Then he shows that there is no real distinction between absolute negation on one side and pre-negation and post-negation on the other side. Difference of time-elements which are attached to negation as its adjuncts explains the difference obtaining between pre-negation and negation and that between them and absolute negation. There is only one kind of negation. This is absolute negation. Then he proceeds a step farther. He holds that there is only one negation in the world. The negation of a jar is not different from the negation of a cloth. The objects negated are only different. But negation-in-itself is not different. The sky enclosed in a jar is not essentially different from the sky encased in a pitcher. The adjuncts which impose limitation upon the sky are only different. The sky remains self-identical. Similarly, the self-same negation appears to be different when it is characterized by the different negata. This difference is our mental construction. A man may hold different offices. Still he maintains his numerical identity. Negation is indeterminate by its own nature. We try to determinate it by means of various adjectives. But these adjectives are external to it. They do not belong to it as its essential nature. Indeterminate negation is one. This is absolute negation (*ghaṭapaṭādipratiyogibhede'pi nābhāvo bhidyate iti*—p. 137). This is the first part of his thesis. Then he takes the second part of his thesis. He discusses the metaphysical aspect of the problem of negation.

Is negation real ? He does not solve the problem directly. He holds that negation is an element of *avidyā* (Nescience). He identifies it with the *āvaraṇaśakti* (the power of *avidyā* by means of which the Absolute is enveloped) of *avidyā*. When the Absolute is enveloped by this element of *avidyā* it does not reveal itself in spite of its self-luminous character. The Absolute should reveal itself and assert its own existence. But it, being under the influence of the enveloping power of *avidyā*, does not reveal itself and assert its own existence. It is believed that the Absolute is beyond the range of consciousness and does not exist. The supreme soul does neither express itself nor assert its own existence. *Avidyā* remains in its potential form. It does not evolve. The potential form of *avidyā* is negation. When *avidyā* assumes the kinetic form and evolves various objects out of itself these objects are always positive. Therefore the distinction between negation and positive objects is only one of degree. According to Nārāyaṇa negation is the foundation of all positive objects (*avidyāvaraṇaśaktereva abhāvatvena abhyupagamāt...asti prakāśate iti vyavahārayogyasya nāsti na prakāśate iti vyavahārasādhāraṇakāraṇam āvaraṇam āhuḥ... anabhivyaktāvasthāyā eva abhāvatvāt*). Thus negation in not a distinct category. The primordial material cause of all positive objects in its potential form, i.e., in its unmanifest condition, is negation. According to the Advaitins *avidyā* is not real. Therefore, negation is not real.

Then he raises another question of no mean importance as to the nature of the relation between negation and the Absolute, the only positive real. He emphatically denies the possibility of such a relation (*tatra bhavobhavatyātmā abhāvasaṃsargabarjjita* etc. —p. 139). As the sun is enveloped by a patch of cloud so the Absolute is veiled by *avidyā* in its enveloping capacity (*āvaraṇarūpikā avidyā*). Such a doctrine reminds us of the Kantian theory that negation falls short of the Ideal of Pure Reason. We have already discussed Kant's theory of negation. According to Nārāyaṇa, negation is the logical condition of all phenomenal existence though *avidyā* is the material cause of the universe. *Avidyā* as the source of obscuration (*āvaraṇaśakti*) is the efficient cause of the universe. *Avidyā* as the source of diversity (*vikṣepaśakti*) is the material cause of the universe. The Absolute is the back-ground of the world of appearance. (*vivarttādhiṣṭhāna*). The underlying unity should be at first enveloped and then and then only the world of diversity makes its appearance. Thus the *āvaraṇaśakti* of *avidyā* is the logical condition of the phenomenal world. In order to evade the problem of dualism he holds that *āvaraṇaśakti* is not related to the Absolute. Negative consciousness points to an indeterminate object, viz. the potential form of *avidyā*. Thus he draws a distinction between negative consciousness and positive consciousness. Nārāyaṇa Sarasvatī has got the clue to his new movement from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and others but has not stopped half-way. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa holds that absolute negation and mutual exclusion belong to the class of pre-negation. Other

Naiyāyikas identify absolute negation with mutual exclusion. This hint is sufficient for Nārāyaṇa to develop his own theory of negation. His theory is the most perfect specimen of logical accuracy in this line of thinking. The logical conclusion is that negation has lost its distinctive feature and become indeterminate. The variety and plurality of negation disappear under the pressure of logical development.

This view corresponds to that of Plato to some extent. Plato holds that matter is non-being (*ma on*). It is indefinable, formless and imperceptible. It is the condition of the creative activity of the Idea and is therefore co-eternal with God. The duality of matter and the Idea has not been overcome in Plato's philosophy. John Cook Wilson says in connection with the explanation of not-being by Plato that the student of Plato must however notice that, in the *Republic*, not-being, the extreme opposite of being, with the intermediates lying between, is not the relative not-being of the *Sophist*. It is the absolute negation of any kind of being, the correlate of *agnoia* (not-knowing). It is not ignorance in the ordinary sense but mere absence of consciousness (*Statement and Inference*, p. 248). But Prof. J. C. Wilson is mistaken here. Negation is not an empty blank. The *agnoia* of the *Republic* signifies such consciousness as points to the obstructive agent of the creative Idea. The correlate of ignorance is such an aspect of matter as constitutes an eternal obstruction to the action of the creative Idea. This idea has been clearly expressed by Nārāyaṇa Sarasvatī. He says: *vidyamānasya sataḥ...prakāśārhasya asti, prakāśate iti vyavahārayogyasya nāsti na prakāśate iti vyavahārasādhāraṇakāraṇam āvaraṇam āhuḥ*. It means that ignorance is such as expresses the reality which should have been expressed in the judgments 'It exists', 'It reveals itself' by means of the judgments 'It does not exist', 'It is not revealed'. This ignorance is cosmic ignorance. It is not an absence of consciousness but a consciousness of the absence of consciousness of the ultimate unity. The correlate of this consciousness is the force of resistance which constitutes the essence of matter. This idea has been well-represented by Weber. "Its co-operation is resistance. It is formless and unlimited, and therefore opposes and resists the form, limitation, and finish which the eternal artist desires to give it ; this resistance manifests itself as inertia, weight, disproportion, ugliness, or stupidity. It is non-being or the perpetual negation of being, and consequently opposes and resists everything positive, stable, and immutable, and for ever destroys the works of God." (*History of Philosophy*, p. 94). *Āvaraṇaśakti* is not a distinct term. It is not metaphysically different from *māyā*. Plato holds that matter is negation. He does not draw a distinction between different aspects of matter. The true import of the proposition "Matter is negation" is that matter which resists the relative activity of the Idea is negation. If the force of resistance is abstructed by a process of logical abstraction from the concrete nature of matter then negation is the force of resistance which is innate in matter. If this logical distinction is overlooked in the Advaita system then *avidyā* is negation. The points of difference existing between them are also noteworthy. (1) According to Plato matter resists the creative activity of the Idea whereas Nārāyaṇa Sarasvatī holds that *āvaraṇaśakti* opposes the existence or the illumination of the basic unity of all beings. This obscuration of the unity is the presupposition of the appearance of the phenomenal world. (2) Plato holds that matter is co-eternal with the Idea of Good. According to the Advaitins *avidyā* is not real. It is a self-destructive force. The Advaitins overcome the dualism of the Absolute and *māyā* whereas Plato fails to do so. (3) Plato asserts that the creative power belongs to the Idea whereas the Advaitins hold that the Absolute is devoid of such a power. According to Plato negation resists the activity of the Idea. But according to Nārāyaṇa negation envelops the Absolute. In spite of all these differences, these two views bear a close resemblance to each other. Both of them hold that negation is opposition and that negation is not determined by its corresponding negatum i.e., negation is indeterminate and that negation offers resistance to the highest reality (the Idea of Good or the Absolute).

Let us now examine the theory of negation of Nārāyaṇa Sarasvatī closely. We shall touch the important points only. This theory of negation is highly original. The beauty of this theory is that it is in close harmony with the traditional view of this school. His theory consists of a few steps. He begins his career as a thinker of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. He assumes the validity of the concept of negation. He examines two broad divisions of the universal of negation. He pronounces his judgment upon the issue that there is only one type of negation and that this is absolute negation. Then he examines the classification of *saṃsargābhāva* (non-mutual negation) into three subdivisions. He holds that pre-negation and post-negation belong to the class of absolute negation. Thus there is only one type of negation. Up to this point he belongs to the common-sense school as a great critic and reformer of this school. Then he soars higher and higher. He does not take his stand upon the solid ground of experience. He is now on the wings of imagination. Negation has been placed on the operation table. The knife of analysis is very busy. The poor creature,—the negation of the common sense school—is took weak to withstand the grand vivisection wrought on it. It is dead on the table. The skeleton of the negation of the common sense school is the negotion of the *Vārttika* of Nārāyaṇa Sarasvatī. He holds that negation is only one. To establish it he holds that negation is indeterminate. He means to say that negation is not a relative term. It does not involve a necessary reference to its correlate term. It amounts to this that the negation as proposed by Nārāyaṇa Sarasvatī is the mutilated dead body of the negation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. If negation is allowed to be thus vivisected then it is easy to prove that there is only one negation in the universe. He arrives at this conclusion by a process of abstraction. Now his synthetic ·mind works. He brings in harmony the result of his analytic mind with the conclusions of the Advaita school. *Avidyā* is the concrete unity of two contrary forces viz. *āvaraṇaśakti* and *vikṣepaśakti*. He identifies negation with the *āvaraṇśakti* of *avidyā*. This *āvaraṇaśakti* is opposed to the unity of consciousness and of all being. It resists the illumination of the basic unity. The very existence of this self-luminous unity is threatened by the oppositional force of this element of *avidyā*. As a matter of fact, to a man devoid of mystic vision the unity of all beings is non-existent. Narāyaṇa concludes that *āvaraṇaśakti* should be either vague or disjunctive i.e. oscillating.

In either case the proof of negation is not trustworthy. In the first case, the proof is wanting. In the second case, the evidence is to be put aside as indecisive. Can an indeterminate object be opposed to the highest unity ? If it is not opposed to the unity, can it resist the illumination of the self-luminous Absolute ? Nārāyaṇa assumes everything as a slave of tradition. Negation which does not involve reference to its correlate ceases to be negation. Therefore, the theory of negation of Nārāyaṇa does not appeal to a critical thinker.

(6) We shall now discuss the theory of negation of another group of thinkers of the Advaita school. The theory of negation of these thinkers is similar to that of the Vaiśeṣikas to some extent. They hold that negation is a distinct term. It is similar to *māyā*. But it is not effectuated by *māyā*. It is sublated by the true knowledge of the Absolute. It is not therefore real. These thinkers have tried to graft the theory of negation of the Vaiśeṣikas on the metaphysics of the Advaita school. Thus they introduce necessary changes into the Vaiśeṣika theory of negation. This is the bare out-line of the theory of negation of these thinkers. We shall now discuss the details of their theory of negation.

(a) Dharmarājādhvarīndra in his *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* has discussed the theory of negation elaborately. He mentions the four types of negation viz. (1) Pre-negation, (2) Post-negation, (3) Absolute negation and (4) Mutual negation. He asserts that the pre-negation of an object is not beginningless (*anādi*) but comes into existence like a positive object. According to him the post-negation of an object is not endless (*ananta*). It is subject to destruction. Absolute negation and mutual negation are beginningless but not endless (*sānta*). The pre-negation of the post-negation of an object is constituted by the object itself and by its pre-negation. Dharmarāja has borrowed this view from a sect of the Vaiśeṣikas. He has discussed the problem why the post-negation of an object is not endless. He holds that negation requires a solid ground to stand upon. The post-negation of an object does not float in the air. It stands upon a locus. The locus of the post-negation of an object is constituted by the material cause of the object itself. The material cause of an object is not necessarily eternal. The post-negation of an object does not survive the destruction of its material cause since it cannot float in the air. Therefore the post-negation of an object is subject to destruction. Now a new problem crops up. Why does the object itself not appear with the destruction of the post-negation of the object under discussion ? Dharmarāja's answer is very simple. He says that it is a problem to the Vaiśeṣikas who assume that the pre-negation and the post-negation of an object do not co-exist ; but it is not a problem to the Advaitas who do not subscribe to such an assumption. Dharmarāja assumes that the pre-negation and the post-negation of an object and the object itself do not co-exist.

Dharmarāja mentions two types of mutual negation. One of them is an event in time and the other is beginningless. We come across such a view in Śivāditya's *Saptapadārthī*. But he differs from the Vaiśeṣikas in this that according to him mutual negation is not endless.

a distinct term. It is identical with the Absolute itself. A similar attempt has been made by Vimuktātman in his *Iṣṭasiddhi*. The real negation is *exparte negatio.* The theory of real negation is not in harmony with the theory of negation as propounded by him.

Let us examine the theory of negation of Dharmarāja. Niścala Dāsa in his *Vṛttiprabhākara* has critically examined the *Paribhāṣā* of Dharmarāja. His criticisms are of great help to us. The assumption of pre-negation and post-negation made by Dharmarāja is unjustifiable, since the Advaita view that *māyā* evolves the phenomenal world contradicts such an assumption. Pre-negation and post-negation which are held to be distinct terms cannot find a place in the Advaita metaphysics. His subconscious bias for the Vaiśeṣika system can only explain such an assumption. His assumption of real negation seriously damages his theory of negation. If negative consciousness has not a distinct object of its own then is Dharmarāja justified in assuming negation as a distinct term ? This question cannot be solved by Dharmarāja. If the negation of *māyā* and its effects be a distinct term then Dharmarāja is to sacrifice Advaitism at the altar of his theory of negation. There is no escape for Dharmarāja from the two horns of this dilemma. He has not dived deep into the problem of negation. Therefore his theory of negation does not satisfy a critical thinker.

(b) Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī in the *Advaitacintākaustubha* has critically discussed the nature of negation. He acknowledges the universality of the experience of negation. He cannot ignore such an experience and be blind to the problem of negation. He critically examines the content of negative awareness. He holds that negative consciousness points to a distinct object. Let us examine a negative judgment and see the result of it. "There is no jar on this spot"—is a familiar illustration. When a jar is removed from this spot we say that there is no jar on this spot. Do we really experience the negation of a jar superadded to the spot ? Or, do we perceive the spot only ? The spot is perceived by us as the container of the negation of a jar. The negation of a jar is the object contained by the spot. The relation of the container and the contained implies that these two terms are distinct. Therefore the negation of a jar cannot be equated with the spot. In other words, the negation of a jar is a distinct term. Mahādevānanda is indebted to the Vaiśeṣikas for this argument. He simply reasserts the truth of the argument of the Naiyāyikas (*adhikaraṇātirikto'bhāvo'styeva*—A. K. p. 243).

Proving the existence of negation he defines negation and classifies it. He defines it as the meaning of the negative particle 'not' (*nañarthollikhitadhīviṣayo'bhāvaḥ*). He holds that there is only one kind of negation which is termed by the Vaiśeṣikas to be absolute negation. According to him the negation of the phenomenal world is only real. The other individual negation such as the negation of this or that object have only phenomenal existence. This view of one real negation reminds us of the theories of Dharmarāja and Nārāyaṇa Sarasvatī. This view of Mahādeva that the negation of *māyā* and the cosmos is only real is similar to that of Dharmarāja. The real negation is not the indeterminate negation of Nārāyaṇa. If negation is determinate then it must be determined by some object. By which object is negation determined ? It is determined by its negatum. If definite character belongs to negation then it should be differentiated. Negation is a class concept. It subsumes many individuals under it. An individual negation is distinct from another since the negatum of each negation is distinct and negation receives its definite character from its negatum (*pratiyogino'bhāva-nirūpakatvena tadbhedamantareṇa abhāva-bhedāyogāt*).

Now a question arises in our mind naturally. What will happen to the other three types of negation propounded by the Vaiśeṣikas ? Mahādeva anticipates this question and tries to explain the other types of negation in terms of absolute negation. He holds that if the characteristic features of a particular negatum be different and if they exert their influence upon the moulding of the definite shape of negation then an individual negation which is determined by a particular characteristic feature is distinct from another individual negation which is determined by another characteristic feature in spite of the sameness of the negatum (*pratiyogitāvacchedakabhedena abhāvabhedo'stu pratiyogibhedābhāve'pi*). Let us take an example to illustrate it. The negation of a jar is determined by a jar , its negatum. Jarness is the characteristic feature of a jar. The negation of a jar is distinct from that of a cloth because a jar is distinct from a cloth. Jarness which is the characteristic feature of a jar may have different qualifications. These qualifications introduce certain changes into the heart of the same characteristic feature. Negations which are determined by these qualifications of the characteristic feature become mutually distinct. Jarness qualified by an element of past time is distinct from jarness qualified by an element of future time. Similarly, the unqualified jarness is also distinct from jarness qualified by past, present and future time. The negation which is determined by jarness qualified by future time is distinct from the negation which is determined by jarness qualified by past time. The former negation is called the pre-negation of a jar. The latter negation is called the post-negation of a jar. The negation which is determined by unqualified jarness is called the mutual negation of a jar. The negation which is determined by jarness qualified by all times—past, present and future—is called the absolute negation of a jar. Thus he arrives at the conclusion that there is only one type of negation. This is really the simplification of the theory of negation of Dharmarāja. This is the *prima facie* view of negation. Mahādeva does not stick to this view. He holds that such an assumption unnecessarily multiplies the number of negation. Therefore, the difference in the characteristic features of negatum does not account for the distinct individuality of negation (*pratiyogitāvacchedakabhedena abhāvabhedakalpanāyām anantābhāvakalpanāprasaṅgāt*). The absurdity of the above assumption may be clearly proved. This is a knowable jar. This is a thing jar. This is an earthen jar. The negation of a knowable jar should be distinct from the negation of a thing jar or from that of an earthen jar, according to the above assumption. The distinct individualities of these negations are experienced by nobody.

Mahādeva revises his theory of negation. He holds that pre-negation and post-negation can have no place in the Vedānta metaphysics. He holds that experience does not bear evidence to pre-negation. The proposition 'a jar will come into being', does not point to negation since it does not contain a negative particle. Moreover, according to the Advaitins, an effect is not essentially different from its cause. The essence "of an effect" is constituted by its material cause. An effect cannot be actually separated from its cause. It is only logically distinguished from it. The pre-negation of an effect does not belong to its cause since an effect is metaphysically identical with its cause. The assumption of pre-negation comes into conflict with the theory of causality of the Advaita school. This theory of causality has been clearly stated in the texts of the Upaniṣads and the *Vedānta Sūtra* (*śrutisūtrābhyāṃ prāgutpatteḥ kāryyasya kāraṇātmanā sattvapratipādanena prāgabhāvasya durnirūpitatvāt* p. 244). Similarly, the concept of post-negation is out of place in the Advaita system. The destruction of an effect means the merging of an effect in its cause. Hence, post-negation is not a distinct term which is externally related to its cause (*niranvayanāśānaṅgīkāreṇa dhvaṃsasyāpi durnirūpitatvāt* p. 245).

Then he examines the concept of mutual negation, He proves that mutual negation is not a distinct type of negation. He argues out his case in the following manner. A jar which rests upon a spot is not identical with it. We express the negation of a jar located upon a spot by means of the proposition that a jar is not the spot. In this case, the jar and its mutual negation are co-ordinate since both of them stand upon the same locus viz., the spot. A jar is the negatum of this mutual negation. The Vaiśeṣikas assume that a negatum and its corresponding negation are opposed to each other. In this case, a jar and its mutual negation are not opposed to each other since they co-exist. Therefore, a jar cannot be the negatum of this mutual negation (*tathā hi na tāvad ghaṭaḥ pratiyogī tasya tadavirodhitvena tadayogāt*). The self-identity of a jar cannot be the negatum of this negation. If the self-identity is itself identical with the jar under discussion then the difficulty is not got rid of. If it is something other than a jar then the negation of this identity is not the negation of a jar since a jar is not negated by it. Similarly, the non-difference from a jar is not negated by the negation. The negation of such non-difference is an instance of absolute negation. The awareness of negation depends upon the awareness of its negatum. The negatum of mutual negation is hard to find out. Therefore the awareness of mutual negation is not possible. The proof of mutual negation is absent. Thus the hypothesis of mutual negation is untenable. He establishes his hypothesis that there is only one type of negation.

Mahādeva discusses the metaphysical aspect of the problem of negation. The Naiyāyikas hold that absolute negation and mutual exclusion are eternal, i.e., they are real. He joins issue with them and holds that negation has only phenomenal existence. He argues thus : as the awareness of negation depends upon that of its negatum so negation depends upon its negatum for its reality. He means to say that negation and its negatum stand on the same level of reality. If an object, say, a jar has phenomenal existence then the negation of that object cannot have absolute reality (*abhāvasya pratiyoginirūpaṇādhīnanirūpaṇatvena tatsattāsamasattākatayā pāramārthikatvaṃ na sambhavati eva*—p.p. 247-48).

Mahādeva arranges all absolute negations in the scale of reality. According to him the absolute negation of the phenomenal world enjoys the highest reality. Other negations have merely empirical existence. He refers to two views regarding the nature of the absolute negation of the whole universe. According to the first view, it is nothing but the Absolute itself. This view owes its popularity to *Iṣṭasiddhi.* According to the second view it is distinct from the Absolute. It is co-eternal with the Absolute. This view is a very old one. It has been referred to and criticised by Maṇḍana Miśra himself. Does it controvert Advaitism (monism) ? The defenders of it say 'No'. According to them, monism means the monism of all positive objects. If negation be a second principle over and above the Absolute then the monism of positive being is not contradicted. In modern times Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa records his assent to this view. Mahādeva repudiates it. He holds that negation which is a distinct term is determined by its negatum and enjoys the same metaphysical status with the negatum. Such negation has no reality since a negatum has only empirical existence. It has only phenomenal existence. As the reality of such negation cannot be established, so we have no right to attach a narrow meaning to the term 'Advaitism'. (*śrutisaṃkoce mānābhāvād adhiṣṭhānātiriktasya abhāvasya pratiyogisattāsamasattākatayā pratiyoginaḥ kalpitatvena tadadhīnasya api kalpitatvasya eva vaktavyatayā vāstavatvasya durnirūpatvāt* p. 250). Ultimately he stands close to Dharmarājādhvarīndra. But he explains what has been assumed by Dharmarāja.

Let us now examine critically the theory of negation of Mahādeva. He is a student of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature but a converted Advaitin. He looks at the theory of negation of the Vaiśeṣika school through the spectacles of an Advaita philosopher. He has modified it greatly to harmonise it with the metaphysical conclusion of the Advaita system. Ultimately he has abandoned the Vaiśeṣika theory of negation and embraced the Prābhākara theory of negation. The thorough examination of Mahādeva's theory of negation reveals its inconsistent character. Mahādeva has not been able to shake off his subconscious admiration for Vaiśeṣika views. His conscious mind is struggling to fit the Vaiśeṣika theory of negation well into the Advaita metaphysical conclusion. The result of this struggle is the remodelling of the Vaiśeṣika theory of negation. His conscious mind is surcharged with the Advaita ideas. The back-ground of his philosophic life is constituted by the Vaiśeṣika ideas. He is a victim of the cross-currents of thought. He admits unreservedly that the implication of negative consciousness is that negation is a distinct term. He asserts strongly that this implication is universal. He draws a distinction between phenomenal and metaphysical negation. Is metaphysical negation an object of negative consciousness ? If it be so then metaphysical negation should be a distinct reality. If it be a distinct reality then the Advaita conclusion that the Absolute is the only reality does not hold good. Mahādeva has preferred to change his theory of negation. He restricts his theory of negation to the phenomenal world. But his epistemological conclusion that negative consciousness implies a distinct negative fact chases him like a rabid dog. He may take away reality from a huge number of individual negations but cannot throw overboard the epistemological meaning of negative consciousness. His epistemology collides with his metaphysics. This collision points to the struggle of his subconscious and conscious mind. Secondly, his theory of negation consists of a big assumption that all individual negations excepting the negation of the universe have only phenomenal existence. He asserts that the epistemological dependence of a term signifies its phenomenal character. The awareness of negation depends upon that of its negatum. Therefore, negation is not more real than its negatum. It is a mere assumption. The Vaiśeṣikas may contend that the relation of inherence has the highest reality in the Advaita sense of reality though the terms which are joined by it and on which it depends for its awareness may have phenomenal existence. This assumption stands in the way of according the highest reality to the negation of *māyā* of the phenomenal world since its negatum does not enjoy the highest reality. If all negations have only phenomenal existence then an unending series of the negation of the phenomenal world is to be admitted since negation, being itself a phenomenon, should be cancelled by some negation other than itself. The negation which cancels the first negation is also a phenomenon. It should also be cancelled by another negation and so on *ad infinitum*. Thirdly, Mahādeva's criticism of mutual negation is superficial. He has failed to grasp the significance of the category of identity. The mutual negation of a jar does not negate a jar but a jar as qualified by the category of identity. The category of identity is an indefinable datum of experience. Fourthly, the hypothesis, that an individual negation is distinct from another if their negata are only distinct is not tenable. The difference in the characteristic features of the same negatum explains the diversity of individual negation. The negation of flowers by which a wreath is composed is distinct from the negation of a wreath of these flowers. The negation of the universal of existence (*sattā*) is distinct from that of the universal of existence qualified by some adjective. The universal of existence inheres in an attribute but the universal of existence with certain limitations imposed upon it by means of an adjectival clause viz. 'which is not co-ordinate with the universals of attribute and action' does not inhere in it. Thus the negation of unqualified existence does not belong to an attribute but the negation of qualified existence belongs to it. Therefore, the negation of unqualified existence is distinct from that of qualified existence though there is no numerical difference between qualified and unqualified existence. Similarly, if different relations qualify the same negatum then the negation of a negatum as qualified by a particular relation is distinct from the negation of the same negatum as qualified by another relation. The negation of smoke which is qualified by the relation of conjunction is distinct from the negation of smoke which is qualified by the relation of inherence. Smoke comes into contact with the smoke-pipe but it does not inhere in it. Therefore, the negation of the conjoined smoke is distinct from the negation of inhering smoke. Fifthly, he has failed to distinguish the difference of the nature of pre-negation from that of absolute negation. Pre-negation is always opposed to an individual. This individual is not marked off by its general characteristic feature. For other reasons also pre-negation cannot be subsumed under the class of absolute negation. Simlarly, post-negation does not belong to the class of absolute negation. In fine we may safely say that he is neither a good theorist nor a sound critic though he is superior to Dharmarājadhvarīndra in his loyalty to Advaitism.

(c) Niścala Dāsa is not a blind follower of Dharmarāja but a critical expounder of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. He elaborately discusses the problem of negation in his *Vṛttiprabhākara*. He has devolved much space to the treatment of the views of his rival schools. He establishes the view of his master. His treatment of an aspect of the problem of negation claims our attention. He discusses whether *māyā* evolves negation as its effect. In other words, is *māyā* the material cause of negation ? The characteristic feature of *māyā* is positivity—whereas negativity characterizes all individual negations. There is a great gulf fixed between positivity and negativity. Negation which is characterized by negativity cannot arise out of *māyā* which is a positive object since an effect cannot be dissimilar from its cause. The concepts of positivity and negativity are data of human experience. These data cannot be set aside as objects involving contradictions. They are the very foundation of our systems of thought. The facts are given to us. We are to explain them. We cannot ignore their existence. Niścala Dāsa boldly faces the objection. He holds that negation is homogeneous with *māyā* in several senses since negation has only phenomenal existence, is sublated by the true knowledge of the Absolute and is other than the Absolute. An effect is not identical with its material cause but in certain respects different from its cause. Pot-sherds which have specific characteristic features of their own are different from a jar which possesses a distinct characteristic feature of its own. He means to say that pot-sherdness and jarness are not identical features. In spite of this distinction of characteristic features a pot-sherd is the material cause of a jar. Similarly, in spite of distinction existing between positivity and negativity, negation is the effect of *māyā*. (*Vṛttiprabhākara*—p.p. 154-55). He tries to bridge the gulf which separates the theory of negation of Śrīharṣa and others from that of Dharmarāja. Absolute negation is held to be beginningless. How can it be an evolute of *māyā ?* The probable answer will be that negation depends logically upon *māyā*. There is much distinction between logical and causal difference. In that case negation is not an effect of *māyā*. Moreover, an effect is not absolutely different from its evolving cause. Negation should be identical with *māyā* in some sense. If this be so then negation should be experienced as a positive object since positivity is the essential character of *māyā*. A jar is identical with earth, its cause. The character of being earthen belongs to a jar. Similarly, positivity should belong to negation if negation be its effect. The Vaiśeṣikas maintain the distinction existing between an effect and its material cause since according to them an effect is in no sense identical with its material cause. Therefore, negation is not an effect of *māyā*. The theory of negation as propounded by Dharmarāja and developed by Mahādeva is distinct from that of Śrīharṣa and others.

(7) Citsukhācāryya in his *Tattvapradīpikā* has elaborately discussed the theory of negation. Though he makes no original contribution to the theory of negation yet his adaptation of the Prābhākara theory of negation to the Advaita metaphysics is very useful. He holds that the locus of the so-called negation is referred to by a negative judgment and

of negation is not a distinct term (*yādṛśe bhūtalādau dharmiṇi ghaṭābhāvo'bhyupeyate tādṛśasya eva abhāvavyavahāranidānamastu kim atiriktābhāvakalpanayā.—Citsukhī* p.p. 277-78). He holds that this substratum is a neutral substance, i.e., it is neither positive nor negative. The Naiyāyikas have raised several counter-arguments to silence the Prābhākaras. Citsukha argues that these arguments do not affect the Advaitins who draw a distinction between appearance and reality. If the realists try to establish negation on the strength of experience as a distinct term then this much can be admitted that it is not a reality but a mere appearance. Moreover, the whole logical process is confined within the narrow limits of the empirical world. This process falls short of reality. If negation had been real then it would have been transcendental to human experience. This line of argument seems to suggest that negation is a distinct term though it is held to be an appearance. Citsukha makes his position unambiguous and states that it is illogical to hold that negation is a distinct term since a neutral substratum is expressed by a negative judgment (*tadevam...niṣpramāṇaka eva—Citsukhī* p. 278). Citsukha is consistent throughout. The Advaitins who hold that negation is a distinct term but is an appearance should admit that the negation of the phenomenal world is identical with the Absolute, the locus of all appearance. Thus they embrace the Prābhākara theory of negation in the long run. We have already stated that the negation of the phenomenal world cannot be itself a phenomenon according to the Advaitins. Citsukha has closely observed the settled conclusion of the Advaita school that the Absolute is the real negation of the world of appearance. The negation of the universe is an object of experience. Now, if negative consciousness points to a special object of its own then the negation of the universe should be a distinct term. Such a view is charged with logical difficulties. The Advaitins who hold that negation is a distinct term are inconsistent. Citsukha represents the Advaita theory of negation in a consistent form. He discards the hypothesis that negative consciousness refers to a distinct object i.e. neagtion is a distinct term. He introduces the Prābhākara theory of negation into the Advaita system and thinks that this theory fits in well with the Advaita metaphysical conclusion. Thus we see that Citsukha accords the highest status in the scale of reality to negation. This view bears a close resemblance to that of the Mādhyamikas. According to them the ultimate reality is the negation of the phenomenal world. Though there is difference of opinion between the Mādhyamikas and the Advaitins regarding the nature of the Absolute yet they all agree in this point that the Absolute is the negation of the phenomenal world. But it should be noted here that the *śūnyatā* of the empirical world, according to the Mādhyamikas, is the relativity but not the voidness of the universe. In the Mādhyamika literature the term *śūnya* is consistently synonymous with neither negation nor void.

Now, let us examine Citsukha's theory of negation critically. His acceptance of the Prābhākara theory of negation speaks highly of his sense of logical consistency. The great teachers of the Advaita school have failed to solve the problem of negation from the Advaita stand-point. The distinction between empirical and real negation aggravates troubles. If some concessions are made to negative consciousness then the distinct character of real negation becomes an inevitable conclusion. Citsukha judiciously avoids this issue. He has to face the counter arguments of the Vaiśeṣikas who have tried their level best to silence the Prābhākaras. The most difficult task before Citsukha is to meet the argument of the author of *Mānamanohara*. He holds that a negative judgment is a synthetic one and that the predicate is distinct from its subject. In other words negation is other than its substratum. Citsukha contends this argument and holds that the predicate at issue is not a real object. Citsukha's examination of this argument is superficial. If it is admitted that negation which has empirical existence is distinct from its substratum then it goes against the theory of Citsukha. Pratyagrūpa has tried to refute the argument under discussion in a different way and thus to establish the thesis of his master. But he has indulged in sophistry in contravention of the logical proceedings. The inference of the above logician is more convincing since it gets the support of sound *tarka* whereas the counter inference of Pratyagrūpa is weak as it is not strengthened by sound *tarka*. We shall not enter into the details of logical technique at present. We can confidently say that the evidence of negative consciousness cannot be ignored. Citsukha stands and falls with the Prābhākaras. The Advaitins stand and fall with Citsukha. The history of the Advaita system will decide whether Citsukha's theory is correct.

Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa in his *Advaitacintāmaṇi* has fairly discussed the problem of negation. He oscillates between the two rival theories. Is negation not distinct from its substratum ? Or, it is a distinct term ? At first he subscribes to the Prābhākara theory of negation. He subjects the theory of negation, propounded by Gaṅgeśa and defended by Jayadeva Miśra, to a severe criticism. The sum and substance of his argument is that the Naiyāyikas fail to mention the specific relation which holds between an individual negation and its locus. The Naiyāyikas have tried to define it but all have failed to supply us with a defectless definition. Jayadeva Miśra defines it in the following manner. According to him the locus of negation itself constitutes the relation of negation to its locus. A jar exists on a spot. The individual jar does not occupy the whole of the spot. The portion of the spot which does not come into direct contact with the spot constitutes the relation of the negation of that jar to that spot. If this be the relation of the above negation of the jar then the awareness of the negation of the jar on the spot will be a valid one even while the jar, the negatum of this negation, exists on the spot. If the jar is removed from the spot then the relational character of the spot is disturbed and the spot should not contain the negation of that jar (*vastutastu pratiyogideśānyadeśatvasya sambandhatve ghaṭavati tadatyantābhāvabodho'pi pramā syāt tadvati tadabhāvabuddheḥ prāmāṇyaṃ duṣpariharam...ghaṭāpasaraṇānantaraṃ tadadhikaraṇaṃ ghaṭātyantābhāvavān na syāt—Advaitacintāmaṇi* pp. 15-16). Therefore the hypothesis that negation is a distinct term involves contradictions. The Naiyāyikas put forward counter-arguments against the Prābhākara theory of negation. The Naiyāyikas try to solve the problem of relation of negation to its locus with deplorable inefficiency. The Prābhākaras are in a position to give a reply to the charges of the Naiyāyikas with this much inefficiency. He intends to signify that both these theories are defective and that any one of them may be embraced by him (*atiriktābhāvānabhyupagame'pi etādṛśasamādhāne durbhikṣābhāvāt*). Then he meets the most formidable objection raised by Gaṅgeśa against the Prābhākara theory that if negation is not a distinct term i.e., if it is identical with positive objects then the awareness of negation should have the common form. He says that the form of awareness is not determined by the nature of objects but is independent of them. The awareness of substantives and predicates has the same form though substantives and predicates themselves cannot be subsumed under the one common form. The Naiyāyikas admit that the awareness of mutual negation has the same form though all individual mutual exclusions do not possess the common form. Then he comes to the conclusion that negation is not a distinct term. This is really a re-assertion of the theory of negation of Citsukhācāryya.

After reflecting deeply on the meaning of negative awareness he arrives at the conclusion that negation is a distinct term. He holds that there is only one type of negation viz., absolute negation. This view is similar to that of Mahādeva though there is a great difference between them. He says that experience does not bear evidence to pre-negation or post-negation. Later on, Raṅgoji revises his opinion and holds that post-negation is a distinct term. This change of opinion is due to the influence of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi upon him. The judgments "The jar is now destroyed", and "The destruction of the jar comes into being just now" signify that post-negation is a distinct term. This admission on the part of Raṅgoji, is, truly speaking, inconsistent with the accepted theory of causality of the Advaita school. He follows in the foot-steps of a section of Naiyāyikas and holds that absolute negation and mutual exclusion are not two distinct types of negation. The absolute negation of the characteristic feature of a substratum is the mutual negation of the substratum. The absolute negation of jarness is the mutual negation of a jar (*ghaṭatvādyatyantābhāvenaiva ghaṭo na ityādipratīter nirvāhāt* p. 18). This view of the Naiyāyikas has already been repudiated by Nṛsiṃhāśrama and others. They record this objection : "How is it that the absolute negation of jarness existing on a spot is expressed in the form that the jar is not the spot ? The proper form should be that the negation of jarness does not belong to the spot." Raṅgoji meets this objection. He holds that this very negation is experienced differently. When it is experienced as negating a jar which is characterized by jarness it is expressed in the form that the jar is not the spot. If it is experienced as negating jarness which is characterized by its essence i. e., jarness-ness (*ghaṭatvatva*) then it is expressed in the form that there is no jarness on the spot (A. C. p. 18). He holds that this negation is eternal and thus real. According to him, difference is not negation but is definitely positive. Difference which is experienced by all of us is a mere appearance (*siddhānte parābhimata-vibhāgavat bhedasya bhāvarūpatvāt. Tathāca dṛśyabhāvatvasya tatrāpi sattvāt bhedasyāpi mithyātvam* p. 72). He borrows the argument of Madhusūdana and others to establish the phenomenal character of difference. Even if reality is denied to difference, the ultimate conclusion of non-dualism cannot be established since negation is a distinct term. Raṅgoji concludes that Advaitism signifies the monism of all positive beings only. The import of the Advaita theory is narrow inasmuch as according to Raṅgoji reality cannot be denied to negation. In other words, negation is co-eternal with the Absolute (*na caivam advaitabhaṅgaḥ bhāvādvaitābhyupagamāt* p. 71). It is not an original contribution of Raṅgoji. It has been referred to by Maṇḍana Miśra in his *Brahmasiddhi*. It has been repudiated by all Advaitins of wide reputation such as Maṇḍana Miśra etc. If we are attentive to the implication of negative consciousness then negation should be regarded as a distinct fact. Negation should not be held to have only phenomenal existence. It is an easy conclusion for the Advaitins to arrive at. But they have failed to realise the full implication of this theory. Is not a negative fact the distinct object of negative consciousness? These Advaitins must reply in the affirmative. This law should be treated as universal, otherwise, there will be no justification for holding negation to be a distinct term. The question of its metaphysical status is a minor issue. Whatever may be the metaphysical status of negation—a negative fact is always a distinct object of negative consciousness. The ultimate negative judgment that there exists no universe consisting of various objects on the Absolute points to such negation as is distinct from the Absolute. If the ultimate negative consciousness does not refer to a distinct object i.e., a distinct negative fact then the hypothesis that a negative fact which is a distinct object has only phenomenal existence becomes a superfluous one since the consciousness of the ultimate unity which is not a negative fact is expressed in a negative judgment. The judgment—the expression of consciousness—decides the character of consciousness. If negative consciousness has no exclusive form of its own then the distinction between positive and negative consciousness becomes an idle talk. Both Citsukha and Raṅgoji are consistent so far as their theory of negation goes. Either one should endow negation with a distinct character or deny this character altogether. The hypothesis that negation is a distinct term but is not real evades the ultimate ethical issue. If the ultimate consciousness negates the phenomenal world then it is not a positive one since it possesses the common character of negating its opposite shared by all negative consciousness. If it is held that negation is not a distinct term then the Advaitins fail to explain why the consciousness of the unity involves a reference to the universe. This unity is a bare identity which excludes all differences and is held to be self-contained. Moreover this consciousness is intuitive and cannot be contaminated by an alloy of subjective super-addition. Citsukha is silent on this point. Most probably this is the reason why Raṅgoji holds in the concluding part of his theory of negation that negation is a distinct mode of reality. It runs parallel to the Absolute. Thus we see that the history of Advaita philosophy speaks in favour of the Vaiśeṣika theory of negation.

Let us now minutely examine the thesis of Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa. He is indebted to the Vaiśeṣikas for his theory of negation. He can claim no originality for the formulation of his theory. Still he should be applauded for his bold assertion and admiration for truth. He is a sincere thinker and seeker after truth. He feels no delicacy to attach a narrow meaning to the compressed formula of the Advaitism, viz. non-dualism. But he leaves aside the problem of relation. How is negation related to its locus? How is negatum related to its corresponding negatum? The question of relation is directly involved in the concept of negation. If relation is something *ab extra* then the conclusion of the non-dualism of all positive beings is hardly tenable. Raṅgoji has tried to evade the problem of difference. All Advaitins have not openly discussed it but have laboured under their preconceived notion. We shall discuss it later on. Raṅgoji holds that post-negation is a distinct term. This hypothesis comes into conflict with the theory of evolution according to which destruction signifies the return of an effect to its cause. An effect stands in its cause in a potential form, becomes distinct from the cause and merges into its cause, *māyā*, which is the material cause of the universe. The destruction of an effect of *māyā* means the disappearance of that effect in *māyā*. The effect becomes identical with *māyā*. Now, if post-negation is a distinct term then this hypothesis cannot agree with the theory of causality of the Advaita school. This problem has escaped the notice of Raṅgoji but it is a serious blunder on his part not to tackle this problem.

Let us now give a brief sketch of the theories of negation propounded by the Advaitins of different ages. There is a great diversity of opinions among the Advaitins. There is no single theory of negation. We are to classify them and discuss their merits and demerits.

(1) Sureśvara holds that the negation is imaginary. It is unreal. According to him it is *avastu*. The idea corresponding to it is a floating one. This view is really borrowed from the Buddhists. It is not consistent with the epistemological conclusion of the Advaitins since hallucination or an idea which is not an image of an object is an absurdity.

(2) The second type of theory represents that negation in indefinable (*anirvacanīya*). It is an evolute of *māyā* (*māika*). Neither the category of reality nor that of unreality is applicable to it. These two categories are not jointly applicable to it. It is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal. It mediates between reality and unreality.

(a) According to some such as Ānandabodha, Ānandajñāna, Prakāśānanda, Kṛṣṇānanda, etc., it is a mental fact. It has no phenomenal existence but only subsistence. They mean to say that the experience of negation and difference is sublated by our worldly experience. It is not a fact that our negative experience is cancelled only by our central experience i.e., by the mystic intuition of the Absolute.

(b) Sadānanda holds that negation has phenomenal existence. He means to say that negative experience is sublated only by the mystic intuition of the Absolute, i.e. by the central experience. He holds at the same time that negation is an inner phenomenon. It is directly revealed by the transcendental consciousness. The subjective view of negation has been rejected by others. We refrain from criticising it since it has been rejected by the majority of the Advaitins themselves.

(c) Negation has phenomenal existence. It is objective. It is sublated by the central experience of the Absolute. This view has been held by the renowned thinkers of this school viz., Maṇḍana, Vimuktātman, Śrīharṣa, Madhusūdana, Nṛsiṃhāśrama etc. The second type of theory contains a flaw in it. This flaw is not noticed by superficial onlookers. According to the Advaitins an experience is not cancelled by another experience since each experience is intrinsically true. The object of some experience is contradicted by another experience. Our experience shows that the object of a judgment is cancelled by another judgment if these two judgments have the same subject and predicate but differ only in quality. The judgment 'A is B' is negated by the judgment 'A is not B'. The negated judgment is not falsified but it is implied that the object of it involves logical contradictions. The Advaitins hold that the central judgment contradicts the objects of all other judgments. Now let us discuss the form and nature of this central judgment. The experience of all worldly objects may be expressed in the form that there is a diversity of objects in the Absolute. The negating judgment should have the form that there is no diversity of objects in the Absolute. The central experience i.e. the mystic intuition of the Absolute should not be expressed in a negative judgment since the Absolute excludes all distinctions between subject and predicate. Such an intuition is supra-judgment. If it is not expressed in a judgment then it cannot negate the above judgment which refers to diversity. Logic demands that the judgment 'there is no diversity in the Absolute'' refers to the distinct individual negation of the world—full of diversity. Is this negation real ? If not then an infinite series of negations should be admitted since the negation of the universe should be negated by another judgment and so on *ad infinitum* and the experience of the fundamental unity cannot be expressed in a judgment. If it is real then the fundamental theory of non-dualism should be abandoned. If this negation is not a distinct term then the assumption that negation is a distinct term but has only phenomenal existence is superfluous. The Prābhākara theory of negation suits the purpose of the Advaitins very nicely. They cannot avoid the disjunctive application of the categories of reality and unreality to negation. They cannot hold consistently that it is neither real nor unreal.

(3) The third type of the theory of negation has been put forward by Nārāyaṇa Sarasvatī. He holds that negation is the *āvaraṇaśakti* of *avidyā*, He tries to get rid of the problem which confronts the second type of theory. But he has dissected negation with the knife of his analysis so sharply that it has been put to death on the operation table. Negation which contains no reference to its corresponding object negated is really no negation. He calls the *āvaraṇaśakti* of *avidyā* negation only by the sheer might of his pen but the universal experience of negation does not lend its support to such a view.

(4) The fourth type of the theory of negation has been put forward by Dharmarājādhvarīndra, Mahādevānanda etc. They hold that negation does not evolve out of *māyā* but is similar to *māyā* in its very essence. In other words, it is not a reality. It should be sublated by the central experience of the Absolute. The problem which confronts the second type of theory remains unanswerable to these thinkers. Mahādeva's theory of negation is an improvement upon that of Dharmarāja since he has freed himself from the bias for the Vaiśeṣika theory of negation. But an oscillation between the Vaiśeṣika theory of negation and the Prābhākara theory of negation is noticed in these thinkers. They acknowledge the meaning of negative experience that negation is a distinct term but do

not stick to it. They hold that the ultimate negative judgment which contradicts the reality of all empirical objects points to the Absolute without the second. But such a view disregards the universal meaning of negative experience. Such an admission shakes the basis of the hypothesis that negation is a distinct term.

(5) The fifth type of theory has been put forward by Citsukhācāryya. It is really a reassertion of the Prābhākara theory of negation. Citsukha is more consistent than the other thinkers. The metaphysical implication of this theory is similar to the metaphysical conclusion of the Mādhyamika school that the Absolute is the negation of all empirical objects. But it is very difficult to prove that the intuition of the Absolute negates the experience of the world of diversity. Can the experience of the Absolute be expressed in a judgment since the Absolute is the bare identity of consciousness-existence-bliss. Something supra-relational cannot be expressed in a judgment since a judgment without subject-predicate-distinction is an absurdity. A judgment points to a relational object invariably. The central experience of the Absolute is not a judgment. It cannot negate the reality of worldly objects. A negative judgment which negates the reality of the universe does not refer to the Absolute. Thus Citsukha's theory of negation does not promote the cause of the Advaitins. A new theory is required to meet this demand.

(6) The sixth type of theory has been put forward by Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa. It is a re-assertion of pre-Maṇḍana theory of negation. Negation is a distinct term. Some limitation has been imposed upon the meaning of the term 'non-dualism' which denotes the central formula of the Advaitins. The influence of the Vaiśeṣika theory of negation is manifest upon the upholders of this view of the Advaita school. But these thinkers do not realise the full import of the Vaiśeṣika theory of negation. It cannot be grafted on the Advaita metaphysics. The true implication of the Vaiśeṣika theory of negation is pluralism. Negation presupposes the reality of negatum and its relations. Raṅgoji and his predecessors are partly conscious of this implication. By the mere super-addition of negation to the Absolute the reality of negation cannot be maintained. Raṅgoji lacks critical insight and discovers an easy solution of the problem of negation from the Advaita standpoint. The problem of negation is a source of perpetual troubles to the Advaitins. Their solution of it is not satisfactory.

Of these different types of theories of negation the second and the third types are consistent with the spirit of the Advaita metaphysics. They represent a synthesis of the realistic and the idealistic theories of negation. Negation is neither real nor unreal. It mediates between reality and unreality. It is a sort of compromise between the Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist theories of negation. The other thinkers of the Advaita school have borrowed the theory of negation from other schools of thought and tried to graft it on the Advaita metaphysics. Of all the thinkers of the Advaita school Nārāyaṇa Sarasvatī's treatment of negation is highly original. Its metaphysical explanation of negation is very satisfactory and keeps well with the spirit of the Advaita metaphysics.

8. *The Mādhva Theory of Negation.*

The success of the Advaitins depends upon the establishment of the Prābhākara theory of negation to a great extent. Citsukha has made his choice of the right course of action. We have pointed out already that the Advaitins have some insurmountable difficulties to face even if the Prābhākara theory of negation is established. It is not an easy task to establish the Prābhākara theory of negation. This theory gives rise to some epistemological difficulties. Citsukha has discussed these problems very hastily. New problems crop up. The Advaitins have also criticised the Prābhākara theory of negation. Thus the task of Citsukha or of his follower is not a smooth one. An opposition against this theory of negation naturally springs up in the dualistic camp. The Mādhvas are the deadly critics of the Advaitins. They have put forward a new theory of negation to prove dualism.

A superficial observation of the Mādhva theory of negation reveals its eclectic character. It appears to be a combination of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of negation with that of the Prābhākaras. A close examination of this theory makes us grasp its distinctive features. They hold that mutual exclusion is not a distinct term. They agree with the Prābhākaras on this point. But they also differ from the Prābhākaras on the point that mutual exclusion is a relative term, is determined by the imaginary identity of the two objects differing and is either positive or negative. Now, the problem is how a non-relative term is identical with a relative term. The Mādhvas hold that mutual exclusion is not the whole of two terms or its locus but is an aspect of them or it. They agree with the Vaiśeṣikas in holding that *saṃsargābhāva* (negation other than mutual exclusion) is a distinct term. The concept of *saṃsargābhāva* of the Mādhvas is different from that of *saṃsargābhāva* of the Vaiśeṣikas. According to the Mādhvas pre-negation and post-negation do not belong to the class of *saṃsargābhāva*, but the Vaiśeṣikas hold that pre-negation, post-negation and absolute negation fall under the class of *saṃsargābhāva*· The Vaiśeṣikas hold that absolute negation negates a real object whereas the Mādhvas hold that absolute negation negates an imaginary object. The commonly cited example of absolute negation is that the horn of a hare does not exist. This is the bare outline of the Mādhva theory of negation. In spite of all these differences the Mādhva theory of negation appears to be a remarkable combination of the Vaiśeṣika, Prābhākara and Buddhist theories of negation. But this theory of the Mādhvas stands close to that of the Vaiśeṣikas in its metaphysical implication since they hold that negation is a distinct real term. It is a new interpretation of the Vaiśeṣika theory of negation. It is an approach to the hypothesis that a negative fact is a distinct and real one from a different angle of vision.

We shall now discuss this theory of negation in a detailed manner. The Mādhvas show much originality in their epistemology, the back-ground of their theory of negation. They hold that a negative fact is directly grasped by us like all positive objects. Jayatīrtha, Śrīnivāsa, Rāghavendra and others hold that the object which is presented to our indeterminate perception as a bare denial is called negative fact (*yaśca prathamopalabdhau nastīti pratīyate so'bhāvaḥ*). Negative consciousness is an awareness of bare denial. It is an undeniable fact. Negative consciousness has a distinct character of its own. It refers to a distinct object. A negative fact cannot be denied. A positive object is represented as a denial of some other object. Let us take an example of significant denial viz. that object is not white. A positive object is a denial. A negative fact is also represented as an affirmation, e.g. the negation of a jar exists. Now, the problem arises how it is to be ascertained that negation is a distinct term since there is no fixed law that negation should be expressed by a negative judgment. The Mādhvas anticipate this objection and hold that a negative fact is invariably grasped by the indeterminate perception, i.e., by the presentative perception as a bare denial. The negative judgment 'there is no jar here' is an expression of the presentative perception of the negation of a jar on this spot. The negation of a jar is here equivalent to the bare denial of a jar. The presentative consciousness reveals the true character of a negative fact. Representative consciousness does not reveal the true character of negative or positive objects. Therefore the judgments which correspond to representative consciousness do not throw light on the distinctive character of their objects. Thus the Mādhvas reassert the argument of Vātsyāyana in favour of the hypothesis that negation is a distinct term. But they assume the argument of Vātsyāyana and make it more reasonable. They also enter into controversy with the Prābhākaras who hold that negation is not other than the locus itself. The judgment 'there is no jar on the spot' does not refer to the negation of a jar as a distinct term but points to the spot itself. The Prābhākaras hold that the neutral spot is expressed in a negative judgment that there is no jar etc. The Mādhvas repudiate this view in the following manner. They hold that the very idea of a neutral spot indicates indirectly the category of negation since a neutral spot is that which contains neither a jar nor its negation. The concept of neutrality involves a necessary reference to the concepts of negativity and positivity. Therefore the argument of Śālikanātha and Citsukha in favour of the hypothesis that negation is not a distinct term is not tenable. We shall discuss this point thoroughly later on (*ghaṭatadabhāvābhyām aviśeṣitam eva bhūtalaṃ ghaṭābhāvādhikaraṇamiti tathāvacanād atirikto abhāvo astīti bhāvaḥ*). Ānandatīrtha in his *Sattattvaratnamālā* assumes that a philosopher should be guided by his uncontradicted experience in the matter of his discovery of the modes of reality. He holds that the finding of such experience is final. The Advaitins submit this view to further examination. If they find that these categories involve logical contradictions then they discard them as mere appearances. But Ānandatīrtha holds that the objects of uncontradicted experience should not be submitted to further scrutiny. The drift of his assumption is that negation is an object of uncontradicted experience. Therefore it is a mode of reality. Its reality cannot be cancelled even if it involves logical contradictions as the Advaitins hold. This is not a new assumption at all. This is one of the cardinal assumptions of the Nyāya Epistemology. The Naiyāyikas assume that the data of experience are given facts and that they should not be logically examined but be accepted as the foundation of the true metaphysics. The dietum of Ānandatīrtha is expressed in the short sentence (*na hyabādhitānubhavasiddhārthe yuktivirodhaḥ śaṃkyaḥ*). This is essentially the assumption of all realists of the different parts of the world. If we accept it then negation is unquestionably a distinct mode of reality. The Naiyāyikas agree with the Mādhvas in this part. They hold that the function of true knowledge is to discover facts but not to create its objects.

Another important point has been discussed in the various works of Mādhva literature viz., *Viṣṇutattvanirṇayaṭikā*, *Nayacandrikā*, *Tattvasaṃkhyāna*, *Sattattvaratnamālā*, *Tattvaviveka*, *Tattvodyata* etc. If negation is a distinct term then how is it that it possesses a positive character viz. cognisibility i.e., the fact of being an object of knowledge ? The old writers hold that negation has a positive character since negation is the substantive of positive judment 'negation exists' (*abhāvaḥ asti*). But an unreal object is also cognised by us. It is also an object of true knowledge. Similarly, it should also possess a positive character. But nobody asserts that an unreal object exists. This problem has not been solved by the earlier philosophers of this school. Ānandatīrtha solves this problem. He holds that existence which characterizes negation is different from the existence which constitutes the essence of all positive objects. The existence in the judgments 'a jar exists' and 'negation exists' has not the same meaning. In the first judgment it denotes a positive meaning. In the second judgment it has a negative meaning. The positive judgment 'negation exists' may be converted into a negative judgment 'a thing does not exist' (*abhāve astitā khalu asattvarūpa eva*). Similarly, when we assert that an unreal object exists we imply by it that an unreal object does not exist. We say that an unreal object exists and carries the stamp of unreality on the face of it. This meaning is (*asad asattvena vartate ityukte kā nāma vyāhatiḥ*) not clear. Bradley has given a different meaning to reality and unreality. According to him the universes of discourse of real and unreal objects are different. The real objects inhabit the universe constituted by us on the basis of our waking consciousness. But the unreal objects inhabit the land of imagination. They are also real in the imaginary universe. The term 'reality' has only a relative meaning. From the stand-point of waking consciousness an unreal object is not real, i.e., non-existent. Thus a real object of this universe is unreal in the universe of imaginary objects. An object which is unreal in this universe is real in some other world. Thus an assumption of many universes solves this difficulty since the term reality has only a relative sense. The Mādhvas have not assumed the plurality of universes. They hold that an unreal object is unreal unconditionally. But it is an object of true knowledge. It may be argued against them that every object of true knowledge is real. How is it that an unreal object is real ? Bradley looks at the problem from a different angle of vision. Ānandatīrtha answers that an unreal object is presented to true consciousness and that this consciousness reveals the true character of an unreal object. If one says that he knows an unreal object truly then he means that he knows that it does not exist. The non-existence of an unreal object is unconditional. It has no universe to live in. It exists nowhere. In this abolute sense the Mādhvas hold that an unreal object is known truly. Non-existence is predicated of an unreal object in the judgment that an unreal object does not exist, the substantive of which refers to an unreal object. They hold that existence denotes two contradictonery meanings viz., inclusion in that universe and exclusion from this universe. Now, if these unreal objects are excluded from the universe and have no place to stand upon then it should be held that they float in the air. They are forced to admit it. But negation does not float in the air. It belongs to this universe. Thus the non-existence of negation is different from that of an unreal object. The Mādhvas fail to draw the distinction between a significant exclusion and a bare exclusion and unwittingly identify the one with the other.

In *Nyāyasudhā* (2.1.4) another point of importance has been discussed. According to some philosophers pre-negation is the very stuff of this universe. These philosophers have not been identified. The universe is preceded by universal dissolution. Universal dissolution is followed by the creation of this universe. During the period of universal dissolution the pre-negation of all objects exists with its causal efficiency unexhausted. It is also the invariable condition of all effects which constitute this universe. They also hold that this pre-negation is the only cause of this effect-world since they refuse to believe in the existence of transcendental objects such as God etc., at the time of dissolution. Therefore, according to them, the pre-negation of all objects is the only cause of this universe which comes into being. For the sake of argument it may be admitted that pre-negation is the material cause of this universe but it cannot be the efficient cause of this universe. A creator of this universe must be an intelligent being. Now, these philosophers may contend that pre-negation is both a material and an efficient cause. They have recourse to the authority of the sacred texts for the basis of this view. Negation is a bare denial. How is it that a bare denial constitutes the background of this universe ? They argue that negation consists of two parts viz, aspect and substratum. The aspect of negation represents a bare denial. But the substantive element of negation is endowed with all attributes which belong essentially to a creator (*tasya dharmato niṣedhatve'pi dharmiṇo aniṣedhatvāt*). This view has been subjected to a severe criticism by the followers of the Mādhva school. They argue that a creator of this universe must be an intelligent person. His volition or mental activity which is invariably associated with his creative power presupposes His intelligence. Pre-negation is not endowed with intelligence. Therefore, pre-negation cannot be the creator of this universe. Moreover, it is difficult to establish the causal relation between negation and positive objects which are held to be its effects. Still they cherish a wrong notion of universal dissolution during which no object transcendental or empirical is said to exist. The Mādhvas prove by means of a counter-inference that God exists during that period. They argue thus :

- All instances of destruction are events in time when some person exists.
  Universal dissolution is an instance of destruction.

Therefore, Universal dissolution is an event in time when some person exists.

The Mādhvas also establish the existence of God as the governor of the moral universe. Thus they conclude that the view of these philosophers is not tenable.

The Mādhvas refer to another view according to which an effect is effectuated by the post-negation of its cause. A sprout springs up when its cause viz, the seed is destroyed. The destruction of threads etc, leads to the destruction of a cloth. If we generalise the nature of cause from several familiar instances then we arrive at the conclusion that post-negation is the source of this universe as well as the agent of its destruction. This view has been represented as *Śūnyavāda* in Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra*. It is not the *Śūnyavāda* of the Mādhyamikas. The Mādhvas do not allude to Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* or Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyābhāṣya* though the text of *Nyāyasudhā* contains no new idea.

Bergson criticises a similar view in his *Creative Evolution*. This view has been charmingly represented by him thus :

"Existence appears to me like a conquest over nought ... Or, I represent all reality extended on nothing as on a carpet : at first was nothing, and being has come by super-addition to it. Or, yet again, if something has always existed, nothing must always have served as its substratum or receptacle, and is therefore eternally prior... In short, I cannot get rid of the idea that the full is an embroidery on the canvas of the void, that being is superimposed on nothing, and that in the idea of 'nothing' there is less than in that of 'something'." (*Creative Evolution* p. 291). According to him the idea of the nought is a pseudo-idea and all the problems that are raised around it are pseudo-problems. Gautama, Vātsyāyana and the Mādhvas do not refute this view from an examination into the logical character of the concept of non-existence. But they repudiate this theory on other grounds. This theory is based upon mal-observation of cause and effect. The problems—such as the problem of relation between cause and effect etc,—which are raised around it cannot be satisfactorily solved. An effect which is a positive being cannot be related to its cause i.e., negation, since negation should be the substratum of its effect.

Jayatīrtha and Śrīnivāsa has discussed another point of great importance. Śrīharṣa and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī have repudiated the hypothesis that negation is a distinct term on the ground that the relation of negation is not related to the so-called substratum which involves no logical contradiction. According to the Advaitins it is a weak point in this hypothesis. Jayatīrtha and Śrīnivāsa meet the argument of the Advaitins. The objections of the Advaitins are as follows :

Does the negation of a jar stand upon a substratum which contains the negation ? Or, does it stand upon a substratum which contains a jar ? If it is answered in the affirmative with regard to the first question then it is a glaring instance of *petitio principii*. In other words, the negation of a jar stands upon the negation of a jar. If it is answered in the affirmative with regard to the second question then such an answer involves contradiction since the negation of a jar and a jar cannot co-exist in the same locus at the same time. The locus of the negation of a jar must either contain the negation of a jar or a jar. Therefore the Advaitins put forward a formidable dilemma before those who subscribe to the hypothesis that negation is a distinct term. Jayatīrtha's answer to this dilemma is a timid one. He tries to shirk the real issue. Śrīnivāsa has boldly met this dilemma. He holds that the negation of a jar stands upon the substratum which contains the negation of a jar. But this negation does not stand upon itself. It stands upon the spot i.e., the substratum of the above negation. This substratum is distinguished from other substrata by means of this negation which qualifies it. He cites an example to bring home his point. The pre-negation of a jar is qualified by a jar. This pre-negation is determined by a jar. A jar which qualifies this negation is not the condition of a jar. A jar is effectuated by this negation but is not self-caused. A jar remains external to this negation and is not an element of the causal efficiency of this pre-negation. Similarly, the negation of a jar stands upon its substratum viz., a particular spot which is marked off from other spots being qualified by itself. But it does not stand upon itself since it is externally related to the substratum. In other words, the standing of an object upon its substratum does not imply necessarily its standing upon the external determinant of that substratum. Therefore the objection of the Advaitins is pointless.

Now, we shall discuss the nature of absolute negation from the stand-point of the Mādhvas. According to them absolute negation is eternal. It is not an event in time. They agree with the Vaiśeṣikas in this point regarding its metaphysical reality. The Mādhvas hold that absolute negation is determined by an unreal negatum. Absolute negation negates an unreal object (*asatpratiyogiko abhāvo atyantābhāvaḥ*). Let us take a familiar example of absolute negation to make the meaning of absolute negation clear. The commonest example of absolute negation is "This jar does not exist on this spot". Does this judgment point to the negation of this jar on this spot ? The Mādhvas answer in the negative. They argue thus. If this jar be placed on this spot in some future time then it is an illustration of the pre-negation of the contact of this jar with this spot. If this jar had existed before on this spot and was removed from this spot then the judgment refers to the post-negation of the contact of this jar with this spot. If this jar does never exist on this spot then the judgment refers to the absolute negation of the contact of this jar with this spot. The absolute negation of the contact of this jar with the spot should not be identified with the absolute negation of this jar since this negation does not negate this jar but its contact with its particular locus. The above judgment does not refer to the negation of this jar for the following reasons. The negation of this jar may denote one of the three types of the negation of this jar viz, the pre-negation, the post-negation or the absolute negation of this jar. The pre-negation or the post-negation of this jar is impossible since this jar exists somewhere else and either of them cannot co-exist with the object negated. Moreover, it is not the absolute negation of this jar since this jar is not a not-existent object but exists somewhere. The Mādhvas take the literal meaning of the compound word *atyantābhāva*. But the contact of this jar with this spot exists nowhere at the time of its negation (*etadbhūtalaitadghaṭasaṃsargasya niṣedhakāle kutrāpi abhāvāditi*). Śaṃkara Miśra refers to this view in his *Upaskāra* commentary. This view of absolute negation has been discarded by him.

The Mādhvas hold that pre-negation and post-negation do not belong to the class of *saṃsargābhāva*. They hold that an effect is not externally related to its cause. Their relation is that of identity. Thus pre-negation is not the negation of the relation that holds between an effect and its cause. Similarly, post-negation is not the negation of relation. They are not also negations of a hypothetical relation since the suggestion of some relation takes place only when there is an absence of all relations but an effect is inseparably connected with its cause. In other words, an effect is intimately related to its cause. Therefore, a relation between them cannot be imagined. Pre-negation and post-negation are classes by themselves.

The Mādhvas have tried to make an improvement upon the definitions of pre-negation and post-negation given by the Vaiśeṣikas. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that pre-negation has its post-negation and post-negation has its pre-negation. Thus the definitions of these two negations offered by the Vaiśeṣikas involve a vicious circle. The Mādhvas have defined them in such a way as to avoid their mutual reference. Moreover, the concepts of pre-negation and post-negation as found in the Vaiśeṣika literature involve the metaphysical difficulty of producing an infinite series of negations. The pre-negation of an effect has its post-negation which is a distinct term. This post-negation has its pre-negation which has a distinct individuality. This pre-negation has its distinct post-negation and so on an infinite series of pre-negations and post-negations is to be assumed by the Vaiśeṣikas. The post-negation of an object is an event in time. It has its distinct pre-negation. This pre-negation is negated by its distinct post-negation. The second post-negation has its distinct pre-negation. This pre-negation of the second post-negation has its distinct post-negation and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus the hypothesis of an infinite series of pre-negations and post-negations is inseparably connected with the concepts of pre-negation and post-negation. The Vaiśeṣikas have failed to give a satisfactory solution of this problem.

The Mādhvas give a new answer to this problem. Śrīnivāsa has recorded it in very clear language. According to him the post-negation of the pre-negation of a jar is the jar itself. Therefore, the assumption of an infinite series of pre-negations and post-negations is not forced upon the Mādhvas. The pre-negation of the post-negation of a jar is not a distinct term but is the jar itself. Thus he avoids the metaphysical difficulty of assuming an infinite series of pre-negations and post-negations. Now, a new difficulty arises from this new hypothesis. The post-negation of the pre-negation of an individual jar is the individual jar itself. The post-negation of this individual jar is the post-negation of the post-negation of the pre-negation of that individual jar. Two negations make one affirmation. These two post-negatinns should cancel each other and the pre-negation of that jar should re-appear according to the general law of double negation. Śrīnivāsa gives an answer to this objection. He assumes that both the individual jar and its post-negation are opposed to the pre-negation of the individual jar. According to the law of opposition the pre-negation of an individual cannot re-appear during the span of life of the post-negation of that individual jar. Some of the Vaiśeṣikas also subscribe to this view. This view of the Vaiśeṣikas has been referred to by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi in his commentary on the *Ātmatattvaviveka* of Udayana. Dharmarājādhvarīndra agrees with the Mādhvas on this point. But the Mādhvas have lost sight of the true nature of negation due to their love of too subtle thinking. Can a jar produce the awareness of post-negation or pre-negation ? The Mādhvas are silent on this point. Such a hypothesis on the contrary invites a destructive criticism of the basic hypothesis that negation is a distinct mode of reality. The metaphysical difficulty alluded to by the Mādhvas is not damaging since such an infinite regressus is not a vicious one as it involves no epistemological difficulty.

The Mādhvas have paid much attention to the problem of difference. Jayatīrtha and others hold that difference is mutual exclusion. Ānandatīrtha and others clearly state that mutual exclusion is not a distinct term. According to the Mādhvas mūtual exclusion is not an attribute. It constitutes the essence of all objects (*vastusvarūpa*). In the *Tattvaviveka* it has been asserted that difference is not itself distinct from positive and negative reals (*bhāvābhāvasvarūpatvāt na anyonyābhāvatā pṛthak*). In the *Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya, Nayacandrikā, Sannyāyaratnāvalī, Mādhvasiddhāntasāra, Nyāyasudhā* and other works the same view regarding the nature of difference has been expressed. Vyāsatīrtha, Śrīnivāsa and others declare that according to the Mādhvas difference is not distinct from its substratum. Thus the Mādhva theory of difference is nearly akin to that of the Prābhākaras. The Mādhvas hold that difference is adjectival to its substratum. It is not identical with its substratum. They mean to say that difference and its substratum have not identity of meaning though in the actual world difference is not super-added to its substratum but is an aspect of it. Difference can be logically distinguished from its substratum. Ānandatīrtha holds thal difference negates the identity of an object with another. Is this identity real ? If it be real then difference is nothing but a mere appearance. He asserts that this identity is unreal. Now, if this identity is unreal then mutual exclusion should become absolute negation since it negates an unreal object. Ānandatīrtha meets this objection and holds that an absolute negation is presented to our consciousness as a bare denial but a mutual exclusion is presented to our consciousness as a significant denial. This difference of experience leads on to the assumption of their distinct nature. (*Sattattvaratnamālā* p.18). Padmanābha refers to two kinds of mutual exclusions. According to him mutual exclusion may either negate the identity of two differents or may exclude a class of objects from a desired object. Let us take an example to understand the meaning of Padmanābha. The example 'a jar is not a post' is a familiar one. The mutual exclusion which resides in both the jar and the post negates the identity of both of them. It is the first type of difference. The second type of difference belongs to the jar alone and excludes its recipient from all posts. The Mādhvas subscribe to the hypothesis of identity-in-difference. They can safely distinguish an aspect from its substratum and connect them together by means of the relation of concrete identity. The Prābhākaras repudiate the relation of identity-in-difference and fail to assign a metaphysically distinct character to difference. Thus the Mādhvas make an improvement upon the Prābhākara theory of difference.

If difference is an aspect of real objects then its metaphysical status should be determined by that of its substratum. A jar is different from a cloth. The difference of a jar from a cloth belongs to the jar. A jar is not eternal. Is its difference eternal ? Some say that it is eternal though the substratum is ephemeral. In that case difference should be external to a jar. This view comes into conflict with the accepted view of this school. Many philosophers of this school hold that this difference is not eternal. It does not survive its recipient. Now, a new problem arises viz., that if the difference of a jar from a post passes away with the decay of the jar then a jar and a post should become identical since identity and difference are contradictorily opposed to each other. Padmanābha solves this problem. He holds that there are two differences which stand in the way of the identity of a jar and a post. The difference of a jar from a post belongs to the jar but the difference of a post from a jar belongs to the post. One of them dies out but the other exists to oppose their identity. In the *Tattvanirṇaya* it has been said that only the difference residing in an eternal object is eternal. He makes mention of five eternal differences. The metaphysical import of this theory is pluralism.

The theory of negation of the Mādhvas is not a blind imitation of any system of Indian thought. They have tried to solve the problem of negation with an eye upon the historical development of this problem. Kaṇāda propounds the hypothesis that negation is a distinct mode of reality. This hypothesis is one of the pillars upon which his philosophical doctrine of pluralism rests. The Buddhists have given a rude shock to this hypothesis. Their substitute for the theory of negation viz., the subjective view of negation, has proved a failure to establish radical pluralism. Kumārila has tried his best to reassert the reality of negation having modified the hypothesis of the Vaiśeṣikas to some extent. Kumārila's thesis is also open to objections. The Prābhākaras embrace the cause of pluralism and deny a distinctive character to negation. They hold that negation constitutes the essence of reality. Reality is difference. Difference is reality. Difference is not a distinct term which is super-added to reality. Pluralists of various schools idolise this hypothesis. Among the Vaiśeṣikas Udayana subjects it to a severe criticism but ultimately makes some concession to it. Thus for certain period it has had its glorious days in the Indian mind. The Advaitins of the Śaṃkara school repudiate all these theories of negation. Among them Śrīharṣa is the most renowned dialectician. He has refuted all the views of the rival schools almost unanswerably. Their theory of negation which is closely consistent with the spirit of their philosophy is that negation has only phenomenal existence. This view has also its limitations. It does not solve the nature of negation mentioned in their ethics. Citsukha has recourse to the Prābhākara theory of negation and proves that it is not inconsistent with monism.

The acceptance of the Prābhākara theory gives a handle to the re-opening of the epistemological problem whether a distinct object corresponds to negative consciousness. The successors of Citsukha do not endorse this view. The settled conclusion becomes unsettled. A review of the problem of negation becomes a necessity. The Mādhvas take this problem seriously and solve it with proper attention to the negative criticisms of the critics of the realists. They hold that negation is a distinct mode of reality. It has a relative character. It is inseparably related by its negatum. But the question of the relation holding between negation and real negatum takes away reality from negatum. The Mādhvas solve this difficulty and hold that absolute negation and mutual exclusion negate an unreal object. They hold that difference is not a distinct mode of reality. It is an element of positive and negative reals. They make the case of pluralism stronger. At the same time they maintain the dependent character of difference in their epistemology and logic. Thus they are justified in offering a new theory of negation. The philosophical import of this theory is to reassert pluralism.

This theory does a great service to Indian philosophy. It paves the way for the reconsideration of the problem of negation. The conclusion of the Mādhvas is not final. Their solution of the problem of negation is not satisfactory. In cases of pre-negation and post-negation the objects negated are real. But they do not exist. How are they related to negation ? If negative consciousness has a distinct object of its own then why is difference an exception to this rule ? The Mādhvas try to solve this epistemological problem but make greater blunder since they hold that bare denial is directly presented to our consciousness. Can we have direct awareness of negation of some sort ? The Mādhvas say 'yes'. But this assumption is contrary to our experience. If negation is real and negates an unreal object which determines it then an unreal object should be related to negation. Can an unreal object be related to a real object ? This puzzle cannot be solved by them.

9. *Negation is Relation.*

Negation is constituted by difference. Difference rests upon two terms. This view of difference has been referred to in the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana and the *Khaṇḍana-khṇḍakhādya* of Śrīharṣa. The true import of this view is found in European philosophy. They hold that negation stands between two terms. It is a relation. The example 'A is not B' illustrates its true character. The relational character of negation is an inference. All relations stand between two terms at least. Negation stands between two terms. Therefore negation is a relation.

Let us critically examine this view. This view of negation has been represented by Adam Smith in his *Greek Philosophy*. Russell refers to this view in his *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*. Bertrand Russel in his *The Principles of Mathematics* has proved the derivative character of negation. According to him negation is not a primitive idea and all axioms respecting negation may be replaced by the principle of reduction (*The Principles of Mathematics* p. 31,). In his *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* he proves that positive and negative integers are only relations.

It is obvious on a moment's consideration that $^+1$ and $^-1$ must both be relations, and in fact must be each other's converses. The obvious and sufficient definition is that $+1$ is the relation of $n+1$ to n, and $^-1$ is the relation of n to $n-1$. Generally, if m is any inductive number, + m will be the relation of n + m to n (for any n) and − m will be the relation of n to n + m. According to this definition, + m is a relation which is one − one so long as n is a cardinal number (finite or infinite) and m is an inductive cardinal number. But + m is under no circumstances capable of being identified with m, which is not a relation, but a class of classes. Indeed, + m is every bit as distinct from m as − m is (*In:roduction to Math. Phil.* p. 64). He also holds that negation is a relation since it stands between two terms. G. Watts Cunninghum in his *The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy* makes a very profiitable use of it as a reliable weapon hurled at Bosanquet's philosophy of Absolutism. The merit of this view consists in this that it contributes to the establishment of pluralism. It may be a useful hypothesis but does not reveal the true nature of negation. Difference is opposed to identity. The relation of contradictory opposition holds between them. They should not co-exist on the same locus. In the example 'A is not B' difference is a relation. A relation is a distinct term and does not change in spite of the changing terms. The meaning and character of 'not' should not alter with the variablity of its terms, say A and B. So, negation should be a non-relative term. But negation always gets its definite shape by means of the object which is negated by it. It acquires its definiteness only when it is determined by the object negated. The undifferentiated 'not' is absolutely vague. It cannot impart definite character to the terms which it connects. Negation is presented to our consciousness as a term. It is adjectival to its substantive i. e. to the substratum of negation. A is not B signifies 'A is different from B'. Difference of A from B becomes a predicate of A. It is united with A by means of another relation. Difference is a predicate of the judgment 'A is not B'. It is not a copula. Difference qualifies A and is predicated of A. If it is a copula then it should be presented to our consciousness without any reference to a distinct relation. But as it is asserted of the subject it requires the help of a further relation since a relational judgment always involves a distinct relation. European philosophers hold that a relation is not joined to its terms by means of another distinct relation. According to them relation is self-relating. In any case relation is united with its terms. Thus identity and difference of A become co-ordinate. They co-exist on the same locus. A has both identity and difference. But they are contradictorily opposed to each other and should not co-exist on the same locus. Therefore, negation is not a relation which stands between two terms.

The study of the problem of negation in its broad outline reveals to us that the problem of negation has not been satisfactorily solved by the ancient and mediaeval thinkers. The thesis has been put forward by the Vaiśeṣikas, the antithesis comes from the Buddhists. The Advaitins supply us with the synthesis. But this synthesis is not complete. The realists prove the inadequacy of this synthesis. With the collapse of this synthesis the Mādhvas place before us a new thesis. This thesis is not also acceptable for reasons mentioned above. The old thesis of the Vaiśeṣikas with necessary corrections has been put forward by the modern logicians (Navya Naiyāyikas). Raghunātha Śiromaṇi has given an ideal expression to the Vaiśeṣika thesis. We shall discuss it later on. Indian philosophy has witnessed a new era. Philosophical development has come to a standstill. Neither the new antithesis nor the new higher synthesis has appeard in the field of Indian Philosophy. Some Advaitins such as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Nṛsiṃha Āśrama etc, have subjected this new thesis to criticism. The followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems have given a fit reply to it. This conflict is going on. There is no decisive victory on any side. But some thoughtful modern thinkers of the Advaita school hold that negation is a distinct type of reality. Thus the view of non-dualism is losing ground in the modern phase of Indian Philosophy.

PART II

EPISTEMOLOGICAL

1. *Is Negative Consciousness Perceptual?*

The man in the street believes that he perceives the realities of the world directly. The real objects exist independently of his perceiving mind. His task is a very simple one. He is to discover them merely. He does not always perceive a particular object at a particular place. When he does not perceive it he says that the object does not exist. What does he mean by it? Does the negative statement *an object does not exist* mean a mode of knowing i.e. the non-perception of the absent object? Or, does it mean that the absence of the object is a real mode of reality which qualifies its locus? An ordinary man will answer without attending to the problem seriously that he perceives directly the absence of the object. This answer points to the assumption that the absence of the object exists independently of his mind. The absence of an object and the object itself stand on the same level of reality and they are perceived directly in a similar way.

This belief of the unreflecting man is challenged after a little reflection. A man opens his eyes and sees objects which are capable of being visualised. Does he see the absence of an object in a similar manner? The spot where the absence of an absent object is believed to exist is crowded with a big host of absences. Why do we perceive an individual negation to the exclusion of other individuals? The answer to this question is not an easy one for the naive realists. If all the absences are not perceived then why should an individual negation be singled out to be perceived? This selection of a particular object cannot be conducted by the mechanical apparatus of perception. It requires the intervention of a subjective element. The introduction of a subjective factor into the causal factors of the perception of negation upsets the assumption of the naive realists.

Vātsyāyana comes to their rescue and tries to justify logically the belief of an ordinary man. He holds that the absence of an object is the negation of the same. The negation is directly perceived. The negative consciousness testifies to the reality and distinct nature of negation beyond the shade of all doubts. He substantiates his case with the help of a *tarka*—"if a jar had been present here then it would have been perceived here". It is an imaginative perceptual judgment. It is similar to an inference to some extent. It presupposes the truth of the universal proposition that if a jar is present here it is perceived. *Here* means the particular locus of the object *jar*. This universal proposition implies that the existence of a jar in a particular spot is necessarily followed by the perception of that jar on that spot provided all conditions of its perception assemble. It differs from an inference in this that it presupposes the non-perception of a jar in the particular spot under discussion. We imagine the perception of an object when we know definitely that we do not perceive it.

Let us now see how Vātsyāyana improves the position of the naive realists. An imaginative perception is one of the conditions of the perception of negation. The inclusion of an imaginative perception in the assemblage of conditions for the perception of the negation of an object implies that we have a doubt regarding the non-existence of a jar. We entertain a doubt whether a jar exists or not. This doubt stands in the way of our perception of the non-existence of a jar. Vātsyāyana means to say that the negative consciousness of an object is preceded by disjunction as to the existence of the object itself. Now, if negation is preceded by disjunction and forms part of an eliminative process then it should be subjective. Vātsyāyana anticipates this objection and holds that an imaginative perception which is subjective cancels this doubt and prepares the ground for the perception of negation. The import of Vātsyāyana's theory is that a doubt selects the individual negation to be perceived but stands in the way of its perception. An imaginative perception solves this doubt and removes the obstruction which besets the path of the perception of the individual negation thus selected. Thus the individual negation becomes fit for perception. Then it is directly perceived.

This theory of the perception of negation is not consistent with the accepted dogma of this school. An object which does not come in contact with the corresponding sense-organ is not directly perceived. Vātsyāyana does not make mention of such a contact which connects the sense-organ with the object of perception, viz., negation. Uddyotakara supplements the theory of Vātsyāyana. He holds that the non-existence of an object qualifies its locus. The sense-organ becomes united with the locus by means of some suitable contact. The negation of an object which is present on the locus becomes connected with the sense-organ through the superadded relation, viz.. the relation of the locus to the sense-organ with the relation of the qualifier to the qualified added to it.

Uddyotakara does not solve the real problem of the perception of negation. Even if we accept that negative consciousness is arrived at through the dispelling of a doubt then it must be admitted that the other characteristic feature should be predicated of the subject of a doubt by the sense-perception of the invariable mark of the said feature. The disjunctive judgment that this is a man or a post gives us no definite knowledge. In order to dispel this doubt we should know one of these predicates (objective characteristics) through its invariable mark. This is a man since the invariable mark of a man, viz., hands and feet is perceived as belonging to *this*. By means of this positive determination of one of these alternate characters a person refutes his doubt. But Vātsyāyana made his choice of the opposite path. By negating one of the two alternates he believes that he perceives the other. But it is really an inference with the major premise suppressed. A particular spot does not contain an object and its negation at the same time. It does not now contain an object. Therefore it contains its negation. This inference presupposes non-existence as a real object and the truth of the major premise. He proves the truth of the minor premise *the particular spot does not contain an object*. Then he concludes that the particular spot contains the negation of an object. He proves nothing by means of this inference. It does not explain the perception of negation but on the contrary presupposes it for its validity.

Other critical thinkers uphold the thesis of the realists. They say that negation is directly perceived. Individual negations have no distinguishing features of their own. The perception of an individual negation is distinguished by the common character of notness. The judgment *this is not* expresses it. *This,* the subject of this judgment, denotes an individual negation. The judgment *this is not* signifies that the individual negation is characterized by *not-ness.* Do we experience such a judgment ? The thinkers answer that the judgments 'the room is empty', 'the spot is empty' etc., are experienced by all. If it is asked what is the meaning of emptiness then the answer is 'this is—not. Emptiness is not a concept of negation. It is an individual negati on-in-itself. It is not an individual negation which is opposed to some definite object. It is negation-in-itself. It is perceived by the determinate perception of the form *this is not.* It is not the negation of something —an indefinite object. If negation opposes something definite or indefinite then that negation is perceived as qualified by its opposite. These thinkers believe that negation is perceived sometimes as absolutely devoid of a distinguishing mark. This view has been referred to by Udayana and Varadarāja. Some later logicians hold that sometimes negation is experienced only as *not*. They say that the sum total of all individual negations is expressed as *not.* Such an experience is the exclusive possession of an omniscient sage. Others hold that an individual negation is experienced as *not* under certain circumstances. We shall discuss this view later on.

Now, let us examine the former view. According to this view individual negations are many. Each locus is qualified by a good number of individual negations. If negation is admitted to be perceived by us then every locus should be perceived as empty. Many individual negations stand upon a locus. If one of them is perceived then others have every right of being perceived simultaneously. But we have never come across a judgment of the form *these are—nots.* Emptiness does not mean the negation of an indefinite object. In that case it will remain ever indefinite. A locus contains a definite object and the negation of an indefinite object simultaneously since the presence of an object is not incompatible with the absence of an indefinite object. If the negation of an indefinite object is perceptible then the locus should be perceived as containing particular object and emptiness. The judgment 'the spot has a jar and is empty' is experienced by no body.

The word *empty* has different shades of meaning. The meaning of it varies according to the purpose of the employer of the word. The meaning of it is ascertained in accordance with the context in which it is used. The word *empty* in the sentence 'the house is empty' has a meaning different from the meaning of that used in the sentence 'the ground is empty'. The sentence 'the house is empty' means that the house contains the negation of its inmates. *Empty* means the negation of its inmates. 'Empty' in the second sentence means the negation of the trees, plants, etc., i.e. the usual contents of a ground. The negation of a particular set of objects will be ascertained from the reading of the intention of the employer of the word. The reading of the intention is objectively determined by the context. The sentence *the world is empty* has different meanings according to the contexts in which it is used. If a lover who has been separated from the object of his love without the hope of re-union utters it then it means that the world has lost all significance to him. The word *empty* denotes the negation of all significance. If a metaphysician says that the world is empty in connection with the description of the universe after the dissolution of the effect-world then the word *empty* denotes the negation of all impermanent objects. When a prospective tenant asks the owner of a house whether a particular house is empty, the word *empty* in the interrogative sentence "Is that house empty" may admit of two meanings, viz., (1) the negation of complete occupation and (2) the negation of indefinite partial occupation. In that case we can say rightly that the house is empty even if we know that the house is partially occupied. The sentence 'the house is partially occupied and partially empty' does not convey a contradictory sense. Thus the word *empty* in the sentences 'the jar is empty', 'the bench is empty', 'the room is empty', 'the chair is empty' etc. has different meanings. Therefore the word *empty* is very slippery. On the strength of the word *empty* we cannot postulate the existence of negation-in-itself. Thus we see that the hypothesis of the realists that negation which is a distinct mode of reality is directly perceived has not yet been proved.

The Buddhists have closely observed the thesis of the realists and noticed the causes of their failure. The realists have discovered a general law in connection with their tracing out the conditions of the perception of negation and established it by means of their experience of positive reals. The basic law which governs an imaginative perception is that all perceptible objects which lie within the field of vision are perceived on the field of vision. They have also noticed that the realists assume further the non-perception of the perceptible object as one of the conditions of an imaginative perception. Thus they presuppose that the very perception of the negation of cognition is one of the conditions of the perception of objectively real negation. This negation of cognition is also believed to be objectively real. Therefore they postulate the perception of negation as the condition of the perception of negation. This is a glaring instance of the fallacy of *petitio principii*. Some other realists hold that the negation of perception is itself one of the conditions of the awareness of negation. This non-perception is held to be objectively real. The Buddhists contend that negation, being opposed to reality, is devoid of causal efficiency. It is no better than an absence of consciousness—an empty void. This absence of consciousness is in no way causally connected with negative experience—an act of consciousness—a moment of reality.

Moreover, an imaginative perception has been postulated by Vātsyāyana to be external to negative experience. Its externality depends upon the hypothesis that an imaginative perception presupposes the awareness of the negation of the perception of a visible object as its condition. The Buddhists beg to differ from them. They hold that the condition mentioned by the realists should be replaced by an expectation of the visible object. The arising of this expectation in our mind is not due to a subjective factor, viz., whims etc., but due to the interdependent nature of the visible object itself. The sense-datum produces sensation and the absent sensibilium on the strength of its previous association with the sense-datum provokes an imaginative perception.

The task of the determinate perception which follows upon the sensation of a sense-datum is to repel the suggested presence of a sensibilium. So the determinate perception of a sense-datum under these circumstances is called non-perception. A positive consciousness becomes thus negative in response to the call of a situation. This theory is really based upon the distinction between a sense-datum and a sensibilium and their mutual dependence as revealed by experience. As a sense-datum and a sensibilium are experienced to be combined in one act of cognition so negative consciousness and an imaginative perception are intimately connected. As the realists have failed to find out the true condition of an imaginative perception so they have become unsuccessful in explaining negative consciousness. The reciprocally dependent nature of a sense-datum and a sensibilium is the pivot upon which the Buddhist theory of negation revolves. If the experience of a sense-datum is capable of producing the negative experience of a sensibilium with which the sense-datum is connected then the Buddhist theory that negation is inferred becomes highly probable.

Let us, now, discuss the nature of non-perception by means of which a judgment conveying the non-existence of a visible object is deduced. Why do we call the sense-perception of a sense-datum, say, a spot, the non-perception of a sensibilium, say, a jar? Is an absent jar perceived? The answer is 'certainly not'. Why is it called a sensibilium i.e., a visible object? Dharmottara's answer is "It is visible because it is imagined to be present". He says, "If it were present on this spot then it would have been visible (*yadi asau atra bhaved dṛśya eva bhavediti*)." Now, the question arises, "why is a particular sensibilium imagined to be present here to the exclusion of others?" He replies that the presence of a visible object is imagined if the conditions of its perception are all present. How do we ascertain that they are all present? His answer to this is that the presence of them is ascertained when of the two objects which appertain to the same act of cognition one is only perceived (*ekajñānasaṃsargi vastudvayam*). Two objects which are reciprocally dependent upon each other and amenable to the same sense-organ appertain to the same act of cognition. If two such objects are present then we cannot restrict our perception to one of them to the exclusion of the other since they possess no difference as regards the possibility of perception. From this we judge that the conditions of perception are all present. Now, if we perceive only one of the two interdependent objects then we naturally imagine if another were present then it would also have been perceived since the conditions of perception are all fulfilled. It amounts to this that presence is suggested of or attributed only to that sensibilium which is expected to be present (*sambhāvita*). This expectation is not determined by subjective frenzy or by a sense of possibility but by the nature of the object itself. This is really an improvement upon the explanation of an imaginative perception as offered by the realists. Dharmottara suggests that an imaginative perception comes as a matter of fact. It is not a hypothesis to be conjectured. It is a mental fact to be observed. Now, this imaginative perception is to be repelled. The act which repels it is called non-perception. It is neither an absence of consciousness nor a consciousness of non-Ens. It is a positive act of consciousness which refers to a positive fact. Such cognition repels the sensibilium which is hypothetically visible. This suggests that negation is a source of real knowledge only in regard to objects of our normal experience. Therefore, negation of transcendental objects is not a source of real knowledge, since these objects cannot be imagined to be visible. It is plain that the Buddhists have been able to explain why an imaginative perception precedes negative experience as its invariable condition. But on the contrary, the realists have failed to prove the sound basis of the hypothesis that an imaginative perception is one of the conditions of perceptual negative awareness, i.e. the perception of negation.

The bare spot which is a point-instant is a sense-datum. It is connected with a sensibilium, viz., a jar. It produces its sensation. Imagination steps in and functions. The result is an imaginative perception of a jar. The determinate perception of the spot which follows upon it, repels it. It becomes non-perception of a jar. This non-perception of a jar is capable of assuming the form of the negative judgment that there is no jar. The capacity for assuming such a form is intrinsic in the determinate perception. Thus non-perception of a jar is existentially identical with the negative judgment that there is no jar. Non-perception of a jar is the negative judgment that there is no jar. The sum and substance of the Buddhist theory of negation is that the same essence is referred to by the mental construction and that it has been superimposed by imagination and that there is a split between the subject and the predicate in an analytical judgment (which is the major premise of the deductive syllogism by means of which we deduce negation) introduced by imagination itself.

Non-perception is a negative judgment, but is an analytical one. It becomes the major premise of the deductive syllogism by means of which the negative judgment that there is no jar is deduced. It is clear now that a negative judgment exists in non-perception's existence. Thus non-perception is the sufficient reason for deducing the above negative judgment. The perception of the spot has two characteristics, viz., the property of being non-perception and the capability of being a negative judgment. They co-exist, at the same moment, in the perception of the spot. The very fact of the existence of the perception of the spot is sufficient for deducing the presence of its essential property. Its essential property is the capability of being a negative judgment. This capability itself is a negative judgment. Non-perception is existentially identical with a negative judgment. The underlying point of reality is the mental fact—the moment of perception. Non-perception and negative judgment refer to this reality—the perception of the spot—which is identical with itself. By means of an analytical deduction negation is deduced. Let us see what the syllogistic form of this deductive reasoning is.

Whenever there is non-perception of a visible object there is the negative judgment that a visible object does not exist.

There is non-perception of a visible object, viz., a jar.

Therefore, There is the negative judgment that a jar does not exist. It may be put in a simple form like this :

Whatever, being perceptible, is not perceived does not exist.

A jar, being perceptible, is not perceived.

Therefore, A jar does not exist.

The major premise of this syllogism is an analytical .judgment. Non-perception is identical with the negative judgment conveying non-existence. The subject of the major premise is perception since non-perception has been proved to be perception. Cognition is introspective. The predicate, being identical with the subject, is cognised instantaneously. Their relation is the relation of identity. This relation of identity constitutes the relation of invariable concomitance. The relation of concomitance is also cognised along with the introspection of the subject. Therefore the Buddhist syllogism is formally correct. The material validity of it depends upon the truth of the major premise. If it is true then non-existence is deduced from non-perception. The implication of this syllogism is that negation is merely subjective.

Kumārila asks the Buddhists whether non-perception *qua* non-perception is the middle term. If they answer in the affirmative then non-existence of a jar i.e., the judgment that a jar does not exist cannot be deduced. If something follows then it is mere non-existence, i.e., non-existence *qua* non-existence. Non-perception *qua* non-perception is not the invariable mark of the non-existence of a jar. The perception of the spot containing a jar is also non-perception of some object other than a jar. Thus non-perception *qua* non-perception becomes the uncertain reason and consequently cannot deduce the non-existence of a jar.

Now, the Buddhists may modify their syllogism and hold that the non-perception of a jar is the middle term. The modified syllogism runs thus :

Whenever a jar is not perceived it does not exist.

A jar is not perceived now.

Therefore, A jar does not exist now.

What is this non-perception of a jar ? Is it the perception of the spot ? If the Buddhists answer in the affirmative then this reason is an uncertain one, since the perception of a spot remains the same even if it is perceived along with a jar on it. But the perception of a spot containing a jar does not help the Buddhists to deduce the non-existence of an object—not to speak of the non-existence of a jar. They say that non-perception means here the non-perception of one of the two combined in the same act of cognition.

Kumārila contends, 'If two are perceived simultaneously then is not the perception of these two also the perception of one of them ?' The Buddhists may say that the perception of the one only is non-perception. The Buddhists should define the word 'only'. They employ a word which has a negative meaning. The Buddhists fail to define non-perception. Non-perception of a jar cannot be equated with the perception of a spot. If they hold that non-perception of a jar is the negation of the perception of a jar then the problem arises how it is cognised. If it is perceived then the case of the Buddhists is lost. It is inferred by means of another non-perception, the Buddhists may say. In that case a *regressus ad infinitum* is to be faced by them.

Some Buddhists infer non-existence by another syllogism of a different type.

Where there is an object there is perception. Therefore where there is non-perception there is the non-existence of an object. They mean to say that the existence of an object is included in its perception. The non-existence of an object has greater extension than that of non-perception. From this major premise they deduce the non-existence of an object. Kumārila questions them 'How is non-perception cognised ?' If they say that it is cognised by means of another non-perception then they have no escape from the trap of a *regressus ad infinitum*. Thus we see that negation cannot be inferred without cognising it either by perception or by non-perception. We cannot also infer negation by means of a syllogism in which the point of reality is a minor term.

All spots are containers of negation.
This is a spot.
Therefore, This is a container of negation.

The truth of the major premise depends upon the proposition that what is temporarily present on a locus is also absent there. We know that objects are temporarily present on spots. From this we know that the spots contain their negation. Without cognising the absence of objects on spots we assert correctly that spots contain negation.

Kumārila points out to them that the truth of the major premise is not established by means of the above proposition since some objects are only temporarily present on spots but the import of the major premise is that spots contain negation of all objects. Moreover, in an inference the relation of invariable concomitance must be established between the subject and the predicate of the major premise. In order to establish such relation both of these two terms should be cognised. One of them is negation. Now, the question is, "How do we cognise negation ?" This negation cannot be inferred by means of a negative mark such as non-perception, since the awareness of non-perception will require a second non-perception and so on *ad infinitum*. Therefore we conclude that negation cannot be inferred.

Dharmottara has raised a relevant question on Dharmakīrti's thesis that negation is an inference. The perception of the bare spot is the non-perception of a hypothetically visible jar. If the negative judgment that there is no jar on the spot depends upon the above non-perception for its existence then it is a function of the perception of the bare spot. Therefore it is not reasonable to hold that the above negative judgment is an inference. If it is existentially identical with the above non-perception then it is surely perceptual. The Prābhākaras rightly hold that the perception of the bare spot is itself negation. Dharmottara as a commentator tries to defend Dharmakīrti that non-perception is the middle term of a syllogism by means of which negative behaviour is deduced. He says that the idea of the non-existence of a visible object receives practical application on the basis of an inference the middle term of which is non-perception. The compound word 'negative behaviour' has a very wide denotation. It includes a negative judgment, a negative proposition and successful purposive movement within itself. Thus we see that he tries to defend his master by a clever manoeuvre of language. His deep veneration for tradition stands in the way of his freedom of thought. He hits the right point but steps back out of his deep regard for tradition and fails to draw the true conclusion. In other words, he has evaded the real issue.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla do not object to the Prābhākara thesis that negative judgment, being non-perception, is determinate perception. They hold that the essential part of the Buddhist theory of negation is that the positive real is referred to by a negative judgment and that objective non-Ens cannot produce negative consciousness. They mean to say that an object is not directly perceived but is perceived through the medium of the content i.e., the form of the real object imposed upon cognition. A content is existentially identical with its awareness. If a real non-Ens had existed then it would have produced a content which is diametrically opposed to that effectuated by a positive real. Therefore this content should not be identical with its awareness. In other words, this content should not be cognised. It will remain ever unknown and unknowable. All consciousness refers to positive reals and positive reals only. It matters little if negation is not inferred. The true import of the Buddhist theory is that reality consists of positive reals only and that negation should be explained in terms of positive reals only.

2. *Yogya-anupalabdhi*

Kumārila observes the thesis and the anti-thesis regarding the nature of consciousness of negation closely. He notices merits and demerits of both these theories. He tries to synthesize these two opposite views. He says with the Buddhists that negative consciousness is not direct but at the same time agrees with the Naiyāyikas in the point that it is produced by an instrument which is not an act of consciousness and that the mere existence of this instrument is essential to the production of negative consciousnesss. The instrument of all forms of valid knowledge excepting perception is some form of consciousness. The sense-organs which produce sense-perception through their instrumentality are such instruments as are not cognised at the time of their operation. Therefore he postulates a different kind of proof as an instrument of negative consciousness. He calls it non-perception in order to mark off negative consciousness from perceptual consciousness.

The synthetic view of non-cognition as an independent proof of negative consciousness has been criticised by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. They have pointed out that

Kumārila wavers between two opposite tendencies, since he holds that either non-evolution of the soul (*ātmanaḥ apariṇāmaḥ*) or non-perception in the Buddhist sense is the *pramāṇa* of negative consciousness. They conclude that Kumārila should give up his new thesis and consistently stick to the Buddhist conclusion.

Bhaṭṭomveka has made out the inner significance of the text of Kumārila and solves the above riddle. He says that non-cognition is an instrumental cause of negative consciousness. But our negative behaviour is controlled by our negative consciousness. In that case our negative consciousness is also an instrumental cause of negative behaviour. Let us take an example to make this point clear. A man by mistake thinks that a jar exists on the yonder spot. He is in need of it and makes for the object. After a few minutes' walk he sees the spot and through the instrumentality of non-perception the negative consciousness that there is no jar on the spot springs up in his mind. He abstains from moving any more in that direction. The abstaining from moving is a positive action. It must be effectuated by some special cause. His negative consciousness is the instrumental cause of his negative behaviour. This negative behaviour is a successful operation. Therefore the negative judgment that there is no jar on the spot has been called a genuine instrumental cause. This negative judgment is not the non-perception of the Buddhists. This negative judgment has also been brought about by the instrumentality of non-cognition of a jar. Non-cognition has been termed as non-evolution of the soul since, the soul evolves its acts of consciousness which are its modes. The soul fails to evolve the consciousness of a jar. This failure is nothing but the pre-negation or privation of the consciousness of a jar. The pre-negation of the perception of a jar belongs only to the soul. Therefore the phrase 'non-evolution of the soul' denotes rightly the pre-negation of the perception of a visible object. Therefore there is no inconsistency in Kumārila's statement. (*Tātparyaṭīkā* p.p. 411-412). If this interpretation of Kumārila's text is accepted then the seeming contradiction supposed to exist between his epistemology and metaphysics regarding the nature of negation is also solved. He says that negation is objectively real. Every object consists of *yes* and *no*. A negative fact is known through the instrumentality of non cognition.

Kumārila in order to establish the superiority of his synthetic view has proved that negative consciousness is not produced by sense-organs. The main point is that the sense-organs become functionless after the production of the sensuous perception of the locus of a negative fact. It is a dogmatic assertion. It is counteracted by a similar dogmatic assertion in the opposite direction. It is to be proved that the sense-organ becomes really functionless with the appearance of the sense-perception of the locus. The basic point is that the sense-organs produce perception of only those objects which come in contact with themselves. This is the common assumption of both these schools, viz., the Bhāṭṭas and the Naiyāyikas.

The whole problem revolves upon the relation subsisting between the sense-organ and a negative fact. If it is proved that a negative fact comes in contact with a sense-organ then a negative fact cannot but be perceived. If it is established that a negative fact does not come in contact with a sense-organ then it cannot be perceived. The Naiyāyikas say that a negative fact simply qualifies its locus. It is not united with the locus by a separate relation. Kumārila holds that a negative fact is related to its locus by means of the relation of identity-in-difference. The locus of a negative fact is related to a sense-organ by means of an external relation. The relation of identity-in-difference is an internal relation. This external relation being added to this internal relation cannot constitute a complex relation, since it is neither external nor internal. A relation cannot be conceived of as one which is partly internal and partly external. Kumārila's metaphysical conclusion stands in the way of the contact of a sense-organ with a negative fact. But the Naiyāyikas do not accept the metaphysical dictum of Kumārila. A negative fact is externally related to its locus. A sense-organ comes in contact with the locus by means of an external relation. These external relations may be combined to form a complex relation by means of which a negative fact will be connected with a sense-organ. The Naiyāyikas may urge that a sense-organ comes in contact with a negative fact neither by means of a simple relation nor by means of a complex relation but by means of a compound relation i.e. one relation superadded to another. The compound relation is not itself a relation but is a juxtaposition of two different relations. Kumārila's objection against such a contention is that a negative fact is never united with its locus. The aim of relation is unification. In metaphysics Kumārila holds that every object consists of two parts, positive and negative, and that they are never united to form a single whole. Maṇḍana Miśra explaining Kumārila says that *sat* is sharply distinct from *asat*. Their unity is never experienced. Their ultimate unity can never be convinced thereby. Their unity consists only in their togetherness. By means of unity *yes* and *no* are only kept together but *no* does never become identical with *yes*. Therefore in the case of a negative fact the relation of identity-in-difference being added to the contact of sense-organ with the locus of a negative fact fails to connect a negative fact with a sense-organ, since, in spite of their togetherness the gulf of otherness remains ever unbridgable and baffles all attempts at connection through the locus. Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa, Gāgā Bhaṭṭa and others have proved that the so-called relation of the qualified is not also an external relation too. A relation is that which belongs to two terms mutually related by that relation. The so-called relation of the qualified to the qualified cannot be really a relation, since, it belongs to one term only. The assumption of one-term relation contradicts the very nature of a relation. Therefore, Kumārila and his followers conclude that a negative fact can never be perceived.

If a negative fact is perceived then Kumārila is to face an absurd position viz., perceiving an object both affirmatively and negatively at the same time, since his metaphysical conclusion is that every object consists of *yes* and *no*. In order to avoid a conclusion which does not get the support of experience Kumārila is constrained to frame the hypothesis that a negative fact is not perceived. He has no choice in this matter.

The contention of the Naiyāyikas on this point is that if negative consciousness is proved to be perceptual consciousness then the assumption of one-term relation is justified since a sense-organ must come in contact with the object of perception. They say that the problem of a relation is a minor issue. The basic problem is whether negative consciousness is perceptual. If it is proved to be perceptual then all the opposing parties should combine to settle the problem of relation by means of which a sense-organ comes in contact with a negative fact. In this case, the assumption of one-term-relation is the most perfect solution.

Kumārila's first argument that a negative fact is not connected with a sense-organ does not prove conclusively his main thesis. It is counterbalanced by a counter-argument pointing to a topic of greater significance. He cites a crucial instance which confirms, he supposes, his thesis conclusively. Beholding his house attentively Chaitra sets out on a journey. On the way someboby asks him whether he has seen Maitra at his place. He recollects attentively all that has been seen. His house with all its contents flashes on his mind. But the memory of Maitra is itself absent. The pre-negation of the memory of Maitra produces the negative consciousness 'I do not remember Maitra being present at that time at my place.' The house itself is beyond his ken—not to speak of the negative fact, the absence of Maitra. Thus Kumārila establishes his thesis conclusively that negative consciousness is not perceptual.

Then he takes up the second part of his thesis that the pre-negation of the cognition of an object worthy of being perceived or recollected is the instrumental cause of negative consciousness. He explains how the negative judgment 'There is no jar on the spot' is produced. The spot is perceived. An object, say a jar, is remembered. The object—a jar—is such as would have been perceived if it were present on the spot. But the perception is absent. The absence of the perception of a jar (which is the pre-negation of the perception of a jar) in co-operation with the perception of the spot and the memory of a jar produces the negative judgment that there is no jar on the spot.

The term *yogya-anupalabdhi* requires an explanation. It consists of two words *yogya* and *anupalabdhi*. The negation of *upalabdhi* is *anupalabdhi*. What is the type of negation which *anupalabdhi* belongs to? Kumārila and his commentators hold that it is the pre-negation of *upalabdhi*. The term *upalabdhi* does not denote sense-perception only since memory is also denoted by it. Cognition is here equivalent to *upalabdhi*. Owing to the absence of a suitable word in English Literature non-cognition will be taken as equivalent to Kumārila's *anupalabdhi*. Non-cognition denotes, here, the pre-negation of cognition—i.e., the privation of cognition in the soul before its coming into being. The word *yogya* requires an explanation. The word *yogya* has different meanings. In the present context it denotes an object which is amenable to either sense-perception or recollection. But the widely accepted meaning of this word is 'sensible'. In that case the word *anupalabdhi* in this context should denote the pre-negation of perception—i.e., non-perception. The compound word *yogya-anupalabdhi* admits of three meanings. It may either denote (1) non-perception of the absent object which is sensible, or (2) non-perception of the absent object on a locus which is sensible, or (3) an imaginative perception cum non-perception. The hypothetical judgment in the form that if an object were present here, it would have been perceived is meant by an imaginative perception. The first meaning is too narrow since, the absence of a transcendental object is illuminated by negative consciousness. The mutual exclusion of a ghost and of the post on which it is present is cognised by us. The second meaning is too wide, since the negation of virtue is not perceived on the soul which is introspected by us. The third meaning is to be accepted. The discussion on the meaning of *yogya anupalabdhi* is conspicuous by absence in the early works of Mīmāṃsā Literature. It was imported into the Mīmāṃsā Literature from the work of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi by Gāgā Bhaṭṭa. The third meaning of *yogya-anupalabdhi* has been accepted in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* of Dharmarājādhvarīndra. Dharmarājādhvarīndra and Mahādeva Sarasvatī agree with Kumārila in the point that *yogya-anupalabdhi* is the instrumental cause of negative consciousness. But they disagree with Kumārila on some points. Dharmarāja holds that negative consciousness is direct though nonsensuous. Mahādeva holds that uncognised non-perception does not effectuate negative consciousness. He also meets the objection of a *regressus ad infinitum* directed against it. Kumārila objects that if non-perception is cognised then it must be cognised through another negation and the second negation through a third one and so on *ad infinitum*. Mahādeva answers that this negation, the instrumental cause of negative consciousness, is illuminated by transcendental consciousness which underlies an empirical ego. Transcendental consciousness is self-luminous consciousness *per se*. Thus the objection of Kumārila does not effect the position of the Advaitins. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa, however, departs from the traditional path chalked out by Kumārila. He holds that non-perception, being cognised, produces negative consciousness. An instrumental cause produces its desired effect through a process. The process of non-perception is an imaginative perception. Thus negative consciousness is not a distinct mode of knowledge. It is inferential. But he has dogmatically put forward his revised thesis. He has not faced the problem of Kumārila that if a negative fact is an inference then the relation of invariable concomitance holding between a negative fact and its invariable mark should be cognised. In other words, how is the major premise of a syllogism by which a negative fact is deduced framed ? If it is an inference then the fallacy of a *regressus ad infinitum* steps in. If it is perceptual then it is more logical to say that a negative fact is perceived. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa's silence on this point controverts his thesis.

Let us critically examine the synthetic view of Kumārila. Is it really a synthesis of two opposite views ? What is the metaphysical presupposition and implication of this thesis ? Kumārila assumes at the back-ground of his thesis that negation is a distinct objective fact. He proves by his thesis that negative consciousness points to a negative fact which is distinct from all positive facts of the universe. It is also real. Therefore he re-establishes the thesis of the realists that negation is objectively real. The method only is different. The problem whether negation is directly perceived or indirectly known through non-perception has the same metaphysical significance. From the metaphysical point of view these two theories are homogenous. A mere synthesis of methods which does not synthesize the underlying metaphysical doctrines is a pseudo-synthesis. As no real synthesis has come into existence in Indian Epistemology the conflict between a thesis and its antithesis is ceaseless. A metaphysical thesis has been put forward. It has been proved by means of a method. An antithesis develops itself. It criticises the old thesis and its method. A thinker tries to synthesize these two methods without harmonising the original thesis and its antithesis. This synthesis cannot have a bright prospect. It is to face the double-edged attacks of his friends and enemies. Such is the lot of Kumārila's theory.

The Buddhists, the Jains, the Prābhākaras, the Advaitins and the Naiyāyikas have all subjected this theory of Kumārila to a severe criticism. The most damaging attack comes from the hands of his friends, viz., the Naiyāyikas. Udayana and Gaṅgeśa are the worst critics of Kumārila and his followers. For the intellectual satisfaction of accurate thinkers a few points of the adverse criticism of his enemies and the symposium held between the Bhāṭṭas and the Naiyāyikas will be discussed.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla say that negation is absolutely unreal. The thesis that negation is objectively real cannot explain negative consciousness. The positive facts are the causes of the contents of our awareness. These contents are existentially identical with our awareness. If a negative fact exists and *ex hypothesi* is diametrically opposed to a positive fact then it must be the cause of a content which is not identical with the act of awareness. In that case a negative fact becomes an unknown and unknowable reality. Such an epistemological conclusion contradicts the very thesis. This objection does not touch the position of Kumārila since this criticism presupposes the epistemological conclusion of the Buddhists. It is a criticism from a different plane. The critics presuppose that what is opposed to a real fact is unreal. This assumption is wrong. If the different positive facts effectuate contents which are identical with awareness then why should a negative fact fail to do it. As it is real it will on the strength of its reality effectuate consciousness.

Abhayadeva Sūri in his *Tattvabodhinī* commentary has raised many subtle objections against this epistemological theory of negation. Some important points will be discussed here. Does negative consciousness reveal the negatum ? If it does how is it an awareness of its negation ? It reminds us of the argument of Sigwart against the negative idea *not-B*. If it does not then how is it possible for negation to negate the negatum ? Now, it may be held that a negatum is revealed as distinct from its negation. A pertinent question arises : How is a negatum cognised ? It is perceived or recollected ? If it is perceived then the negative consciousness of its negation cannot negate it but on the contrary the negative consciousness itself will be contradicted by such a perception. If it is asserted to be recollected then the negative consciousness of its negation cannot discharge its function of negating its negatum since a negatum which is present to our consciousness as an object of memory is always associated with reference to the past time when it was actually known. Negation as revealed in negative consciousness does not negate the negatum as that negatum. The negatum is thus revealed neither by perception nor by remembrance. If the negation is not presented to the negative consciousness of its negation then this negative consciousness is itself meaningless. Therefore Kumārila's theory of negation that non-cognition is the instrumental cause of negative consciousness should be rejected. (*Sammatitarkaprakaraṇa* with commentary page 24).

There is much force in this criticism. The answer to this objection is not an easy task. This criticism does not affect Kumārila or his followers alone but the whole band of the realists who hold that negation is objectively real. This negative criticism is not the original contribution of the Jains. The inspiration for criticism in this direction comes from the Buddhists. The true answer to this objection can only be had if the law of contradiction is fully grasped by us. The unqualified A is not contradictory to though opposed to the unqualified not-A. Qualified by some relation A is contradictory to not-A as qualified by the same relation. On a certain spot A exists. The existence of A is determined by a specific relation. In this case the relation is conjunction. The negation of A which is qualified by conjunction cannot exist on the same spot. The contradiction of A and not-A consists in non-compresence on the same locus. The logical counter-part of this doctrine is that the law of contradiction does not hold good between two terms but between two propositions of some specific nature. In not-A *not* represents an individual negation and A qualifies it by the relation subsisting between negatum and negation (technically called *pratiyogitākatva*). A by means of this relation A is connected with *not*. The qualified *not* is called *not-A*. A negation is thus determined by its negutum. Now, there is no contradiction if negation is qualified by its negatum, since their relation to the locus is not the same. How is this negatum known ? It can neither be perceived nor remembered. Kumārila makes an attempt at connecting negation with its negutum by means of the memory of the negatum. In that case the Jaina criticism stands unanswerable. The negatum cannot be dissociated from the 'that' element—an element which is invariably associated with every object of memory. Kumārila's doctrine thus requires some modification. It has been done by the Navya Naiyāyikas. It will be sufficient here to indicate the outline of their modified doctrine. The awareness of a negatum as characterized by its characteristic feature which represents its oppositional character is one of the conditions of the negative consciousness of its negation. This awareness may be perception or memory. If memory be one of the conditions then the Jain objection reappears. The answer to this objection is that memory is not here a condition in its specific nature but in its generic character viz., as an act of cognition. When it operates as an act of cognition then its specific effect does not come in.

The criticism of the Prābhākaras is also no less formidable. The bitterest criticism has been represented in the *Prabhākaravijaya* of Nandīśvara (p. 60). He offers the counter-argument of Bhavanātha in a better form. He examines the crucial instance cited by Kumārila to establish his theory conclusively. It has been stated above that Caitra cognises the negation of Maitra and that the instrumental cause of this negative consciousness is non-remembrance of Maitra. But if he comes back and perceives Maitra there then does he cognise the negation of Maitra at his place in the morning (the time of his departure)? Kumārila should answer in the affirmative. But is this answer tenable? Caitra's pre-negation of memory as existing in the morning dies a natural death with the decay of the morning. With the perception of Maitra non-perception of Caitra ceases. Therefore *anupalabdhi* cannot produce negative consciousness here. By other counter-arguments the Prābhākaras try to disprove the theory of Kumārila.

This argument is really a direct attack upon the metaphysical basis of Kumārila's epistemological theory. The statement that the pre-negation of memory dies a natural death with the decay of the morning requires a close examination. If the pre-negation of an effect is established independently then it can be shown that it does not die out automatically with the passing away of the morning. This criticism is not very fair since Nandīśvara does not criticise Kumārila with due attention to his presuppositions.

Udayana's criticism of Kumārila's theory of negation is classical. The first point of his criticism is that negative consciousness is perceptual since the instrumental cause of it remains ever uncognised. Secondly, it is perceptual because a negatum and the corresponding negation are objects of a similar type of consciousness. Thirdly, it is so, otherwise, an illusory experience of negation cannot be explained. An illusory experience is generated only by a defective instrumental cause. The instrumental cause of sense-perception is a sense-organ. The adjective 'defective' is sensibly applicable to it. But non-perception cannot be asserted to be defective. Therefore errors of negative facts can only be explained if negative experience is perceptual. Fourthly, the negative judgment that this spot contains the negation of a jar is distinctly perceptual since it cannot be conjointly produced by the sense-perception of the bare spot and negative consciousness of a jar. If it had been so produced then it would become partly direct and partly indirect. It is absurd since it implies the overlapping of two contrary universals in an individual. The consistent position must be like this that the sense-organ viz., the eyes with the auxilliary conditions viz., the sense-object-contact and negative consciousness of a jar produces this negative judgment. It is a piece of knowledge by complication. The negation of a jar is not directly sensed. Negative consciousness itself constitutes the contact through the medium of which the sense-organ becomes connected with the negative fact, viz., the negation of a jar.

The first three arguments of Udayana are not conclusive. Kumārila may answer in the following manner. A direct knowledge is that which is produced by sense-organs. Negative consciousness is not produced by sense-organs and it is not direct. Kumārila holds that positive objects and their negations are not grasped by similar consciousness. Inferential or verbal knowledge reveals merely positive facts. Therefore, Udayana's second argument is not tenable. The third argument of Udayana is based upon misunderstanding. A cause which produces illusion is not itself defective but is associated with defects. Non-perception may also be associated with defects and produce illusory experience of negation. The fourth argumet of Udayana contains an element of truth. But the generalisation arrived at by Udayana is hasty. It is based upon mal-observation. Therefore this generalisation is unwarrantable. The negative judgment that there is no jar on this spot is not perceptual. The pre-negation of the perception of a jar in collaboration with the perception of the spot and the cognition of a jar produces this judgment. The spot is not sensed. It is the perception of the spot which connects the spot with the negation of a jar, the object of negative consciousness. The focus of attention is the negation of a jar but not the spot. The spot is known by complication. Therefore, there is ample scope for non-perception to produce negative consciousness.

Gaṅgeśa subjects this view of Kumārila to a severe criticism. Gaṅgeśa cites a few cases which demonstrate the truth of the Nyāya theory that a negative fact is directly sensed. The judgment that the negation of colour exists in the air is decidedly perceptual. The air cannot be visualised. Colour does not inhere in the air. *Yogya-anupalabdhi* fails to produce such a negative experience. Now, the Bhāṭṭas may contend that the pre-negation of the awareness of the colour produces such a negative experience. This answer is not tenable since the awareness of the colour *ex-hypothesi* is such as cannot be introspected. The Bhāṭṭas cannot even hold that this experience is inferential since the form of an inferential judgment is like this that the air is colourless. The Bhāṭṭas cannot deny that the negative experience of the first type is a psychological fact. They canot hold that one of the conditions of negative experience is the sense-perception of the locus of negation by that sense-organ which grasps the negatum of it. This condition has been disowned by Kumārila himself. The crucial instance cited by Kumārila precludes the possibility of this condition. The perception of the house of Caitra is not one of the conditions of the negative experience mentioned above. The existence of this negative experience cannot be challenged. But Kumārila cannot explain it. This experience is causally connected with the function of the sense-organs. Therefore this negative experience of the negation of colour in the air is perceptual.

The second case cited by Gaṅgeśa is more convincing. A man having the memory of a jar reaches a spot which contains a jar. It takes some time to frame the perceptual judgment that the spot contains a jar or that there is a jar on the spot if the jar is not instantaneously perceived with this spot. Now the question is whether this perceptual judgment is preceded by a negative judgment that there is no jar on the spot. According to Kumārila the perception of the locus, the memory of the negatum and non-perception of the sensible object are the conditions of negative consciousness. The man perceives the spot and possesses the memory of a jar. The perception of a jar has not yet occurred. The conditions of the negative consciousness of a jar being fulfilled the negative consciousness of a jar becomes inevitable since Kumārila has laid down these three factors as conditions of negative consciousness. This negative consciousness of a jar is a valid consciousness. The succeeding perceptual judgment that the spot contains a jar should not contradict the foregoing negative judgment that there is no jar on the spot. It is an absurd conclusion since the spot cannot contain a jar and its negation at the same time in direct violation of the law of contradiction. To avoid such an absurd conclusion it must be admitted that negative consciousness is also produced by its object negation. Thus it must be admitted that negative consciousness is also produced by its object negation. Thus it must be admitted that negative consciousness is perceptual since an object is one of the factors of perceptual consciousness only. If this is admitted then no difficulty arises since the negation of a jar is really absent on the spot.

Gaṅgeśa then challenges the very authority of the crucial instance itself. The uncognised pre-negation of the remembrance of Maitra cannot produce the negative consciousness of Maitra. The negative consciousness of Maitra i.e., the negative judgment that Maitra was not there may be sometimes illusory or doubtful. In such cases, uncognised non-remembrance which is the instrumental cause of this negative consciousness remains unchanged. It can neither itself suffer from defects nor can be associated with defects. Therefore illusion or doubt cannot be explained. If the negation of memory is internally perceived by us then it produces the above negative consciousness. The inner perception of non-remembrance which is the invariable mark of the non-existence of Maitra produces our knowledge of the non-existence of Maitra. If we have illusion or doubt regarding this invariable mark then the inferential knowledge of the marked, thus produced by a defective cause becomes illusory or doubtful. Kumārila has said that Chaitra remembers all that has been seen attentively. But the focussing of attention becomes appropriate on the part of Chaitra if he tries to perceive internally the negation of his memory. The syllogistic form of this inference, is as follows :—The house of Chaitra contained the negation of Maitra at that time because it is not recollected as containing Maitra though it is remembered to contain its other qualities viz., shape, size etc., Whatever is thus not recollected is so e.g., the spot containing the negation of a jar.

From the drift of Gaṅgeśa's criticism it is clear that Kumārila has not been able to maintain his position uniformly. His main contribution has been that non-perception is one of the special factors of negative consciousness. The memory of the negatum as one of the factors of negative consciousness points to the law that an individual negation is cognised to the exclusion of others. It also helps negative consciousness to grasp an individual negation as determined by the positive object contrasted. Kumārila's selection of the phrase 'the memory of the negatum' is bad. The philosophic world is indebted to the Jains for their criticism of this point. It has paved the ground for postulating a sounder hypothesis. The Navya Naiyāyikas have completed the task of determining the exact condition of negative consciousness. The value of Gaṅgeśa's criticism lies in this that it has opened a new channel of reconsidering the problem of the way of cognising negative factor. There is much truth in Gaṅgeśa's criticism. If the instances cited by Gaṅgeśa are true then it is a truism that negative consciousness is perceptual. If one-term-relation is assumed by us then all this discussion comes to an end. If such an assumption seems to be absurd then the dispute between the Bhāṭṭas and the Naiyāyikas will go on for ever since the counter-arguments of Gaṅgeśa are not irrefutable. Jayadeva Miśra in his *Āloka* commentary has suggested the line of defence which may be adopted by the followers of the Bhāṭṭas. Still the hypothesis of Kumārila requires some necessary modifications though non-perception is accepted to the special cause of negative consciousness. The theory of Kumārilla is not also immune to an absurd assumption.

They must admit that non-perception of a jar is connected with the spot, the locus of the negation of a jar through the medium of the sense-perception of the spot in order to justify the negative judgment. "There is no jar on the spot". The contact in the shape of cognition is asserted of the sense-organs. The application of such a contact to non-perception is unique in the epistemology of Kumārila. The crucial instance cited by Kumārila is far from satisfactory. It may be concluded that Kumārila's theory with necessary changes as suggested above is neither proved nor disproved. But it can be asserted confidently that it is not a synthesis of two opposite ways of knowing negation.

The thesis of the Naiyāyikas that negation is perceived is equally strong. Now, we assume the objectivity of negation. The thesis of the Naiyāyikas that negation is objectively real has been discussed in a separate chapter. We have now an occasion for discussing elaborately the theory of the Naiyāyikas since the fuller development of this theory presupposes the other theories already discussed. We have discussed the theories of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara. A hypothetical judgment or an imaginative perception is an essential condition of the perception of negation. Uddyotakara has supplemented the theory with the introduction of the relation of the qualifier to the qualified. The defects in these theories have been mentioned. The Buddhists have suggested that all the conditions of the perception of the absent object must be fulfilled to produce a negative judgment. Kumārila has suggested the three conditions of negative awareness viz., the perception of the locus, the memory of the absent object and non-perception of the sensible object. The next important suggestion comes from Udayana. He admits that negation cannot be perceived singly but as located upon a locus. This is really an explicit statement of what has been stated implicitly by Kumārila. He accepts non-perception as one of the conditions of the perception of negation. But he holds at the same time that all the conditions which make the perception of the absent object possible excepting the object itself and its corresponding sense-object-contact are necessary for the perception of the negation of the absent object. He is indebted to Vācaspati Miśra for this suggestion. But this suggestion really comes from the Buddhists. It is the realistic interpretation of the Buddhist suggestion. Then he accepts the suggestion made by Uddyotakara and makes an improvement upon it. He shows how the relation of *viśeṣaṇatā* is superadded to the sense-object-contacts with the locus in question. The complete list of these factors is, however, found in Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. In his *Tātparyapariśuddhi* he states clearly that an imaginative perception (a hypothetical judgment) is not a necessary condition of the perception of negation. He says after Vācaspati that the awareness of the absent object i. e.. the negatum but not its memory is also one of the necessary conditions of the perception of negation. Udayana's originality consists only in the elimination of an imaginative perception as one of the conditions of the perception of negation. Udayana's polemic against the instrumentality of non-perception has proved one thing that some negative judgments are perceptual. Till he has failed to prove that negation is directly sensed. The cause of his failure may be traced to the fact that he has failed to find out the true condition of the perception of negation. The negation of an object is not always perceived as located upon a locus. The negation of sound is singly perceived by us and hence Udayana's basic assumption is wrong. The negation of colour in the air is directly sensed but this perception of the absence of colour does not presuppose the conditions laid down by Udayana. Therefore, Udayana's theory requires a thorough revision. Gaṅgeśa appears in the field to mend Udayana and establish the Nyāya thesis. He holds that the awareness of the negatum, an imaginative perception, non-perception and the contact of a negative fact with the sense-organ and the negative fact itself constitute the special conditions of the perception of a negative fact. He has assigned some reasons for including an imaginative perception in the group of the conditions of perceptual negative consciousness. Gaṅgeśa's imaginative perception is a hypothetical judgment. It consists of two elements : (1) antecedent and (2) consequent. The antecedent is called an *āpādaka* (probans) and the consequent is called an *āpādya* (probandum). The consequent is the subalternant and the antecedent is the subalternate. Their relation is the subaltern. But it presupposes the awareness of negation as its condition. A hypothetical judgment 'if a jar had existed here then it would have been perceived' presupposes the awareness of the negation of a jar on this spot on the part of the framer of this judgment. Gaṅgeśa shows the usefulness of a hypothetical judgment in the perception of negation. Its usefulness consists in fixing up the perceptibility of an individual negation. The worthlessness of this hypothetical judgment has been argued by many. One of these objections as presented in the *Advaitacintāmaṇi* of Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa is as follows. He points out that even in cases of imperceptible negation a hypothetical judgment may be framed as pointing to its perceptibility. Gaṅgeśa anticipates such arguments against it and holds that one should be cautious about its application in order to avoid the fallacy of *Secundum Quid.* The negation of earthness present in a big volume of water is perceptible. Does it mean that the negation of earthness present in an atom of water is also perceptible ? The negation of earthness is the same. If it is perceptible in one case then why is it not in the other ? Gaṅgeśa warns us against misapplying the general rule expressed in the hypothetical judgment to special cases to which it is inapplicable. The hypothetical judgment 'if earthness were present on a vast sheet of water then it would have been perceived' is a condition of the perception of the negation of earthness on a vast sheet of water. The hypothetical judgment 'if earthness were present in an atom of water then it would have been perceived' cannot condition the perception of the negation of earthness in an atom of water. In the first case the unconditional perceptibility of earthness has not been imagined. In the second case that condition has not been fulfilled. The application to this special case is unjustifiable. The general rule expressed in the hypothetical judgment has been applied here in a sense in which it is not true. Gaṅgeśa holds that a hypothetical judgment is not intrinsically useless but a misapplication of it to unsuitable special cases makes it so. Mahādeva Punātmakara subjects this view of Gaṅgeśa to a severe criticism. He points out that even if this hypothetical judgment is admitted to be one of the conditions of the perception of negation then the perception of the negation of a post from a ghost cannot be excluded. But the serious objection to this hypothesis has not been raised by the critics of Gaṅgeśa. Gaṅgeśa has not answered the objection raised by Udayana to the admission of the hypothetical judgment to the group of the conditions for the perception of negation. A hypothetical judgment presupposes the perception of that negation of which it is asserted to be one of the conditions. It is a glaring instance of *petitio principii.* To convince others of the absence of an object it may be useful but it is not a condition of the perception of negation.

Some of the post-Gaṅgeśa logicians put forward a somewhat new hypothesis of their own. It is not absolutely new but a great modification of Gaṅgeśa's hypothesis. As the positive objects are sensuous and non-sensuous so some individual negations are sensible and others are transcendental. The sensuous or other character of an individual negation is to be determined by an appeal to experience. In the empirical system of the Vaiśeṣikas everything is determined *a posteriori*. The conditions of the sense-perception of an individual negation are to vary according to the nature of the individual case. We are giving a few illustrations to represent their view adequately. In order to visualise the negation of huge dimension or that of colour the eyes should come in contact with such substrata which are devoid of great dimension and colour respectively and through the medium of these substances become united with the negation described above. To visualise negations other than these two types the eyes should be connected with substances which great dimension and manifest colour belong to. The essence of this doctrine is that different types of negation-sense-contact explain the perception of negation. Thus the tactual perception of some types of negation is explained by the particular type of sense-negation-contact. The auditory perception of the negation of sound takes place owing to the direct contact with the ears. This contact is *viśeṣaṇatā*. This is an one-term-relation. In all these cases the efficacy of *viśeṣaṇatā* has been acknowledged. In some cases this one-term-relation is added to some other relation but in other cases this alone establishes the connection with the sense-organ. Thus the sum and substance of this new hypothesis is that the sensibility of negation is determined by the negation itself and by its contact with the senses.

The next point discussed by them claims our attention. Is non-perception one of the special conditions which determine the perception of negation ? These logicians answer in the affirmative. They define non-perception and show its utility in special cases. They say that the specific non-perception which is opposed to the specific perception is one of the conditions of that perception. Let us take an example to make our point clear. I see a jar on this spot and do not see it on that spot. Is the non-perception of a jar on that spot a condition of the perception of a jar on this spot since the non-perception of a jar on that spot is also the non-perception of a jar ? Therefore the non-perception which conditions perception should be defined. We perceive an individual negation as located upon a particular locus and well determined by its characteristic feature. This perception of negation does not take place if we perceive a positive object which is exactly opposed to the negation mentioned above upon the same locus. These two perceptions, of course, should be generated by the same sense-organ. Thus they say that non-perception is a vague term. It should be defined properly. The absence of the perception by a particular sense-organ of a positive object having its specific feature on a particular locus is one of the conditions of the perception by the same sense-organ of an individual negation which opposes the above positive object with regard to its specific feature on the same locus. Such a well-defined non-perception is one of the conditions of the perception of negation.

Now, it may be asked whether such a well defined non-perception is at all a condition of the perception of negation, since, well-defined sense-object-contact and a sensible negation explain the perception of negation. These later logicians answer that there are cases where non-perception should be taken as one of the conditions of the perception of negation. Its usefulness consists in precluding the perception of negation which, though sensuous, becomes non-sensuous under certain conditions. Let us take an example. The negation of earthness is perceptible since it is perceived on the locus of a vast sheet of water. If an atom of water is perceived by complication i.e., it becomes connected with the eyes through the contact in the shape of some form of knowledge of it and the negation of earthness is somehow connected with this atom then do we perceive the negation of earthness on that atom of water ? The negation of earthness in an atom of water is not perceived. If such non-perception is not admitted to be one of the conditions of the perception of negation then the perception of sensuous negation under the above-mentioned condition cannot be precluded. In order to find out a general law which covers all cases of perception of negation non-perception has been admitted to be one of the conditions of the perception of negation.

This view has been discarded by another sect of later logicians. They hold that non-perception as defined above is not one of the conditions of of the perception of the negation since the instance cited by them is purely imaginary. The law must be based upon real facts. The relation of the container and the contained cannot be established between an atom of water which is perceived by complication and the negation of earthness which is grasped by normal perception on the locus of a vast sheet of water. There is not the slightest possibility of such a perception of negation. Therefore the preclusion of such a perception is not worth considering. In other words, non-perception is not one of the conditions of the perception of negation.

The earlier logicians may contend that an atom of water is connected with a big volume of water by complication and the negation of earthness is a predicate of a big volume of water. An atom of water being connected with the subject is also the logical subject here. Therefore the predicate of the big volume of water is also the predicate of an atom of water. Thus non-perception should be taken as one of the conditions of the perception of negation. Moreover, according to the law of obstruction the perceptual judgment in which earthness is a predicate of the same subject stands in the way of the negative judgment described above. But the general rule runs to the effect that the negation of an obstructor is the condition of the obstructed. If follows from the above law that non-perception is one of the conditions of the perception of negation.

These critics argue that this is a wrong application of the law of prevention. The law of prevention should be directed to the causality of the soul in which perception, an effect of the soul, inheres. It will be a wrong application of the law if it is directed to the object i.e., to the meaning of a perceptual judgment. Much discussion centres round this point. A very important methodological principle of logical economy i.e., Occam's razor, has been applied by both the parties to decide the acceptance or rejection of either of these two hypotheses. We shall not enter into the details of the subtle arguments brought forward by them since the argument on the basis of the law of prevention can be disposed of from another angle of vision. If non-perception is considered to be one of the conditions of the perception of negation on the ground that its causality is deduced from the law of prevention then it becomes one of the general conditions of the said perception on that very ground. The negation of an obstructor is a general condition. It is not one of the specific conditions of the perception of negation. These logicians have shown that if the law of prevention is allowed to work in this sphere then it will not work in a general way and a specific law is to be formulated for each individual observer according to the specific nature of the case in hand. Hence an appeal to the principle of logical economy does not go in their favour. Therefore, non-perception is not at all a condition of the perception of negation. The modern logicians firmly establish that negation is perceived by our senses.

Now, we shall discuss another aspect of this problem. In the above hypothesis the objective conditions of the perception of negation have been discussed. A question arises in our mind—What about the subjective condition of the perception of negation ? Is the memory or awareness of a negatum an essential condition of the perception of negation ? The problem is no less important. The Naiyāyikas hold that each individual negation is determined by its corresponding negatum. It is a rough representation of the Nyāya theory. To be more exact it should be pointed out that an individual negation is characterized by the force of opposition (*pratiyogitā*) belonging to a negatum. The force of opposition has been abstracted from the negatum in order to lay emphasis on its contrast with the corresponding negation. Moreover, it has a logical necessity. If negation is not determined by *pratiyogitā* then the negation of this jar cannot be differentiated from that of a jar. The negatum of the negation of a jar is this jar since it is an individual of the jar-class. The negatum of the negation of this jar is this jar. Therefore, a distinction between these two individual negations becomes difficult. But if it is held that negation is determined by *pratiyogitā* then this difficulty does not arise. The *pratiyogitā* belonging to an individual jar is distinct from the *pratiyogitā* which belongs to all other individuals of a class. This *pratiyogitā* is further characterized by the relation and the characteristic feature of a negatum. Such a well-determined *pratiyogitā* determines an individual negation. The determinate nature of an individual negation is not perceived if we perceive negation-in-itself. The *pratiyogitā* which determines negation is not within the range of our eyes. Our sense-organs fail to come in contact with the determinant of negation. Therefore, negation in its determinate character is not perceived. We have not evidence of the perception of negation-in-itself. A reasonable doubtt, herefore, arises in our mind whether negation is at all perceived.

Let us take the example of an individual negation—the negation of a jar. It will be proved later on that the negation of a jar is not the totality of individual negations of this and that particular jar but is a distinct individual negation. This negation has innumerable negata viz, all the particulars past, present and future belonging to the jar class. Do our eyes come in contact with all of them in order to perceive the negation of a jar? It is absurd to imagine even such a contact. The Naiyāyikas are to explain how such a perception takes place. Different answers to this problem have been offered by different logicians. We shall discuss them one after another.

First, we shall try to understand how a negatum comes in contact with our sense-organ. We say that we visualize the negation of that jar. That jar lies beyond the range of our vision. If it does not come in contact with our eyes then the negation of that jar cannot be perceived. The Naiyāyikas hold that the cognition of that jar is one of the conditions of the perception of the above negation. The cognition in a transcendental manner establishes the connection of the eyes with that jar. The eyes have transcendental contact with the individual negation. By the synthetic power inherent in our soul these objects are presented as a complex in which the negation is the substantive and that jar is adjectival to it. In the language of modern psychology this percept is partly presentative and partly representative. According to the Naiyāyikas it is partly transcendental and partly normal.

The example, referred to above, deserves our special attention. The negation of a jar does not signify the negation of this or that jar but that of all individual jars. If the awareness of a negatum be the condition of the perception of the corresponding negation then in the case of the negation of a jar the awareness of all individual jars is necessary. It is impossible for a man to cognise all the negata, i.e., all individual jars. If they all are not apprehended then the perception of the negation of a jar cannot take place. A solution has been offered by the old logicians. They hold that the universal *jarness* is also perceived along with an individual jar. This universal *jarness* inheres in all individual jars. The transcendental perception of the negatum *jar* reveals all individual jars since it becomes related in a transcendental manner to all individual jars through the medium of the universal *jarness.* Thus the transcendental perception of the negatum *jar* is competent to produce the perception of the negation of a jar. Poincare relies on a direct intuition of the mind which makes possible the generalisation and universality of a mathematical law. He says, "A direct intuition of mind knows itself capable of conceiving the indefinite repetition of the same act when once this act is possible" (*Science and Hypothesis*, Eng.

Tr. p. 13). The direct intuition of Poincare is functionally similar to the transcendental perception of the old logicians just mentioned.

This hypothesis of the old logicians has been discarded by the later logicians. The transcendental perception of all individual jars is not to be admitted as one of the conditions of the perception of the negation of a jar. They contend that one is not to perceive transcendentally all the individual jars in order to perceive the negation of a jar since our experience goes against such transcendental perception. The awareness of an unqualified negatum is not the condition of the perception of negation. The negatum should be determined by its exact characteristic feature. In the present case an individual jar is the negatum. The characteristic feature of it is jarness. This feature belongs to all individual jars but does not belong to a particular which does not fall under this class. They hold that the cognition of any individual jar marked by this characteristic feature, viz., jarness generates the perception of the negation of a jar. It may be put in a general manner that the cognition of a negatum marked by its characteristic feature is the condition of the perception of its corresponding negation.

This hypothesis has been subjected to a severe criticism by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. He examines and analyses a negative judgment and points out that it is not a simple judgment but a complex one. The perceptual negative judgment *there is no jar* has for its substantive the individual negation which is determined by its negatum *jar*. The negatum is not an indeterminate predicate but is determined by another predicate viz., jarness, the common characteristic feature of all individuals. This is technically called *viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya-avagāhibodha*. Such a complex judgment is generated by a simple judgment with the second predicate of the complex one as its indeterminate predicate. This is the general law of causality which governs judgments. Raghunātha assumes negative consciousness as a complex judgment, and therefore does not feel a need to make special provision for it. The older logicians hold that negative consciousness is first a judgment and then a complex one. The primary feature of it should invite our attention. A special condition should be found out for it, since as a judgment it is a class by itself. Raghunātha's inner meaning is that there should be no special law which is to govern a negative judgment.

The critics of Raghunātha hold that if there is no special rule for the perception of negation then negation should be perceived as a mere *not*. The critics of Raghunātha argue thus : Raghunātha does not rule out the perception of negation-in-itself since he simply explains the condition of a complex negative judgment. But on the contrary, if it is held that a negative judgment must find its condition in such a distinct cognition then the perception of indeterminate negation is ruled out automatically. The followers of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi find out cases which contradict the view of the critics. Some dogmatic followers of Raghunātha hold that negation-in-itself is sensed by us as a mere *not*.

They have missed Raghunātha's metaphysics of negation. Negation is indissolubly connected with its negatum. This relation may be external but still it is inseparable. Thus the permanent characteristic feature of negation is its negat um. Negation minus its negatum is an abstraction. Its essence consists in its relatedness. Negation-in-itself is a phantom which can never be intuited. Negation as an object is one of the conditions of its perception, so negation is never perceived as a mere *not*. If the Naiyāyikas hold that a negatum only temporally qualifies a negation then they will proceed along a path which is sure to lead them to a pitfall. If negation is not taken as a correlative object then there is no justification for the assumption of negation. If it is held that negative consciousness in the form of a mere *not* gives evidence of its distinctive individuality then it should be admitted that there is only one negation since its adventitious relations both objective and subjective to all the objects of the universe may be established. Distinction will be introduced into the very heart of it by means of these relations. Negation as qualified by a distinct relation will be different from itself as qualified by another relation. Ultimately, its distinction from a positive object itself will be difficult to maintain since it is opposed to none. An innocent negation like this is of no use to the pluralists. Such a theory of negation is sure to betray the cause of the pluralists. Therefore they should not put their faith in the evidence of indeterminate negative consciousness. Moreover, if we scrutinize such negative consciousness then we shall see that there is only an elliptical form of true negative consciousness which negates definitely. Let us now return to the old problem whether Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's explanation is reasonable. There is no experience of bare negation. The basis of the argument of his opponents is wrong. There is no possibility of the perception of negation *qua* negation since this perception is determined objectively. Therefore there is no special subjective factor which conditions the perception of negation. Thus we see that the view of the Nyāya-Vārttikakāra has been reestablished in a better form after a continuous symposium of different schools extending over a few centuries in the history of Indian Thought.

3. *Is negation objectively real ?*

(*Is the object of negative consciousness the locus of negation ?*)

In the first chapter of the second part we have established that whatever is knowable is real. In other words every object of our consciousness is real. In the second chapter we have proved that negative awareness is perceptual. Now, a suggestion arises in our mind. It is "Is not the object of negative awareness a distinct type of reality ?" We have previously assumed the objective reality of negation for our convenience. This assumption should be either justified or discarded. We do not ignore the existence of negative awareness. We do not call in question the established theory that the object of experience is real. The problem before us is whether the object of negative awareness is a distinct mode of reality. There are several answers to this problem. We shall discuss them one after another.

A section of the Prābhākaras solves this problem. They hold that negation is not a distinct mode of reality but is itself identical with its locus. The locus is a real positive object. They say that negative consciousness points to a real object. But this real object is a positive one. They mean to say that a positive object may be communicated by means of a negative proposition and that the negative judgment corresponding to it points to the positive objective constituents. The Prābhākaras have framed this hypothesis. It has been embraced by many philosophers of the rival schools. In the first part the essence of it has been discussed. In this section it will be critically examined.

A brief history of this hypothesis will not be out of place, I think. This hypothesis does not owe its existence to Prabhākara Miśra, the founder of the Prābhākara school. In the *Ṛjuvimalā* commentary it has been mentioned. Śālikanātha Miśra, the illustrious commentator of Prabhākara Miśra with one accord does not proclaim that this hypothesis is sound. Other ancient illustrious writers of this school do not cling to it firmly. Some later thinkers of this school have lent their strong support to it.

With the help of an illustration let us understand the import of this hypothesis. Let us take the most common example of negation viz., there is no jar at this spot. Those who hold that negation is objectively real mean by it that this spot contains the negation of a jar. The negation of a jar is the object contained. This spot is the container. The relation of the container and the contained holds between these two distinct terms. The Prābhākara hypothesis is based upon the negative criticism of this view. The Prābhākaras hold that the negation of a jar is not a distinct mode of reality but is itself identical with this spot, the socalled container. The spot, a positive object is pointed to by the negative consciousness of the negation of a jar.

A question arises in our mind automatically—if a spot is capable of being referred to by such a negative consciousness then why is a spot containing a jar not referred to by such a negative awareness ? This objection has been suggested by Kumārila in *Śloka-vārtika*. The meaning of it is that a spot *qua* a spot is always the same whether it contains a jar or not. A spot which contains a jar cannot be a non-spot. If a spot is referred to by the above negative judgment then a spot containing a jar should do the same since the self-identity of the spot is not contradicted by this qualification. Śālikanātha grasps the cogency of this objection and revising the hypothesis states that the neutral spot i.e., the spot which contains neither a jar nor its negation is called neutral, is referred to by such a negative judgment. The neutrality (*udāsīnatva*) of the spot has been described as *kaivalya, ekākitva tanmātratva* etc. According to the law of excluded middle a spot should contain either a jar or its contradictory negation. If this law is honoured then a neutral spot is something akin to a mare's nest. Śālikanātha does not challenge the authority of this law but holds that such a neutral spot is the presupposition of all parties. It finds common acceptance. He argues thus : The negation of a jar neither rests upon the spot which contains a jar, nor stands upon the spot which contains the negation of a jar. The opponent should steer clear of contradiction and *petitio principii*. The only course open to him is the assumption of the neutral spot. Is this solution satisfactory ?

Does not the word *neutral* have a hidden negative meaning ? Ravideva strongly asserts that the concept of neutrality is definitely positive. Mere emphasis or bold assertion does not help us to solve a problem. The real meaning of the word *neutral* is other than both positive and negative. The phrase *other than* will be either nonsense or contradictory if it means *neutral*. It cannot but have a negative meaning. Moreover, the concept of neutrality presupposes the concept of negativity since the former is relative to the latter and without involving reference to the latter is incomprehensible. Therefore a negative real is implied by a negative judgment. Similarly, the words *kevala*, *ekākin*, *tanmātra* etc., have negative meanings though they appear like the word 'only' to be positive. A spot containing a jar is in no way different from an unqualified spot i.e. a bare spot, since the same essence viz., spotness characterizes both of them. Therefore without the assumption of a negative real we cannot explain a negative experience. This is the sum and substance of the arguments brought by Jayanta, Vācaspati, Vallabhācārya, Pārthasārathi Miśra, the two Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitas, and others against the defence of Śālikanātha and Bhavanātha.

Let us now examine the hypothesis of the realists who hold that negation is objectively real and the negative criticisms brought against it by the Prābhākaras. If the negative criticisms of the Prābhākaras are not adequately met by the Naiyāyikas and the other realists then this problem will remain an open question since a satisfactory solution of it has been reached by nobody. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has worked out the implication of the views of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara. He asserts that negative consciousness bears a stamp of uniqueness on the face of it. Its unique character is explained only if it is assumed that its object is a distinct mode of reality. His argument for the objectivity of negation is derived from the very nature of negative experience. This is the first thesis of the Naiyāyikas.

The Prābhākaras subject it to criticism. They argue that there is no hard and fast rule that a negative judgment points invariably to a negative real and that an affirmative judgment points to a positive real. They cite a few exceptions to invalidate the hypothesis of the Naiyāyikas. The affirmative judgment 'negation exists' refers to a negative real. The negative judgment 'A is not not-A' points to a positive real. Therefore, negative experience does not necessarily point to a negative real. The view of the Naiyāyikas is not conclusive.

The later logicians and other realists revive the issue. They hold that the above affirmative judgment is a pseudo-affirmative judgment. It has merely the appearance of an affirmative judgment since the negative particle 'not' has not been attached to the copula. This judgment contains a negative term and as such is negative. The second example still remains inexplicable since the Naiyāyikas admit that a term itself is the double negation of itself. A = not not-A. The identity of the double negation of a term with the term itself depends upon the assumption 'that the terms which occupy the same space are themselves numerically identical.' Raghunātha Śiromaṇi challenges the validity of this assumption from the empirical point of view. The experience of A is not the same as that of not not-A since the former is independent of other experience while the latter presupposes the experience of not-A. If two objects are identical then their experience cannot but be the same. The difference in the nature of experience explains the difference in the nature of the objects referred to. A theory starts with experience. The value of experience should be duly recognised. The above assumption contradicts our experience. It should be discarded since it does not keep itself in touch with true experience which is the only guide in our speculation.

The predecessor of Gaṅgeśa and Raghunātha have tried to establish the ontological distinction of negation on a separate ground. They hold that a negative judgment 'there is no jar at this spot' refers to the relation of the container and the contained holding between the spot and the negation of a jar. This relation implies the difference of the two terms related by it, since no term contains itself.

The Prābhākaras meet this argument of the Naiyāyikas. They argue that a judgment which refers to this relation does not necessarily imply the difference between two terms. The Naiyāyikas admit that the negation of a term which stands upon another negation is identical with its locus. The judgment 'not-B contains not-A' does not imply that not-B is different from not-A. In spite of their identity the relation of the container and the contained holds between them i.e. not-A and not-B. Therefore this argument has not much weight behind it.

Gaṅgeśa argues in favour of the distinct ontological status of negation thus: A negative real is never cognised by itself. A negative awareness is always relative since it involves reference beyond its own object to the correlative negatum. But a positive consciousness is self-complete. He means to say that a positive object is given in our intuition whereas a negative real is not given. Gaṅgeśa thinks it to be the most cogent argument against the Prābhākara theory of negation. But it is simply the reassertion of the old epistemological argument of this school. The older Prābhākaras contend that the awareness of the relative positive objects such as long, short etc., is not self-complete since it involves reference to correlative terms. Gaṅgeśa meets this objection and points out that these objects are given in our consciousness. They are not relative objects from the metaphysical point of view but they are only relative in the universe of logic. But negation is metaphysically a relative term.

The later Prābhākaras have unsettled the solution of Gaṅgeśa. They point out that A=not not-A, according to the Naiyāyikas. A as A is a non-relative term but as not not-A is a relative term. Therefore each term is non-relative from a particular point of view but is relative from another point of view. Hence Gaṅgeśa's contention is not logical since a positive term may be an object of either positive or negative awareness. A spot as a spot is the object of positive awareness. But as the negation of a jar it is the object of negative awareness.

Viśvanātha argues against the Prābhākara theory in an original way. He contends that the negation is not identical with its locus since if they were identical then an individual negation which cannot be grasped by a particular sense-organ would have been sensed by that organ. Negation and its corresponding negatum are grasped by the same sense-organ. Colour and the absence of colour are only visualised. In the judgment 'The air has no colour' if the absence of colour is identical with the air then everybody should feel the absence of colour by his touch as he feels the presence of the air. A blind man should feel the air as colourless. Viśvanātha has given many instances which negate the theory of the Prābhākaras. This criticism has given a rude shock to the Prābhākara theory.

The later Prābhākaras have tried to meet this objection. They hold that the air as air is only felt by our touch, but the negation of colour is only visualised. They mean to say that negation is not the whole of the positive object but is a mode of it. This is only the right interpretation of their theory. In that case, they break away from their traditional theory and stand close to the Jains. The possibility of this defence rests upon the old theory of Vācaspati and Udayana that two negatives make one affirmative. If the law of contradiction and that of excluded middle as understood by Vācaspati and Udayana are not accepted then this defence on the part of the later Prābhākaras becomes impossible. Thus we see that Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's contention is the best of all since he has touched the most essential point. He has created an unbridgable gulf between positive and negative reals.

Mahādeva in his *Nyāyakaustubha* has made an improvement upon the arguments of Vallabha and others and refuted the theory of the Prābhākaras. He points out that if negation is identical with its locus then a spot which contains a jar should be perceived as containing the negation of a jar. Let us now follow his logic. A spot by its very nature is the negation of a jar. If a jar is placed on it then it cannot give up its nature. If it is held that the negation of a jar is not cognised at the time of the presence of a jar then the negation of a jar should not be cognised even when the jar is not placed on it or removed from it since the spot maintains its identity in spite of its external relation to the jar. As long as the spot remains identical with itself it will be apprehended as containing the negation of a jar. Now, the Prābhākaras may contend that when the spot is cognised as containing a jar, it is not cognised as containing the negation of a jar, according to the law of prevention. Now if such awareness does not take place then will the spot be cognised as containing the negation of a jar ? The Prābhākaras say *amen*. If this be the case, the awareness of the spot as containing the negation of a jar in the absence of the awareness of the spot as containing a jar will not only arise but should be taken as a true knowledge since it fulfills the conditions of a true knowledge. It refers to a real object viz., the spot which is the negation of a jar. The law of prevention cannot work afterwards since it cannot sublate a true knowledge. The spot which contains a jar may be apprehended later on as containing a jar. But it should also be apprehended at the same time as containing the negation of a jar. From this absurd conclusion thay can manage no escape.

Another section of the Prābhākaras paid much attention to the argument of the Naiyāyikas from the implication of the relation of the container and the contained. According to them an element of time is the negation of an object. In the judgment 'A jar does not exist now at the spot' the word 'now' represents the negation of a jar. The phrase 'a jar does not exist' explicates the sense of 'now'. Negation is always presented to our consciousness as an object in time. It has no meaning apart from its relation to time. The word 'now' is vague by itself. The Prābhākaras make the sense of it clear. 'Now', the element of time, acquires a definite meaning if it denotes definite negation according to its context. Their logic is like that of the subjectivists that the two things are identical if they are always apprehended together. An element of time and negation are always apprehended together. Therefore, they are identical.

Gaṅgeśa and Mahādeva refer to this view. Gaṅgeśa has subjected this view to criticism. A point of time is non-relative. But negation is a relative term. Therefore negation cannot be identical with a point of time. The very law which explains their identity is unwarrantable. The Prābhākaras have themselves refuted the validity of this law in connection with their refutation of the logic of the subjectivists.

Śālikanātha, Bhavanātha and others subscribe to the subjective view of negation. According to a major section of the Prābhākaras negation is not an objective entity. It is only a judgment. Let us take an example to understand this view. The judgment 'there is no jar at this spot' does not refer to the negation of a jar which is objectively real. The negation of a jar is the awareness of the spot which does not contain a jar or which is other than the spot, the container of a jar. Thus the negation of a jar is not the bare locus but is the awareness of the bare locus. Various objections have been raised against this theory by Maṇḍa na Miśra (in his *Vidhiviveka*) and others. Let us describe a few of them. A man is passing through a thorny ground in the dark night. He sees the ground vaguely but not the thorns growing wild on it. The awareness of the bare ground is the negation of thorn. Thus if a man roves in a dark night on such a thorny ground then he should not feel the prick of thorns on his feet. A tank is situated at a solitary place. If the embankment around it breaks down suddenly at that lonely spot then water will not flow out of it since the negation of embankment is not possible, being an act of consciousness as there is no person. Similar other objections raised against this theory have been answered by the Prābhākaras. They hold that int hose solitary places there are insects and other animals which witness the bare spot and that the possibility of the required negation is explained easily. The subjectivity of negation is a better hypothesis since it solves all difficulties which beset the other theories of negation. Viśvanātha refutes this theory since it cannot explain the perceptibility of the negation of a jar. The Prābhākaras may contend that the awareness of the bare spot is itself perceptual. An objective existence is denied to negation. They think that the right use of Occam's razor removes negative reals for the assumption of which there is no good reason. Viśvanātha presupposes the perception of negative reals. But there is no justification for such a presupposition. Gaṅgeśa refutes the subjective view of negation. He argues that the awareness of the bare spot involves reference only to the bare spot but not to the jar, the negatum of the negation in question. The awareness of the negation of the jar involves a necessary reference to the corresponding negatum. Therefore the awareness of the bare spot, i.e. the spot which is not a container of the jar, cannot be the same as the awareness of the negation of the jar i.e. the negative awareness in question. An analysis of these two acts of awareness proves their difference. Moreover, the awareness of the bare spot is direct and does not depend upon the awareness of some other object ; but the dependent character of negative awareness is undeniable. The relative character of negative consciousness constitutes its differentia. Therefore the awareness of the bare spot cannot be identified with the negative awareness in question. But if Gaṅgeśa accepts the validity of the laws of contradiction and of excluded middle then his contention is really untenable. Ragunātha Śiromaṇi dives deep into the problem of negation. He does not apply the logical law of contradiction of the Buddhists to reality. He defines it properly and discards the law of excluded middle. If an absolute gap is fixed between positive and negative reals then and then only the distinctive feature of negative awareness can be consistently maintained. We cannot argue from the nature of consciousness to the nature of its objects if we do not consistently cling to this method. All the predecessors of Raghunātha are open to the charge of inconsistency. Raghunātha removes it and proves the objective existence of negation.

4. *Ideality of Negation.*

In the previous chapter the Buddhists have tried to establish that the negative judgment is inferential. The realists have refuted this thesis of the Buddhists. They hold that it is perceptual. But all philosophers will agree to the point that nobody has the sensation of negation. In other words, negative consciousness is always indirect in the Buddhist sense. If it is indirect then it is conceptual. Now, if the Buddhists are successful in establishing their thesis that a concept is relative and dialectical i.e. negative and does neither convey the cognition of the particulars subsumed under it nor the cognition of a universal which exists really in the external world, then the Buddhist theory of the ideality of negation will be irrefutable. The Buddhist theory of *apoha* i.e. the negative meaning of a word throws light on the nature of concepts and thereby on the problem of negation. We shall discuss only those portions of the doctrine of *apoha* which have a bearing upon the problem of negation. The very core of the problem of negation will be discussed in this section.

According to Dignāga, verbalised experience is always conceptual, since names and ideas are intimately connected inasmuch as names call up ideas and ideas invoke words in our minds. According to Dignāga conceptual knowledge is always discriminative. Direct knowledge is pure affirmation whereas the indirect one is negative. Our intellect is always negative. A concept is the denial of the contrary. To be conscious of a concept we must distinguish it from that which it is not. We thus impose limitation upon it since distinction is essentially limitation. The concept *cow* is known only when it is distinguished from a *non-cow*. A non-cow is similarly distinguished from a cow. Whence do we get a non-cow? The answer is that the intellect dichotomizes itself. The one part is the concept *cow* and the other part is the concept of *non-cow*. The very existence of knowledge presupposes such a dichotomy of the intellect.

The concept *non-cow* is extremely vague. Is it a significant denial of cow? Or, is it a bare denial of a cow? If it is a bare denial then it is beyond our capacity to be conscious of a concept since such consciousness is a glaring instance of circular reasoning. To be conscious of a cow we must know a non-cow. To be conscious of a non-cow we must know a cow. Thus we can know neither a cow nor a non-cow. If it is a significant denial then the concept non-cow should signify such concepts as have a positive basis such as the concepts of horse, dog, cat etc. Does a non-cow comprise within itself all concepts other than a cow? If it be so then it is impossible to know a cow since such knowledge is possible for an omniscient being only. If a non-cow signifies any particular concept other than a cow e.g. a horse then this discriminative knowledge is insignificant since the concept 'cow' will coincide with the concept 'ass' as both of them are other than the concept 'horse'. Therefore the theory of Dignāga that a concept is a repudiation of the contrary is untenable. A concept must have some positive basis. A mere denial does not constitute its essence. Negativity is not the whole of a concept. Dignāga purports to express that a concept has a negative character primarily but reveals its positive nature by an implication. This essential point of Dignāga's theory of concepts has been narrated by Ratnakīrti. We cannot accept Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation of Dignāga since he has imposed a later theory upon that of Dignāga.

The contention of the realists is that a concept has an intrinsic positive nature and that on the basis of this positive nature it is distinguished from other concepts. Udayana is wrong to suppose that difference is intrinsic in a concept. The negation of a negation being positive the negative character should not constitute the essence of a concept.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla address themselves to this problem. They acknowledge two distinct types of negation viz, significant negation and bare denial i.e. *paryudāsa* and *prasajyapratiṣedha*. According to them general images and points of reality illustrate significant negation. A general image is a mental image which has one and the same form pervasive through many objects. A point of reality is an instance of exclusive particularity which excludes all other points of reality. It is better known as *svalakṣaṇa*. They explain how a general image is constructed by our imagination from a number of images which do not possess a common form. A general idea is not a discovery of a common form by the aid of our memory. But it is a construction of our intellect. The Buddhists hold that our knowledge is progressive or additive. The realists hold that a universal is objectively real. The Buddhists contend that it is unreal. Therefore a concept cannot be the discovery of a universal which is objectively real. (*Tattvasaṃgraha* pp. 316—317.).

Let us now see how far Sāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have been able to solve the difficulty in which the theory of Dignāga has been entangled. The import of their theory of significant negation is that a concept has a positive content which is intrinsically different from another ·concept. This theory of intrinsic difference teaches us that a bare denial is implied by it. A cow is intrinsically different from another viz, a horse, a dog, a lion etc. This nature of a cow suggests to our mind that it is different from a non-cow. This is the essence of the theory of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (*Tattvasaṃgraha* Śl. 1014). Every particular image is also an instance of significant negation. They also hold that a point of reality is really the repudiation of the contrary. In other words, difference is reality. The difference of the ideas, images etc, has only borrowed reality (*etena mukhyatā eva svalakṣaṇe anyāpohavyapadeśa iti uktambhavati. Pañjikā* p. 318). Thus they propound the theory of the relativity of conceptual knowledge. This theory bears a close resemblance to that of Sir William Hamilton and Mansel. "To think is to condition ; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the possibility of thought". "The very conception of consciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction between one object and another. To be conscious, we must be conscious of something, and that something can only be known, as that which it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not. But distinction is neccssarily limitation ; for, if one object is to be distinguished from another, it must possess some form of existence which the other has not, or it must not possess some form which the other has...".

Ratnakīrti has discarded this theory on the ground that the theory according to which a bare denial is an implication is psychologically untenable. He says that nobody is aware of these two successive steps. According to him affirmation and negation go *pari passu*. Udayana in his *Ātmatattvaviveka* has subjected this theory to a severe criticism. The criticism has been brought against it from the metaphysical stand-point. He points out that this theory involves self-contradiction. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla hold that the repudiation of the contrary i,e. significant negation is ontological. Udayana argues that there is no difference in ontological status between difference which is intrinsic in reality and that which is intrinsic in the objects constructed by mixed or pure imagination. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla hold that reality is difference (*anyāpoḍhasvarūpatvādvidheriti*). If difference is reality then images, ideas etc, are not difference since they are not real *ex hypothesi*. If they are real difference then they should be taken as realities. Moreover, reality is transcendental to conceptual knowledge and therefore difference cannot be apprehended by conceptual knowledge. Now, a problem may be put before the realists thus :—If conceptual knowledge is not discriminative then such knowledge cannot be a source of purposive action since nobody proceeds towards an object without differentiating it adequately. Udayana's answer to this problem is not satisfactory. The later logicians face this problem and hold that the reference of positive knowledge is not misleading since the object referred to has a sharp outline of its own. According to the law of nature the essence of a concrete individual does never overlap. If a judgment accords with its objective constituents then there is no chance of missing the real object.

Discriminative consciousness arises afterwards since negation presupposes affirmation. Negative consciousness is not co-ordinate with affirmative consciousness. Positive awareness has a sound basis of its own. An individual object has its own positive essence by which it is well-defined. John Cook Wilson shares the same view with these later logicians. "We recognize some feature in the thing which enables us to identify it as one among other things with which we do not confuse it. But we do not know a given something as merely contrasted with something different, but by what we call its own nature, through which alone the contract is possible ; and thus the sweeping statement *omnis determinatie est negation* is misleading, for it is (taken strictly) an identification of the determinate and definite with the negative, and apparently at all events an objection to any distinction between them. But the negative itself depends for any definiteness it can have upon the positive definite character of the contrasted positive elements...So we may rightly say that we distinguish these from one another by their own positive nature, by what they are and not by what they are not. Now with the supposed purely negative conceptions the case is exactly the opposite... Thus *not-A* and *not-B*, *not-Aness* and *not-Bness*, can only be distinguished from one another through *A-ness* and *B-ness*. This is one way of showing that the so-called negative conception *not-A*, if it existed, could not be equated to or identified with any positive conception whatever... In this way the universal constitutes the whole nature of its species or differentiation...for *not-Aness* is simply the absence of a certain quality and mere absence of a positive quality cannot constitute the whole nature of any positive quality." (*Statement and Inference* pp. 251-53). On the other hand, Udayana holds that difference is an embroidery on the canvas of its positive aspect. The import of a judgment is the positive knowledge of the universal which diffentiates its locus viz., the individual. Differentiation is an aspect of positive awareness but not the whole of it. But negative awareness or denial cannot be collateral with positive awareness since the former presupposes the latter for its very existence. The condition and the conditioned cannot be simultaneous since the condition is *ex hypothesi* antecedent to the conditioned.

The solution of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla is that a concept is not merely negative. It is a general idea. They define the negation. They hold that a general image is not a bare denial as Dignāga supposes since this reciprocal negation will lead to an absolute null. Kant holds that a concept is an absolute nothing. Hegel contends that reciprocal negation is the negation of special content and that such a negation does not end in an absolute nothing. The contention of Hegel against Kant is similar to that of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. They hold that a general image has phenomenal existence but is not an absolute null. Udayana's criticism is directed against this theory. He argues that significant negation is based upon difference. Difference is, according to them, reality. They create an absolute gap between sense-knowledge and conceptual knowledge. Therefore difference cannot be conceived. In other words, mutual negation cannot constitute the essence of a general image. Moreover, the import of all judgments is not negative. A general image is known to be positive. An awareness of negation follows it since it presupposes affirmation.

Dharmottara addresses himself to this problem. He holds that a concept or a universal image is positive. But it does not refer to an external universal which is objectively real. A concept is a floating idea. In the perceptual judgment 'this is a cow' the predicate 'cow' is a subjective image. It does not refer to the universal 'cowness'. it is objectivized and becomes identical with an individual cow because the experiment neglects the difference existing between the objectivized image and the particular.

Let us explain the nature of the identity due to neglected difference. An image is neither converted into reality nor the two coalesce with each other. An image which is our thought-construction is imposed upon the external reality. The form of the image 'cow' is imposed upon the particular cow denoted by this. Now a question arises with regard to this imposition. The form of the image should be introspected before its imposition. If imposition succeeds introspection then imposition is impossible since the image in question has only momentary existence. Dharmottara's solution of this problem is that introspection and imposition take place simultaneously.

This raises a fresh problem. An image is subjective. If its form is transferred to the external reality then it will lose its significance, being misplaced. Moreover, can we separate the form of an image from its necessary association ? Can it be united and identified with an external reality which cannot be conceived but only sensed ?

Dharmottara solves this problem. He holds that all these questions do not arise since the form in question is nothing but an objectivized image. It is all illusion.

Negation which repels such an image is also an objectivized image. It does not point to an external reality. A negative judgment also comes within the scope of illusion. A negative idea is a floating idea.

Reality is a constant flow of momentary existence. On the other hand, unreality is a floating idea—an objectivized image. What is durable and stable is nothing but unreal.

This view has also been refuted by Vācaspati and Udayana. The negative criticism directed by them is also classical. We shall discuss only a few points of it.

(1) An unreal object is not presented to our consciousness. We have already proved that whatever is knowable is real.

(2) A thing-in-itself has nothing in common with an image since a particular has no extension in space, no duration in time but is possessed of causal efficiency whereas an image has extension in space, duration in time and is devoid of causal efficiency. Therefore it is impossible to find out a connecting link between a particular and an image so that their identity may be established. Dharmottara contends that the awareness of identity is illusory. The real ground for this illusion is the wrong identification of a particular and an image through overlooking their difference. Udayana argues that if such non-apprehension of difference (*bhedagraha*) establishes identity between an uncognisable

point of reality and an objectivized image then every point of reality would be identical with every such image since there is no real ground for limitation.

(3) The projected subjective image depends upon the act of productive imagination. The very existence of the former depends upon the life of the latter. This image appears and disappears with the coming into being and the passing away of the act of imagination. Every act of imagination has only momentary existence. Therefore the image should change constantly. If the image is not stable then it cannot serve the purpose of a unity. It cannot appear as a unity but on the contrary must appear as divided into discrete moments. It should be unutterable like a momentary feeling of pleasure or pain.

(4) The hypothesis of non-awareness of difference presupposes that difference belongs to an objectivized image which is unreal. The difference of an image from a point of reality being itself real cannot belong to an unreal object viz., an objectivized image. The relation between a real object and an unreal one is unthinkable. If an image is not really different from a real object then the image must be real, being identical with a real object.

Thus we see that the very concept of a positive unreal object involves self-contradiction. If a positive unreal object is not established then the unreality of negation cannot be established. Therefore the ideality of negation has not yet been established.

Udayana refers to another hypothesis of the concept. The propounder of it is said to be Jñānaśrī. We come across the same view in Ratnakīrti's *Apohasiddhi*. He does not refer to Jñānaśrī. Are they identical? We have no space for the historical research. According to Ratnakīrti a concept is both positive and negative. It involves no reference to a real universal since a universal itself (abstract or concrete) is a thought-construction. It is a vague image constructed out of several images of particulars by our intellect overlooking their sharp differences. Conceptual knowledge without discrimination cannot set up purposive action. If somebody is asked by another person to tie up a cow then he cannot take action unless and until he knows a cow and differentiates it from other objects i.e. non-cows. He says, "*nāsmābhir apohaśabdena vidhireva kevalo'bhipretaḥ. Nāpi anyavyāvṛttimātraṃ kintu anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiśabdānām arthaḥ*" (*Apohasiddhi* p. 3). A concept is according to him a thought-construction. Negation which is an aspect of a concept is also ideal. He asserts strongly that a concept is constructed by our imagination out of the materials supplied by the images of particulars which follow in the track of sensation and memory-images and involves no objective reference (*yataḥ pūrvapiṇḍadarśanasmaraṇasahakāriṇātiricyamānā viśeṣapratyayajanikā sāmagrī nirviṣayaṃ sāmānyavikalpam utpādayati...sarvathā nirviṣayaḥ khalu ayaṃ sāmānyapratyayaḥ...* ibid p. 12). The import of the judgment 'this is a cow' is that a positive image well-denied by negation is identified with a particular.

What is the ontological status of its form? He is even prepared to accept that the form in question is unreal. The meaning of it is that a concept is absolutely unreal (*asadeva vā tadrūpaṃ khyātu*—p. 12). He has refuted the reality of the universals of the realists. Hence he feels no hesitation to deny even phenomenal existence to a concept. Negation is also absolutely unreal. It is a product of pure imagination. The only negative character of a general image as proposed by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla is untenable. According to Dharmottara a concept refers to an objectivised image which is hallucinatory. This image has a positive character. Dharmottara's theory comes into conflict with the traditional view of the Buddhists that a concept is dialectical. Ratnakīrti makes an improvement upon the thesis of Dharmottara and brings it into line with the traditional view. According to him the meaning of a concept is an objectivized image which is positive in itself, but is negatively determined. He means to say that affirmation is relative. It is not affirmation in itself but is also a negation. The theory of concept has been propounded by Dignāga and advocated by Dharmakīrti and after two remodellings has attained its culminating point at the hand of Ratnakīrti.

Udayana and his successors have subjected the theory of Ratnakīrti to a severe criticism. We shall discuss only the main points of their criticism. According to the Buddhists, a judgment—a piece of determinate knowledge sets up our action. When we take action we proceed towards a particular but not towards an abstract or concrete universal. An individual object is beyond the scope of a judgment since it is only sensed. How can a concept be related to an individual ? Ratnakīrti holds that a concept is identified with the particular. 'This' in the judgment 'this is a cow' denotes a particular cow. This is the substantive, but 'a cow', the predicate, is merely a concept—a construction of our mind. Can a subjective construction be identical with reality ? Dharmottara's answer is that an identification is possible owing to the neglect of difference. This answer has been the classical answer of the later Buddhists. The logic of illusion explains this identity. But the subject of the judgment of illusion is always real. The Buddhists maintain a radical distinction between the senses and the understanding. Hence the particular and the concept cannot be grasped simultaneously. The illusion of identity cannot consequently take place. The Buddhists may revise their thesis and hold that 'this' does not denote the real individual but the image of the individual. An image is an object of perceptual judgment and hence a concept may be falsely identified with it. The Buddhists mean to say that though an image is the indirect reflex of a particular yet it follows immediately in the track of sensation. Therefore the action of a person may be stirred up by a judgment. The realists contend that the Buddhists should admit that an image is constructed from impressions of our immediate past experience but not *a priori* out of the forms of thought. An image is not a source of transcendental illusion of an empirically real world. The Buddhists argue that the awareness of an image produced by impressions of former experience is illusory since it is cognised as real. The ground of its illusory character lies in this that it is not directly produced by a sensory stimulus. The Naiyāyikas contend that if reality remains uncognisable, the illusory character of the experience of an image is not established since the real ground for this illusion is the wrong identification of a particular and an image through overlooking their difference. If the Buddhist hold that an identity between an uncognisable point of reality and an image is established owing to the non-awareness of difference then every particular of this universe would be identical with every image since there is no ground for limitation. Ratnakīrti has failed to solve this objection raised by the realists.

Ratnakīrti holds that a concept refers to an objectivized image. The outline of this image is distinct. The objectivized image of a cow is marked off from other images by a boundary line which is constituted by 'non-cow'. Cow and non-cow are as conjugate as the field and its boundary-line are. One is known with reference to the other. A question is put to Ratnakīrti as to how he would prove the positive element of this image and the nature of the relation of the negative element to the positive one. Is the negative element identical with the positive one ? If it is answered in the affirmative then Ratnakīrti simply contradicts himself. Ratnakīrti should say that the negative element qualifies the positive element. In that case the qualifier and the qualified cannot be known simultaneously. Ratnakīrti raises the question but evades the real issue. Does determination mean cognition of distinction through negation ? We have discussed the problem already. Sigwart rightly says, "The sensation of red, or more precisely of a definite red, is something quite positive, having a characteristic content. This something, quite definite, is differentiated in the highest degree without any help from the side of the understanding. It is then either unemployed or redoes what is already done by others". Ratnakīrti may answer that the positivity and the negativity are experienced together and that the one cannot be abstracted from the other.

Ratnakīrti thinks that his view that the positive image is qualified by a negative element is strengthened by our practice. According to him, conceptual knowledge stirs up our purposeful action. We proceed towards an object to the exclusion of others. Similarly a concept refers to a positive image which is excluded from others. The image of a cow is excluded from non-cow. Non-cow is at the same time excluded from the image of a cow. But non-cow itself remains vague since the objects included in non-cow remain unknown to us. If two differents are not difinitely known then they cannot be mutually distinguished. A horse should not be distinguished from a cow on the strength of the distinction of a cow from a non-cow. The concept of a cow may as well stir up activities to obtain a horse instead of a cow. This theory has no bearing upon our conduct. Human practice does not presuppose the discrimination of the image as proposed by Ratnakīrti.

Ratnakīrti holds that the judgment 'this is a cow' is analytical since the subject 'this' and the predicate 'cow' refer to the same image. Thereby he tries to meet a few objections raised by the Naiyāyikas. Vācaspati Miśra objects to this view. He holds that the image, even if it is objectivized, cannot be separated from the logical subject viz the 'I'. The above judgment should be expressed in the form 'I am a cow'. This is the standing objection against the Buddhist view. It has not been solved by Ratnakīrti.

If the judgment ‘this is a cow’ is analytical then this is identical with the image ‘cow’. This image contains both positive and negative elements. “This’ is pure affirmation. Therefore the subject and the predicate cannot be identical. If he modifies his thesis and holds that ‘this’ is an element of the objectivized general image then this judgment should be a synthetic one. In that case, a greater disaster will overtake him.

5. *The Vaibhāṣikas.*

The most important point of criticism directed against the Buddhist theory of concept is that the wrong identity between the particular and the concept or the objectivized image cannot be established. The Vaibhāṣikas attend to this problem. According to them the thing-in-itself is referred to directly by a judgment. The subject of a judgment is a point of reality and a concept is applicable to it. A concept, being mental, does not belong to reality but is imposed upon it. The concept is negative. It is the repudiation of the contrary. A concept is constructed by our awareness of ontological negation. An individual cow is really different from all other points of reality. Similarly, all individual cows are different from other individual objects. Of these ontological negations we make a selection and frame a group of these selected negations and subsume it under a negative form, viz a non-cow. Thus we say that all individual cows are other than a non-cow. The Vaibhāṣikas hold that the judgment ‘this is a cow’ is a synthetic one since an individual cow contains the concept but is not identical with it.

This solution is not satisfactory. An individual cow is also different from another individual cow. The denotation of non-cow is not clear. Does it include all differences from an individual cow within itself? In that case, an individual cow other than the individual cow in question will contain the the concept ‘non-cow’. The concept ‘non-cow’ will comprise only a few differences from an individual cow within itself. As there is no definite law according to which the meaning of the word ‘a few’ will be ascertained, an anomaly in the application of the concept ‘cow’ will arise. The concept ‘cow’ might be as well applicable to a horse since the concept ‘cow’ may be constructed from the differences of an individual cow from a buffalo, a lion, an ass, a cat etc. but not from the difference of it from the horse in question. (*gotvāvacchinna vyāvṛttyavacchinna mahiṣādivyāvṛttisattvāt tatrāpi govyavaharāpattiḥ. Ātmatattvavivekaṭīkā* p. 384). The Vaibhāṣikas have made other suggestions to render their theory tenable but have failed to prove their thesis. A concept refers to a real universal. It is positive. We shall not discuss the problem whether a universal is real since it is beyond the scope of our present work.

If the concept is not negative then a negative idea does not necessarily follow a perceptual act which has been described by the Buddhists as non-perception. No amount of imagination can manufacture a concept which is negative. Therefore the Buddhist theory of negation that negation is merely ideal is not tenable.

The Buddhists have drawn a radical distinction between sensation and conceptual knowledge. Conceptual knowledge only is determinate. In a judgment the predicate is identified with the substantive neglecting their difference. They are thus forced to give the highest cognitive value to an idea. Therefore determination means the determination of the predicate idea. Other possibilities of determination being absent they frame the hypothesis that the intellect dichotomizes itself. Thus the law of the relativity of knowledge becomes the centre of gravity of Buddhist epistemology. But this law itself involves a vicious circle. The idea 'cow' becomes determinate if it excludes 'non-cow'. 'Non-cow' becomes definite only when it excludes 'cow'. A cow refers to a non-cow and a non-cow refers to a cow. If we cannot know a cow definitely in and through its positive nature then there is no chance of determining it. If the hypothesis of the law of the relativity of knowledge is discarded then the negative character of a concept cannot be proved. If a concept is not necessarily negative then the hypothesis of the subjectivity of negation is consequently untenable. The Buddhist conclusion that negation is subjective is wrong because it is deduced from false premises.

The philosophers who subscribe to the monism of Being hold that negation is a floating idea. Such a conclusion is a deduction of their ontology. Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya* holds that negation is subjective unreal. He suggests that it is an idea which anchors in no reality.

Sureśvara, amongst the Advaitins of the Śaṃkara school, holds the same view regarding the nature of negation.

These views have been discussed in the introduction. I beg only to mention that Bhartṛhari has no follower. His successors acknowledge his authority on various subjects but his theory of negation has been discarded. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa and others subscribe to the Nyāya theory of negation. Nāgeśa, a close follower of Bhartṛhari, holds that negation is a mental fact. It has not phenomenal existence but subsistence (*prātibhāsikasattā*). Though it is subjectively determined yet it exists beyond the act of its presentation. In other words, it is not a floating idea. Similarly, Sureśvara's theory of negation has been given up by his successors. This abandonment proves its inadequacy.

In European philosophy Lotze holds a view which bears a close resemblance to that of Ratnakīrti. According to Lotze positive positing is united with the exclusion of everything other. This affirmation as well as this negation is one inseparable thought. Affirmation and negation are one and the same since their thought is one and inseparable.

Herbart's view corresponds to that of Dignāga and his immediate successors. In sensation, says he, is contained absolute position, without our noticing it. In the understanding we must begin by creating it anew, through a negation of its contrary.

Prof. Ulrice defines the understanding as the differentiating activity of the soul. Every difference involves not only a mutual negation between the objects but also their mutual unity. This theory is essentially Hegelian though he holds that every word expresses its own meaning through the repudiation of the contrary.

Locke maintains a distinction between a clear idea and a distinct idea. According to him a distinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all others. Locke has hinted at the most essential point of Dignāga's theory. The other element of the Buddhist theory viz. a radical distinction between sensation and undestanding remains implicit in him.

According to Bain all names are positive and negative at the same time. Neither 'there is an affirmation which would not be a negation at the same time' nor 'there is a negation which would not be an affirmation at the same time.' What affirms also denies. He does not think that negativity is the soul of the universe. He holds that the same word expresses both positive and negative things. In that case it becomes impossible to determine which things are positive and which are negative. Bain says, "In fact, positive and negative must always be ready to change places". Then the only conclusion possible is that all are negative since they are negative of each other. Bain says, "One might suppose that a chair is an absolute and unconnected fact. The case is quite otherwise". Bain's law of Relativity has shown a tendency to drift in the Hegelian direction. This theory approaches that of Dignāga.

W. E. Johnson alludes to the same difference between sensation and understanding as is maintained in the Buddhist logic. He says "Neither images nor perceptions reflect the concreteness and particularity of the individual thing, which should be described as determinate in contrast to the indeterminateness of the mental process. The contrast is between the freshness of a particular sensation and the generality of a conception".

Now, we shall compare and contrast the theory of concept as propounded by Dignāga with those of Kant and Hegel.

Kant mentions two types of illusion, empirical and transcendental. The second one is intrinsic in the human reason. It gives rise to four antinomies which reason fails to solve.

In the Mahāyāna school two types of illusion have been admitted of which one is called *mukhya* (empirical) and the other is called *antar upaplava* (inner disaster) of the human mind. This corresponds to the natural illusion of the human mind of the Kantian system. This natural illusion produces all the concepts which the human mind experiences. The dialectic in the Kantian sense is the logic of illusion.

Hegel holds that each concept is dialectical and gives rise to an antinomy. The Mahāyāna stand-point corresponds to that of Hegel. In the logic of Kant all empirical objects, their images and the corresponding concepts are not dialectical. They are given us. Though they are constructed by Productive Imagination since they contain manifold in tuition yet they are given us. This conclusion of Kant is not consistent. The Buddhists consistently hold that the point-instant is only given. Everything else is constructed by Productive Imagination and by the natural Dialectic of the Human understanding. Each constructed object is the interpretation of transcendental reality. According to Dignāga emperical objects are constructed dialectically whereas Kant holds that they are not so constructed.

Dignāga's theory of concept agrees with that of Hegel to some extent. Hegel says, "The universality of a concept is posited through its Negativity : the concept is identical with itself only inasmuch as it is a negation of its own negation". Dignāga holds that all concepts are negative. A cow is not a non-cow. The negative is also positive. The contradictory does not result in an absolute Naught, in a Null, but essentially in a negation of its own special contents. According to Dignāga as interpreted by Jinendrabuddhi a concept means merely the negation of the contrary. A cow and a non-cow, a pair of opposed parts of a contradiction, negate mutually. Hegel also holds that thesis and antithesis negate each other. "Affirmation is relative ; it is not affirmation in itself but it is also a negation".

Kant holds that both the opposed parts of a contradiction sublate one another and the result is Null. Hegel goes a step beyond the Kantian position and holds that negation negates only the special contents of its opposite. The result of this negation is some kind of real affirmation. The thesis is not only a negation of the anti-thesis but is also identical with it. Dignāga maintains that if A is other than B then the former cannot be identical with the latter. This is his logical stand-point. But as a metaphysician he upholds the doctrine of monism. But it is not clear to us whether the doctrine of identity-in-difference has been taught by him.

Hegel draws a distinction between Uuderstanding and Reason. Understanding maintains the difference of the objects of this world. It is disjunctive. It maintains 'either' and 'or' firmly. Reason embraces understanding and transcends it. Difference apart from Identity is meaningless just as Identity apart from Difference is a mere abstraction. All the differences of the world are absorbed in the all embracing concrete Identity.

Hegel differs from Dignāga with regard to the pure sensation of the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself is a mere abstraction. It has no absolute reality in the Hegelian system. Sensation is a mere mode of the spirit. It is not a distinct sourse of knowledge.

Let us now give a synopsis of the comparative study in abstract of the positions of Kant, Hegel and Dignāga regarding the three cognitive faculties : the Senses, the Understanding and the Reason.

(1) Kant assumes three cognitive faculties : the Senses, the Understanding and the Reason. Of them the Reason is only dialectical.

(2) According to Hegel the difference between the senses and the understanding cannot be acknowledged. He holds that the objects or concepts are cognised by the understanding non-dialectically but by the Reason dialectically.

(3) Dignāga has not mentioned Reason as a separate source of knowledge. Reason is not different from the understanding. He perpetuates a sharp distinction between the senses and the understanding. The senses are a non-dialectical source of knowledge but on the other hand the understanding is the dialectical source of knowledge.

(4) Kant and Dignāga agree on the points that there is a radical distinction between the senses and the understanding and that the Thing-in-Itself is the only source of real knowledge.

(5) In Kant's system Reality is divorced from Logic. In Hegel's system they become confounded. In Dignāga's system they are kept asunder of the plane of logic, but merged in a monistic whole on the plane of metaphysics.

(6) Dignāga differs from Hegel in one essential point that the dialectical movement of the Hegelian logic is wanting in Dignāga's logic. The thesis passes on to its antithesis and becomes identical with it. A contradiction arises from this identity. This contradiction requires to be solved. A synthesis comes into being and solves this contradiction. The synthesis retains them as its moments and removes their opposition. It is a concrete unity of two opposites. It is a unity-in-difference. The goal of this dialectical movement is the absolute, the most concrete synthesis of all categories.

I agree with Dr. Stcherbatsky in many essential points so far as this comparative study is concerned.

6. *Vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchainnābhāva.*

(*Negation determined by a characteristic feature which does not belong to its negatum*).

The meaning of this compound word *vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnābhāva* requires to be made clear at the outest and a short history behind it is to be given. This is best done by means of an illustration. The meaning of the negative proposition that the horns of a hare do not belong to a cow is the best example in point. This negation may seem awkward on the face of it but for the history that is behind it. The Buddhists employ it as the crucial example of their theory of negation according to which negation is subjective —nay a floating idea. We have examined the Buddhist theory and proved that it is open to such objections as cannot be answered. They contend that nobody will admit that an imaginary object is real. If reality is denied to an imaginary object than this denial is undoubtedly a negation. Is this negation real ? This problem is a hard nut to crack. It unsettles the settled conclusion of the realists as well as the well-worked-out thesis of Bradley. The negation of the flower in the sky cannot be real since it is determined by an imaginary object. According to the Naiyāyikas and other realists the negatum must be a real object ; if it is not real then it is necessarily unreal and the idea which reveals it should be a floating one. Bradley postulates several universes of discourse in order to refute the hypothesis of a floating idea. Now, if the reals of the universe of imaginary objects are repulsed then which universe do they belong to ? Do they belong to the real universe of the waking consciousness ? But we have no experience of their reality. If they are transported to a different order of universe then an assumption of infinite types of universes is forced upon Bradley. Such an assumption is merely an article of faith since it is not based upon sound experience. Moreover, the principle of logical economy is on the side of the Buddhists. But, on the contrary, the assumption of a floating idea is logically far superior to that of endless universes of discourse.

An attempt at solving this problem gives rise to the hypothesis of a *vyadhikaraṇa-dharmāvacchinnābhāva.* This is the hypothesis of Sandoḍa—a pre-Gaṅgeśa logician. Dharmottara's theory of concept constitutes the basis of this objection. A concept points to an objectivized image. It is unreal. It has only imaginary being. The Buddhists work under the influence of the old hypothesis of the Being-Philosophy that reality cannot be negated. Dharmottara holds that a point of reality cannot be negated. The form of an idea *qua* consciousness cannot be negated since it is also real. Therefore negation negates only the objectivized image. In other words, negation negates only an imaginary object. This view of Dharmottara has been nicely expressed in Ratnakīrti's *Apoha-siddhi.* Dharmottara's theory of concept has been refuted. But his theory of negation which has been dissociated from his theory of concept has been pressed into service by his successors. This is the short history which lies behind this problem.

Kumārila, Udayana and Gaṅgeśa have tried to solve this problem. But their solution does not touch the core of it. They hold that the negation of the horns of a hare and the negation of the flower in the sky mean respectively that the horns do not belong to a hare and that the flower does not exist in the sky. But is the negation of a horn belonging to a hare the negation of the horn of a hare ? The former negation opposes a horn while the latter opposes a hare's horn. The horn in the first example remains unqualified while in the second one the horn is a qualified one, being qualified by relatedness to a hare. Gaṅgeśa recognises the difference between the negation of a horn belonging to a hare and that of the horn of a hare. But he holds that the second type of negation is uncognisable. Kumārila and Udayana have evaded the problem since they have not honestly discussed the problem. Gaṅgeśa has tried to justify their predecessors' evasion. His answer to the problem is that the experience of the negation of an imaginary object is not itself a fact since the alleged fact is uncognisable. The form of this experience is wrong. It should be regularised. The form of experience which accords with reality is that the negation of a horn belongs to a hare.

The later Prābhākaras find fault with this solution since these realists disfigure the very form of experience. They analyse the negative experience that the horns of a hare do not belong to a cow. The result of this analysis is that the negative idea is not a floating one. It poins to some kind of reality. The type of reality which it refers to will be described just now. Before doing this we should say something about the nature of negation. A negation is made definite by means of its correlative negatum. The negatum is opposed to its corresponding negation. The Naiyāyikas hold for the sake of convenience that negation is opposed to the vital force of opposition which belongs to the negatum. This vital force of opposition is called *pratiyogitā.* In Logic it is abstracted from its substratum. In metaphysics it remains ever identical with its substratum. In our practice we determine an individual negation by means of the abstracted vital force. The Prābhākaras hold that the real negation in question has two characteristic features, one of which belongs to the negatum but the other does not belong to it. They mean to say that the vital force is a floating reality. The negation in question is determined by two vital forces of opposition viz, the one which belongs to a horn and is qualified by hornness and the other which is determined by relatedness to a hare but does not belong to the negatum in question. The second vital force of opposition floats in the air and belongs to no negatum. The floating vital force of opposition is a substitute for the floating idea of the Buddhists. But is this substitute a better one? Is it not vital force of opposition a logical abstraction? If it is admitted to be so then is it not an idea? In that case, a floating idea has been replaced by another floating idea. This solution is therefore no solution at all. The only merit of the Prābhākara hypothesis is that it re-opens the problem seriously.

The later logicians welcome the Prābhākara suggestions and give a consistent form to the above thesis. They hold that the experience of a negation determined by a characteristic feature which is absent from its negatum is an undeniable fact. Mathurānātha holds a brief for them. He asserts that if this experience is contradicted by our subsequent experience or if it is known as illusory even then a negation may be experienced as determined by a characteristic feature which is absent from its negatum. The two vital forces of opposition determine the negation in question. One of them is qualified by a characteristic feature which belongs to the negatum in question while the other does not belong to it. But these two vital forces related to the negation in question by means of the negatum - negation - relation (*pratiyogitākatvasambandha*) like the two fruits belonging to a footstalk. Mathurānātha's important point is this that the negative experience in question is always illusory. In that case the vital force which does not belong to the negatum is also real since it has been only misplaced in a wrong context. They hold that illusion is merely a case of misreading (*anyathākhyātivāda*). Therefore the negation in question is determined by a horn and relatedness to a hare but relatedness to a hare does not belong to the horn. Therefore the vital force of opposition which is characterized by relatedness to a hare does not find its substratum in the horn. The other vital force of opposition which is specified by hornness belongs to the horn. But these two vital forces are related to the negation in question and are mutually related through the common medium of the negation in question (*evamāpātataḥ nyāyanaye śṛṅge śaśīyatvasya bādhitatvepi bādhapratisaṃdhānadaśāyāṃ śṛṅge śaśīyatvaprakārakajñānasya bhramarūpasyaiva sambhavena śaśaśṛṅgaṃ nāstītyākārakapratyakṣe bādhakābhāvāt. bādhapratisandhānadaśāyām api śaśīyatvāṃśe nirdharmitāvacchedakād ekatra dvayamiti nyāyena śaśīyatva śṛṅgatvobhayaprakārakajñānāt śaśīyatvāṃśe nirdharmitāvacchedakasya ekatra dvayamiti nyāyena śaśīyatva-śṛṅgatvobhayaviśiṣṭa vaiśiṣṭyabodhātmakasya śaśaśṛṅgaṃ nāstīti pratyakṣasya sambhavācca. Vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnābhāvarahasyam.* p. 63.). He expresses his final conclusion on this topic in the following extract (*vastutastu ... pramāṇasatve'pi śaśīyatvāvacchinnapratiyogitākatvasambandhena abhāve śṛṅgasya, svāvacchinnapratiyogitākatvasambandhena śṛṅgābhāve śaśīyatvasya ca bhrama eva* ... Ibid p. 64.). Mathurānātha states that the connection of the negation of a horn with relatedness to a hare is merely subjective and that the relation of the negation of relatedness of a hare to a horn is also subjective. These negative judgments do not accord with the objective constituents according to the order given in these judgments. Therefore, these judgments are illusory. Mathurānātha at first challenges the factual existence of this experience but as good sense prevails upon him he accepts it as a fact and explains it in terms of illusion. Some later logicians hold that the negative experience of the negation in question is true. According to them the vital force of opposition is not a logical abstraction but a reality. It is factually separate from a negatum, its support. Though this vital force of opposition belongs to no negatum yet it is not absolutely floating. It is tied down to the negation in question. Mathurānātha has discarded this hypothesis of a peculiar sort of negation by the application of Occam's razor. But if the experience of this negation is proved to be valid then an empiricist cannot use the instrument of Occam's razor freely since the should keep himself in close touch with experience. The objective reality of the negation in question depends upon the validity of the experience under consideration.

Now, if we assume the validity of the negative experience in question then a fresh problem arises, whether the negation in question is at all cognisable. Lastly, we shall discuss whether the negative experience in question is true. The solution of the last question will decide whether the negation in question is objectively real.

Let us now discuss the epistemological problem whether the negation in question is cognizable. The old logicians of the modern school of Nyāya (*Navyanyāya*) hold that an attempted affirmation is the condition of its corresponding negative judgment. They justify the truth of their hypothesis on the ground of the awareness of the specified individual negation. Let us make their position clear with the help of an illustration. Suppose, there is a lake which contains the negation of fire. But the negation of fire is a misnomer since the lake contains various kinds of the negation of fire. Fire has several relations. Fire inheres in its parts. Fire is in contact with the wick of a lamp. Similarly, fire has other relations to objects other than itself. The negation of fire in conjunction is other than the negation of fire which inheres. Thus the relations of fire determine the distinct individuality of its negations. The above lake contains different individual negations of fire. Why do we cognize one of them to the exclusion of others ? In order to explain the perception of an individual negation of fire to the exclusion of others we should postulate an attempted affirmation in which the determinant relation of the negation in question is one of the objective constituents as the only condition of its corresponding negative judgment. The attempted affirmation that fire is in contact with the lake conditions the negative judgment that there is no fire on the lake (this negative judgment signifies that fire is not in contact with the lake). This theory corresponds to that of Sigwart as formulated in his logic. It is superior to that of Sigwart since these logicians specify the nature of an attempted affirmation which invariably precedes a negative judgment well-defined. An attempted affirmation is the deliberate construction of our imagination. It presupposes the valid experience of its opposite.

If a person knows that there is no fire at this spot then he imagines deliberately in spite of his contradictory experience that there is fire at this spot. A cow has horns. Therefore the affirmative judgment that a cow has horns is not imaginary but a true one. The negative judgment that a cow has no horns of a hare cannot come into being since there is no possibility of its being preceded by an attributed affirmation. Therefore, the negation in question is uncognizable.

Mathurānātha subjects this theory to a severe criticism. (1) An attempted affirmation is not the invariable condition of a negative judgment. A negative judgment of illusion cannot be conditioned by an attempted affirmation. An illusion of the negation of fire arises in our mind when a spot which contains fire is taken by us as not containing fire. Fire cannot be imagined to exist at a spot where it is actually present. Therefore an attempted affirmation of fire at the spot is impossible. Hence if an attempted affirmation is the invariable condition of a negative judgment then an illusory negative judgment cannot come into being since the absence of the condition implies the absence of the conditioned.

(2) A true negative judgment does not necessarily depend upon an attempted affirmation. An earthen jar had earth-colour at first. Being burnt it has become red. The negative judgment of perception that the jar is not earth-coloured cannot be conditioned by the attempted affirmation that the jar is earth-coloured, since earth-colour cannot be attributed to the jar in question in which it once inhered.

(3) The universal of Being (*sattā*) may be qualified by an adjectival phrase in order to impose limitation upon its denotation. The universal of Being which does not inhere in quality and action has a restricted denotation. Thus the pure *sattā* is logically and factually distinct from the qualified *sattā*. A negative judgment involving the negation of the qualified *sattā* does not presuppose the attempted affirmation of the qualified *sattā* since the pure *sattā* inheres in qualities and actions and is not ontologically distinct from the qualified *sattā*. *Sattā* cannot be ascribed to an individual in which *sattā* inheres. Therefore, the theory as it stands is untenable. It requires a thorough remodelling in order to render it serviceable. Even if we take it for granted that the specified attempted affirmation is the invariable condition of a negative judgment then the negative judgment involving the negation in question is not an impossibility. The attempted affirmation that a cow has the horns of a hare may condition the negative judgment that the horns of a hare do not belong to a cow. Even if we admit that such an attempted affirmation is impossible then there is no bar to the attempted affirmation that a horse has the horns of a hare. This attempted affirmation should condition the negative judgment that a horse has no horns of a hare. This negative judgment refers to a *vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnābhāva.* Therefore the epistemological theory of the logicians of the new school of Nyāya does not exclude the possibility of the experience of the negation in question. But this theory itself is a wrong one since it presupposes the very awareness of negation which it seeks to explain.

Gaṅgeśa objects to the experience of the negation of the horns of a hare since a negative judgment of perception presupposes an affirmative judgment in which the negatum is the substantive and the characteristic feature of the negatum is its predicate. This affirmative judgment accords with its objective constituents. He means to say that the negatum and its characteristic feature are real. The horns of a hare are the negatum in question. Horns are real but relatedness to a hare cannot be their real predicate. One cannot have the experience of the negation in question since the conditions of it are not fulfilled.

The successors of Gaṅgeśa have discarded his epistemological theory of negative experience. According to them the awareness of the horn, the negatum in question, and that of relatedness to a hare conjointly give rise to the negative experience in question. Some other logicians have offered other suggestions which explain the negative experience of the negation in question.

After examining a few epistemological theories which have a bearing upon the experience of negation, Mathurānātha concludes that the negative experience of the negation in question is not an impossibility. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācḥāryya etc, have arrived at the same conclusion. According to a large section of logicians the negative experience of the negation in question is an undeniable fact. Therefore, the realists should face the Buddhist problem. The evasion of it will go against them.

Two solutions of this problem are before us. One is offered by Sondaḍa and the other is due to Mathurānātha. According to the former the negative experience in question is true. The negation of the horns of a hare is not a floating idea. It is the negation of horns but is also characterized by the characteristic feature which does not belong to horns, the negatum in question. He means to say that the negation in question has two characteristic features which do not co-here in the negatum. In other words, a negation which is determined by two characteristic features one of which does not belong to the negatum is called *vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnābhāva*. It is objectively real. It occupies all spaces and all times. It is called *kevalānvayī*. It is opposed to none.

Mathurānātha develops the thesis of Pakṣadhara Miśra and holds that this negative experience is necessarily illusory. He argues that the predicate of a true judgment is a real one. In a true negative judgment the characteristic feature which determines the negation actually belongs to the negatum. In the negative judgment which refers to a *vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnābhāva* one of the characteristic features of the negation does not belong to the corresponding negatum. Therefore this negative experience is illusory. Then he uses the instrument of Occam's razor as an additional proof to strengthen his hypothesis. If one slackens then the other will tighten it.

Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācāryya has examined the thesis of Mathurānātha. According to him Mathurānātha's induction that in a true negative judgment the characteristic feature of the negation referred to actually belongs to the negation in question is not reliable. We experience the negation of a jar. This negative judgment is known to be true when it accords with the reality referred to by it. The negation of a jar is determined by jarness.

But this negative judgment is true and will remain true even if we do not enquire into the actual relation of jarness to the negatum in question. The negative judgments "a jar does not exist", "the negation is determined by jarness" have different imports. In the second instance the negatum is in the back-ground. Nobody tests its validity by the nature of its relation to the negatum. Gadādhara takes his stand upon empiricism but does not criticise his experience. Mathurānātha defends Pakṣadhara Miśra's thesis half-heartedly. He refers to *vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnābhāva* as a real object in his *kevalānvayi-anumāna*. He hovers between the hypotheses of Sondaḍa and that of Pakṣadhara since his conviction is not strong enough to stick to one of them. Gadādhara similarly oscillates between two hypotheses viz, whether the experience of the negation in question occurs in our mind at all. The same oscillation occurs in the mind of Raghunāth Śiromaṇi and his followers. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi in his *Padārtharatnamālā* holds that the negation in question is a species of the absolute negation. In his *Vyadhikaraṇadīdhiti* he says "*yadi punar ānubhaviko lokānāṃ svarasavāhī ghaṭatvena paṭo nāstītyādi-pratyayaḥ na tadā tādṛśābhāvanivāraṇaṃ gīrvāṇagurūṇāmapi śakyamiti mantavyam*. p. 120.). But Jadadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra cites a few examples of the negation in question which nobody can deny. The negation of a jar as the sky and the negation of the knowable as the nameable illustrate the type of negation which is determined by a characteristic feature which does not belong to its negatum, Padmanābha Miśra in his *Setu* commentary has subjected this new hypothesis to a severe criticism. But his labour is lost since his criticism is pointless owing to the poor understanding of the whole controversy held among the neo-logicians.

We see that the neo-logicians are divided in their opinion about the reality of this new type of negation. Some hold that it is real but others deny reality to it. Pakṣadhara and Mathurānātha hold that though it is not objectively real yet it is presented to our consciousness. But our experience of it is always illusory. If this hypothesis is open to criticism then the objective reality of the negation in question is forced upon us. Then another difficulty arises. The truth of this experience should be held to be self-evident since this experience is never contradicted. Such a conclusion comes into conflict with the fundamental epistemological theory of this school. The experience of this negation is either true or false. But in no case the subjectivity of this type of negation is proved. Therefore, the contention of the Buddhists is not tenable.

7. *Subjectivity of Negation*
Vs.
Objectivity of Negation
(*in European Philosophy*)

We shall now discuss some theories of negation of European Philosophy in order to ascertain the present tendency of European Philosophy towards the subjectivity or the objectivity of negation. We shall not discuss all essential points of these theories but attend to them only from our point of view. It is a huge task to take all relevant theories of negation into consideration. Owing to the limitation of our space we shall discuss only a few of them.

We shall start with Sigwart since his influence upon contemporary British Philosophy is decidedly great. Let us put the conclusion of Sigwart first since our interest lies in the point at issue. Sigwart reviews a view which transfers the negation to the nature of things themselves. Sigwart says, "But such views always involve a confusion between the negation itself as a function of our thought, and the presupposed objective ground of this negation—the exclusive individuality and uniqueness of each one among the many things which are real. That which they are not never belongs to their being and 'nature'; it is only our thought, which, in making comparisons, brings such alien elements into contact with them. All that concerns us is to recognise why we have need of these subjective expedients in order to know the world of reality in which no counter-part of our negating thought is contained. It is only by a constant confusion between negation in thought and those real relations in being which are very imperfectly expressed by mere negation that the Hegelian logic succeeds in presenting it as a real power, and as the nature of things ;..." (*Logic* p. 126.).

He holds that a negative judgment is not co-ordinate with a positive judgment. It pre-supposes a positiue attribution of a predicate to a subject and has meaning only in annulling such an attempted synthesis. He says "Negation has no meaning except in opposition to an attempt at a positive statement".

Sigwart holds that negation owes its existence to a chance since it pre-supposes 'a subjectively arbitrary and contingent thought'. The aim of the negation is to put a check upon the subjective and accidental movement of individual thought which very often extends beyond what is objectively valid.

He defines the nature of a negative judgment clearly. He holds that a negative judgment is not that which has a negative copula. A negative copula is a contradiction in terms. A copula is that which unites a predicate with its subject. A negative copula means a bond that divides. It is therefore nonsense. Therefore in a negative judgment the copula is only negated. He concludes that 'the negation is a judgment concerning a positive judgment that has been essayed or passed'. He proves in Appendix A the double dependence of the negation upon the positive judgment. He says, "thus the negation is doubly dependent upon the positive judgment. It presupposes as its object a thought which was expected to be valid, and it rejects an attempted statement. The ground of its rejection, again, is ultimately something positive, an object given to intuition and recognised as different from my idea—*vernm sui index et falsi*". (Ibid p. 382).

His theory of negation presupposes the validity of the hypothesis that negation is only directed against a positive judgment. The negative particles 'no' and 'not' are opposed to propositions only. An idea cannot be negated. "Taken literally, the formula not-A, where A denotes any idea, has no meaning whatever. There is no such thing as an idea which is only the pure negation of the contents of another idea". (p. 134). If an idea is put aside then it is not peesent there. An absent idea is not itself an idea. Sigwart says, "If not-A were taken to denote everything not present in our ideas when we form the idea of A alone, everything therefore the idea of which is not immediately given with the idea A, then A and not-A would no longer denote incompatible determinations, and it would not be true that they are mutually exclusive". (pp. 134-35). He holds that even if there were a real negation then it must be expressed only in a negative judgment. "But if not-A were a real negation, the idea A must be denied of something, and so pass, either expressly or tacitly, into a judgment". Not-A denotes that object of which A is to be denied. Such an object is always positive. He says, "I must review in thougt all possible things in order to deny A of them, and these would be the positive objects denoted by not-A". (p. 135). He says that it would be an impossible task for a person to comprehend such not-A. This argument is really directed against the Prābhākara theory of negation if we judge it from the Indian point of view. This first argument of Sigwart that not-A is not an idea is directed against the Buddhist theory of the relativity of knowledge.

This argument of Sigwart bears a close resemblance to the Jaina argument directed by Abhayadeva Suri in his *Tattvabodhinī* against negation, real or ideal. Abhayadeva argues, "*abhāvapratipattau pratiyogisvarūpaṃ kimanuvartate, vyāvarttate vā ? anuvṛttau kathaṃ pratiyogino'bhāvaḥ ? vyāvṛttau kathaṃ pratiṣedhaḥ pratipādayituṃ śakyaḥ?* etc." *Tattvabodhinī* p. 24). The sum and substance of this argument is this : Does the corresponding negatum accompany the negation in the negative idea of the negation in question ? Does A accompany real not-A in the negative idea of not-A ? If it does then how does not-A negate (put aside) A ? If it does not then how is not-A a negation since it does not negate A ? He intends to say that if A is not present then it cannot be put aside. Śāntyācāryya also holds that if we admit that a negative idea of negation is possible then negation and its corresponding negatum should not be taken as incompatible (mutually exclusive) since the negatum accompanies its negation (necessarily) in thought as its correlative term (*Jainatarkavārttika* p. 82). According to Sigwart one cannot think of not-A except by thinking of A. We cannot interpret not-A as denoting something which does not as a rule accompany, they cannot be incompatible. Let us sum up the view of Sigwart. The most essential point is that negation is expressed only in a judgment. A negative judgment presupposes a positive one. Its only function is to judge a positive judgment. As a matter of fact it presupposes an attempted affirmation. It depends upon subjectively arbitrary and contingent thought. It is therefore purely subjective. It is impossible for us to have a negative idea. A careful analysis of the meaning of a negative term can at the utmost show that it denotes an unwieldy number of positive objects. It is impossible for us to comprehend them all by means of a single idea. The hypothesis of real negation owes its existence to our confusion of thought.

Let us see whether the theory of Sigwart is tenable. The weakest link in his theory is the postulate of the negated copula. Let us take an example of an affirmative judgment.

This is red. 'This', the subject is united by the copula 'is' with 'red', the predicate. The negative judgment which aims at denying its truth is 'This is not red'. It signifies that it is false that this is red. The negation is directed against the bond that unites the subject with the predicate. Thus the copula is negated. The bond disappears and the subject and the predicate become divided. Now, the question is if the bond is negated then 'this is not red' ceases to be a judgment since 'this' and 'red' are held apart. Two ideas do not constitute a judgment by their simultaneous presence only, since every idea is conscious of its content only. One should be united with the other by means of a distinct relation. In a negative judgment if this very bond is negated i.e. cancelled then the judgment is reduced to ideas. Do we actually reduce a judgment to its components to test its truth ? Can we test the truth of a judgment by means of its component ideas ? If we simply put aside the bond of the judgment 'this is red' then the judgment is not invalidated thereby. A judgment can only replace another judgment. If 'this is not red' be a judgment then and then only it can test the truth of the judgment 'this is red'. 'This is not red' cannot be a judgment unless 'not-red' is united with 'this'. In the above two judgments the copula 'is' denotes different relations. Sigwart may urge that the negative judgment 'this is not red' is a judgment which is passed upon the positive judgment 'this is red'. The negative judgment in question signifies that the positive judgment 'this is red' is not true. In this case, the object referred to by the negative judgment should be different from and incompatible with that referred to by the above affirmative judgment, otherwise, one cannot invalidate the other. Now the point requires to be decided whether the object referred to by a negative judgment is a positive one. If Sigwart holds that the object referred to by a negative judgment is a positive one then he stands close to the Prābhākaras. The law of contrary opposition becomes more fundamental than the law of contradiction which is a mere abstraction. Bosanquet and the Prābhākaras have made this point clear. Now, Sigwart should prove that a positive object is referred to by a negative idea. The Naiyāyikas have proved that this hypothesis is untenable. If a negative object is referred to by a negative idea then Sigwart's theory should be discarded since he acknowledges the objectivity of negation. Sigwart like the Jains has a misconception of the law of contradiction or of incompatibility. The problem of the compresence of A and not-A in thought has puzzled him. A is correlative of not-A and at the same time is incompatible with it. In order to know that a term is incompatible with another term we should take into consideration some definite relation. A jar is in contact with a spot. The negation of the conjoining jar and the jar itself cannot occupy the same position of the spot in question. But the negation of an inhering jar and the jar can occupy the same spot. In the idea of not-A, A qualifies its negation by means of a particular relation. The negation is presented to our consciousness as a substantive and A, the negatum, as an adjective. Thus one may accompany the other without violating the law of contradiction since they are not incompatible with regard to the subject-object-relation. A and not-A may be compresent in the same act of thought. This compresence in one act of thought will not be a guarantee for their compresence everywhere. In the determination of the incompatibility of two terms we should take into account the particular relation. Therefore, a negative idea is not meaningless. This is the answer of the realists to Sigwart. Sigwart is right to hold that the negative term 'not-A' cannot denote a large number of positive objects. If it manages to denote them somehow then it is impossible for us to comprehend them all in one negative idea. A common form being inconceivable, it is absurd to put them in one idea. A negative idea points to a negative real consequently. A negative judgment presupposes a negative idea. If positive objects are not the reference of a negative idea then a negative real should be postulated. Sigwart holds that a negative judgment presupposes an attempted affirmation and is consequently subjective. But an attempted affirmation presupposes an awareness of negation. If negation be not real then an infinite series of judgments will be required to explain a negative judgment. Sigwart's motive for upholding this theory of negation is clear. He has tried to keep himself at a safe distance from the influence of Hegelian logic which gives an element of reality to negation. Dread of Hegel has created confusion in his mind. He has failed to realise the true nature of negation. As a love-stricken person creates in dream his lady-love so awe-stricken Sigwart has constructed a life-boat for the protection of his philosophic life in the shape of the theory of subjective negation out of his imagination. This boat is shattered into pieces when it dashes against the solid rock of experience.

F. H. Bradley has been inspired by Sigwart's theory of negation but does not wholly accept his theory. According to his early view negation is merely subjective. Negation is not the denial of the existing judgment. The reference of the idea to actual fact is not denied. 'It repels the suggested synthesis, not the real judgment'.

We have seen before that Sigwart's hypothesis that negation affects only the copula is vague. Bradley interprets it in an intelligible manner. He says, "The affirmative judgment qualifies a subject by the attribution of a quality, and the negative judgment qualifies a subject by the explicit rejection of that same quality". (*The Principles of Logic* p. 116.). He mentions two conditions of a negative judgment viz, a suggested synthesis and the affirmation of a positive quality that excludes the suggested idea. He has made the second point clear in the following extract. "Every negation must have a ground, and this ground is positive. It is that quality X in the subject which is incompatible with the suggested idea. A is not B because A is such that, if it were B, it would cease to be itself". (p. 117.). He illustrates his point thus, "If a body is not red because it is uncoloured, then the addition of colour would destroy that body as at present we regard it". Therefore a denial should start from an incompatible quality and character. This theory depends upon the assumption that the nothing which is nothing cannot possibly do anything, or be a reason for aught. Hence, no subject can repel a suggested idea on the strength of what it is not. This negative quality must mean something positive. This assupmtion of Bradley is similar to that of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. According to Bradley, the essence of the negative judgment is the exclusion of a suggestion that the real is qualified and determined in a certain way by means of the application of this suggestion to actual reality.

According to Bradley, logical negation always contradicts, but never asserts the existence of the contradictory. A mere denial of B can never assert that the contradictory not-B is real. The positive ground which constitutes the basis of logical negation is not itself contradictory but only contrary. Not-A, the bare negation of A, is a mere non-entity—an impalpable void—a reflection thrown upon empty space. It cannot be real. It cannot be realised in thought.

Not-A is not a bare negation. It is also positive. The contradictory idea is the universal idea of the discrepant or the contrary. It is a general name for any hypothetical discrepant. Thus contradiction rests upon an undetermined contrary. But contradictory negation is always definitely singular such as not-B. On the other hand, contrary negation is indefinitely plural. All that are contrary to A cannot be determined by a general formula. Therefore there is a sharp distinction between them.

Bradley's answer to this problem is as follows: Contradiction is thus a subjective process, which rests on an unnamed discrepant quality. It cannot claim "objective" reality, and since its base is undetermined, it is hopelessly involved in ambiguity (p. 124). "And negation is 'subjective' in the sense that mere negation, mere exclusion, is an abstraction and is by itself really nothing at all. Otherwise negation is not 'subjective', though it is more reflective than affirmation is". (p. 127).

This is not the final view of negation, according to Bradley. We shall not criticise this view elaborately but only point out that Bradley has committed the same error as was committed by the Buddhists long ago. The negative idea 'not-A' cannot refer to an absence which is objectively real. If contradictory negation refers to an undetermined positive object then a negative judgment will cease to be a judgment since a judgment is always determinate knowledge. Moreover, it has not been proved that the sole referent of a negative judgment is a positive object. If not-A does not point to some reality then it is a floating idea, the very existence of which has been denied by Bradley himself. This view of Bradley is either contradicted by experience or self-contradictory. Bradley discards his earlier view. He says, "My book is faulty here owing to its acceptance of 'floating ideas', and through its failure to recognize that in its own sphere every idea has reality". He means to say that negation is not "unreal". He also holds that negation is not subjective. He says, "You may, when it is compared with affirmation, call it, more reflective, in the sense that we, perhaps generally, know that we assert, before we know that we deny". (p. 665).

Bradley's final theory of negation coalesces with that of Dr. Bosanquet. According to this view, negation is real. Bradley's theory of judgment suggests this revised theory of negation. Every judgment consists of two aspects. A judgment refers to the Universe i.e. the Reality and, selecting some feature out of it, refers it to the Reality. This singled out feature of the Universe represents the predicate of the judgment. But this selected feature which is an ideal content is referred to the undivided totality. The ideal content—the predicate—is also inseparably connected with the Reality. It implies a loosened unity of the 'what' and 'that'. The other aspect of the judgment is that the world as it appears in the selected feature is only judged. In this limited sense of a judgment the predicate is referred to this or that (the selected portion) but not to the remaining portion. The selected feature 'this' is distinguished from 'that' the residue. What is asserted of 'this' is at the same time denied of 'that'. There are two real differences in this disjunctive totality in which one part excludes the other. Every judgment is at least implicitly negative and disjunctive. Bradley concludes that 'disjunction within a whole is the one way in and by which in the end negation becomes intelligible'.

Bradley clearly expresses his view thus :— "Negation everywhere has a ground, not on one side merely but on both sides. There is a reason, a positive character, on account of which 'this' excludes 'that', and 'that' again on its side is opposite to 'this'. There is no such thing as a distinction which, merely adventitious, supervenes want only, or is superimposed in the absence of a ground. A bare exclusion is a mere abstraction. A distinction is always based upon real difference. The important point of Bradley's theory of negation is that contrary negation is grounded on identity. He says, "We have in opposition the movement of differences to occupy, through their partial identity, simply the same point, and so to qualify at one both that point and each other". (p. 664). Diversity implies partial sameness. 'This' has a tendency to qualify 'that' owing to its partial identity and exclusion is based everywhere upon this tendency. Distinction and negation are only possible in such Universe as is under the sway of identity and difference. An order is imposed upon the elements of this Universe only by means of these two principles. Bradley concludes that 'all negation is real, and that it is real just because it is relative'. There is no absolute exclusion of a denied content. A content which is repulsed from a limited sphere belongs to some other sphere of the Universe. This theory of negation suggests a metaphysical view of the Universe. "Negation in short implies at its base a disjunction which is real, and its goal is to set before us reality as a systematic and explicit totality of complementary differences". Mere affirmation cannot approach that perfect end. Every experienced world falls short of this ideal world. Therefore every world lacks ultimate truth and reality.

Bosanquet has discussed the problem in an original manner. According to him negation is an essential aspect of Reality. He has made an improvement upon the theories of negation of Sigwart and Bradley. We shall discuss some essential points of his theory.

Negation bears the stamp of denial on the face of it. What does it deny ? It appears to express that some ideal content does not belong to reality. What does it presuppose to be denied ? Bosanquet holds that negation 'does not presuppose an affirmation. A matter is not always judged to be true before it is denied. If it is thus judged then a negation will always turn out to be self-contradictory. Sigwart holds that an attempted affirmation is the condition of the negation. Bosanquet holds that an attempted affirmation is synonymous with suggestion and question. The content of this suggestion is not a floating idea but one of a set of alternatives which have a positive basis i.e. come under a general predicate in which an interest is taken and is referred to actual Reality. Therefore every suggestion is a sort of disjunctions the limit of the alternatives of which is not fixed up. Among many alternatives one is judged as probably belonging to reality. Regarding the question whether affirmation is prior to negation, Bosanquet's answer is that 'affirmation presupposes the idea of negative relation in general, while negation presupposes the idea of a corresponding affirmative relation in particular'. But in complete thought they stand more or less on the same level. When 'Reality becomes for us an articulated system affirmation and negation alike become double-edged, each involving the other'.

The primary form of negation appears to us as excluding a suggested qualification of reality. The deeper meaning of it is generally overlooked. We take negation as bare denial. The negative judgment the import of which is bare denial is the infinite judgment. Some infinite judgments which are essentially negative have the pseudo-affirmative charcter since they have undistinguished or indefinite predicates in which a positive element is wanting. Thus these two types of infinite judgments purport to convey bare denial. Bosanquet holds that the bare denial amounts to nothing. This view is based upon two assumptions : (1) metaphysical and (2) epistemological. (1) In no real objects identity and difference fall apart. Of all existent objects identity and difference are two inseparable aspects. Infinite judgment suggests that these two aspects fall apart. Hence it ceases to be an intelligible judgment. Mere identity and mere difference are alike unintelligible.

a) The old assumption of Plato is that knowledge is the knowledge of something. Something is that which is antithetical to nothing. Every judgment must contribute something positive to knowledge. But a bare denial cannot be made into affirmation. Therefore an infinite judgment is absolutely meaningless. A negative judgment which expresses significant denial is a true judgment since significant denial conveys something positive. 'All judgments have in common the interest or bearing of the judgment. What is the predicate in an ordinary judgment ? If we try to find out its predicate apart from the context in which it has been used then this judgment appears to us to be an arbitrarv one which conveys an unreal predicate. As the nucleus of every judgment is neither indefinitely variable nor free from ideal selection and synthesis, a negative judgment cannot be interpreted as conveying bare denial since it cannot be devoid of the common character of all judgments. If it merely signifies bare denial then it amounts to the cancellation of the whole reason of the interest on which it should centre. Moreover the consequence of this judgment imparts a positive meaning to the denial. An element of positive import which justifies the denial must be included in the denial. Every judgment has two grounds viz, real and logical. A negative judgment is not an exception to this rule. Therefore a negative judgment is based upon something positive. "Hegel has quaintly compared the distinction between bare and significant denial to that between crime and civil dispute. If I steal, my act says 'This is not yours' ; with asserting that it is mine or any one's by right, i e. it ignores the whole sphere of property or reasonable possession by alleging no ground for its denial. In a civil dispute I say 'This is not yours, because it is mine', i.e. I assert rights of property, as you do ; but I deny your right on the ground of mine''. Bare denial cannot be the import of a negative judgment since the meaning of it is conditioned by a whole system of context and positive interest which is presupposed to be always present with it. Bosanquet says, 'We are therefore referred for the meaning of significant negation to the positive ground, on positive consequence, of the exclusion which forms the outward and visible shape of negation' (*Logic* p. 288.)

The pure form of negation is simple contradiction. It is nothing but the abstraction of differenee. Reality is full of positive differences. A question arises in our mind that negation presupposes a real system and this system also presupposes negation. Therefore the theory of negation as formulated by Bosanquet is a glaring instance of circular reasoning. Bosanquet meets this objection thus :—All thought involves positive differences and it is possible for all members of a system to presuppose one another, and to develop mutual distinction at the same time.

Bosanquet bestows the force of contradiction upon contrary negation. Contrary negation has only the true import of some material value. According to him, difference develops into contrariety. How it is possible ? He answers that if positive differents register their claim upon the same place in the same system i.e. the same relation to it, then difference turns out to be discrepancy. He arrives at the conclusion that 'negation is rooted in the fact of difference, but difference is not enough to warrant negation. This view reminds us of the view of Nandīśvara that difference is ontological but negation is logical. Bosanquet holds that 'Negation is simply the logical, conscious expression of difference'.

Bosanquet holds that the possibility of significant denial depends upon the fixing up of the number of the contraries. If the number of them remains indefinitely vague then no positive result will follow. Moreover, negation always presupposes the relation of contradiction between the contraries. This set of alternatives which are contradictorily opposed to one another should fall within a positive whole. Significant denial presupposes it in order to have its bearing, interest or *raison d' etre*.

Bosanquet's concluding remark on the nature of significant negation is as follows :

"Significant negation then combines in itself the absolute Contradiction which was illustrated by the Infinite Judgment, and the Contrariety which arises between differents when referred to the same place in the same system. Without contrariety negation would have nothing that it could mean, but without contradiction it would not have in itself the power to mean anything" (p. 293). The most important point in Bosanquet's theory is that Reality is a system and a system which involves no negation is no system.

Bosanquet's theory of negation is similar to some extent to that of the Prābhākaras. The Prābhākaras agree with Bosanquet in discarding the hypothesis of the Infinite Judgment in their Logic. According to them all negative judgments have only positive import. The idea of significant denial is less pronounced in their Logic. The Bhāṭṭas have introduced this idea into Indian Logic. Bosanquet's theory is superior to that of the Prābhākaras in an essential point. The metaphysical back-ground of the Prābhākara theory of negation is merely difference while that of Bosanquet is Identity and Difference. Bosanquet's Reality is a system which is ruled by both identity and difference whereas the Reality of the Prābhākaras is a catalogue of different knowables. The right conclusion should be that Identity and Difference imply each other. The Prābhākaras stop when they prove the existence of positive differences but Bosanquet brings out the implied meaning of positive difference.

We shall now discuss the theory of negation of J. D. Mabbot. It is an improvement upon the theory of negation as formulated by Bosanquet. Mabbot claims that his account of Negative Judgment is more faithful to that of Negation as proposed by Hegel who has also been followed by Bosanquet and Bradley.

His main thesis is that there are two types of negative judgments. The first type of them eliminates a possibility. It illustrates our ignorance since elimination is a *pis aller*. Though a negative judgment is itself false yet it has usefulness and some value since it is based upon a universal disjunction and leads to an affirmative judgment which points to Reality. The universal disjunctive judgment does not express real negation but the relation of difference. This relation of otherness is absolutely positive. It is dennted by the con. junction 'and'. The other type of Negative Judgment expresses 'a genuine discrepancy in reality between promise and performance'. It expresses real negation which has been described by Mabbot as teleological failure.

Mabhot selects for examination only genuine negative judgments. He does not accept the infinite negation as genuine. He refuses to discuss the import of nonsensical propositions. He represents them as Turkey carpet judgments. According to him the genuine specimens of negative judgments grow in their logical habitat and are not mutilated by the non-logical factors viz, the casual caprice of the moment, the need to contradict a rival or instruct a friend. Thus the eliminative negation represents the genuine type and other negative judgments are illustrations of damaged specimens.

According to Mabbot the predicate which is repelled by a negative judgment is in some way related to the subject. 'The predicate must be "suggested" as "possible". To be possible here means to be one of a set of alternatives judged true of a universal of which the subject is a particular case'. He gives several instances of genuine negation. He says that the possibility of a predicate to be negated depends upon the categorical judgment of fact. In the negative judgment 'The cashier did not commit the burglary', the cashier is a possible candidate since the safe was unlocked by a key and he is one of the persons who were known to be in possession of a key at the time of the act of burglary. The fact in question suggests that the burglar had a key. A disjunction results thereby that 'the burglar was either the manager, or the cashier, or the chairman of directors. In the present case, the cashier has been eliminated on the strength of an evidence such as an alibi but not on the ground of the knowledge of the actual criminal. If we know the criminal then the eliminative judgment becomes pointless. A negative judgment aims at an affirmative judgment by elimination. Some other examples of negative judgments as given by Mabbot are as follows : 'The signal is not red', 'The effect is not that of corpuscular emission' etc. Mabbot says, "Similarly red is one of the possible colours of that signal, which means that it is actually one of a set of colours disjunctively asserted of a universal (British railway signal in general), of which the subject of our judgment is a particular instance.

The aim of negation is in every case elimination. The set of alternatives is limited. If one of them is rejected then the field of alternatives becomes narrow. Thus the ultimate positive goal is suggested by elimination. An elimination is a means to that end. It should not be confounded with the goal itself. If the affirmative conclusion is reached somehow then elimination is pointless. The negative judgments which express bare denial are not genuine, since this denial does not lead to an affirmative conclusion. The significance of an elimination lies not in itself but in leading us to an affirmative conclusion. A bare denial lacks this meaning. Therefore it is nonsensical.

The next point of his thesis is that negation is subjective. He establishes the truth of this point on positive arguments and negative criticisms of Bosanquet's theory. Mabbot holds that negation is subjective since it is only part of the eliminative process. But he says that the predicate which is negated is not subjective since it is determined by a true disjunctive judgment which is not subjective at all. Negation is a *pis aller* when no direct method is available. It has a value because of our ignorance. But no negative judgment supplies us with the complete experience of truth. His stronger argument is as follows :— "In short, all negative judgments of this eliminative type err in attributing a disjunctive character to a particular subject and in implying a suggestion which fuller knowledge would recognize as unwarrantable. Negation is therefore once again subjective as necessarily involving ignorance and error". (*Knowledge, Experience and Realism* p. 74.).

His negative criticism of Bosanquet's theory contributes to the establishment of his point. Bosanquet argues thus, "The aim of negation is to raise contrary to contradictory opposition, because when there are only two alternatives, denial of the one is equivalent to and grounded on assertion of the other". The drift of this argument is that negation is objective. Mabbot's repudiation consists in this that if the true alternative is known then there is no need of the circuitous way of rejecting the false alternative. According to Bosanquet and Bradley the perfect case of contradictory negation is that in which ground and consequent are one. But Mabbot points out that if negation were based on the knowledge of the true alternative then such knowledge would have rendered a further eliminative judgment pointless. If knowledge of truth is the ground of denial then this denial is truly a command but not a judgment and lies outside the province of logic. "When Bosanquet speaks of positive differents claiming the same place in the same system", he is forgetting his own distinction between the genuine disjunctive judgment and the pseudo-disjunctive, which is particular. Bosanquet also confuses the cases of real negation (teleological failure) with the eliminative type of negation and looks for disjunction vainly.

G. Ryle champions the theory that 'there are real negative facts'. In order to do so he reviews the theory of Mabbot. The gist of Mabbot's contention is that all negative sentences do not signify genuine negation, that genuine negation is inferior to knowledge and that the meaning of the negative sentences which do not mean genuine negation is nonsensical, that negation is subjective and that teleological negation is objectively real. Ryle critically examines these points of his thesis.

We shall not discuss all points of Ryle's paper but only those which answer our point of view. Negation is subjective since it is part of a process of elimination. Is negation identical with the acts of "excluding", "rejecting" and "eliminating" ? Do we eliminate B-ness from A ? Or, does A's nature excludes B-ness from A ? The correct view will be that A's nature excludes B-ness from A. We simply know that A is not B. The act of excluding or eliminating is not a practical one but an intellectual one since it is based upon the knowledge or belief in a negative fact.

Mabbot's second argument for the subjectivity of negation is that the disjunctive character cannot be applied to a particular since a particular having such a character becomes indeterminate. The implication of this argument is that a disjunctive proposition in which the subject is a particular is equivalent to its contradictory. 'This cat is either red or white or green or black' is the same as 'This cat is neither red nor white nor green nor black'.

Ryle contends that the implication of the above disjunctive proposition is that the cat is coloured and that its determinate colour is a species of the genus 'colour'. We know only the character of the character of the particular. This knowledge is not indeterminate. It is a knowledge of a fact. As disjunctive propositions about particulars are possible so negative propositions about them are consequently possible. Such a negative proposition refers to a non-individuating fact about the particular. 'This cat is not red' points to a fact viz, being-a-colour-other-than-red is a real character of the colour of the cat. This character belongs to other colours excepting red. Though it does not individuate its recipient yet it is a real character.

According to Ryle negation is objectively real. But it is abstract since it is not the character of things but the character of the character of a thing. It is a fact about a thing but not a fact of a thing.

Ryle supplies us with the criterion of a genuine proposition. A genuine proposition is an answer to a real question. A real question is such as is necessarily 'known to have an answer'. But an answer remains sometimes unknown. Double questions are not real ones. A proposition is nonsensical if neither it nor its contradictory is true. The infinite judgment 'This cat is not black' is an answer to the question 'what colour is this cat not ?' Similarly he establishes that a large number of infinite judgments is an answer to real questions.

Then Ryle refutes the hypothesis of Bosanquet that a negative assertion is grounded on a positive one. The negative assertion that this cat is not black is neither an assertion of a colour nor based upon the assertion of a colour. When we say that the ticket is not in my ticket-pocket, we do not say so having discovered it, before in some other pocket.

He says that 'elimination may precede and not ensue upon the discovery of the required fact'. He proves that the assertion 'B is not D' is not identical with the assertion 'B is C', since if a fact is necessitated by another fact then these two facts are never identical. Even if the assertion 'B is C' is false then the assertion 'B is not D' may be true. I say truly that my ticket is not in my ticket-pocket under the impression that it is on the table of my reading room. Even if the proposition that the ticket is on the table is false, the negative proposition that the ticket is not in my ticket-pocket is true. Even when I fail to know the actual habitat of the ticket I say correctly that the ticket is not in my ticket-pocket. Thus we see that Bosanquet's hypothesis is not acceptable.

Negative sentences are not always complete. Though they are elliptical yet their meaning is intelligible since the ambiguities of their meaning are avoided by their context etc. If a 'but' clause is added to such an elliptical negative sentence then the true meaning of the sentence in question is made clear without altering the meaning of the elliptical sentence.

When we say that this cat is not black we know and presuppose that this cat is coloured, and that there are several determinates of the determinable 'being coloured'. The elliptical negative sentence that this cat is not black should be supplemented by the 'but clause'. The sentence thus supplemented assumes the form that this cat is not black but has some other colour. It is an answer to the question, "Which colour is not the colour of this cat ?" The denial of the colour 'black' is not the assertion of the colour 'white' but it assumes that the colour of this cat is some species of the genus 'colour' and that this species is other than the species 'black'.

Ryle establishes another point and thereby supplements the theory of Mabbot. He says, "Now there are various sorts of disjunctive sets, of which the set of Determinates of a Determinable is only one, just as there are various sorts of 'predicate' of which qualities are only one". (*Knowledge etc.* p. 87.). He gives an example of a negative sentence which pre-supposes that the disjunctive set is not a set of Determinates of a Determinable. The negative sentence, 'Jones is not the secretary of the Club', is an example in question. He brings out some possible meanings by completing the sentence with different 'but' clauses (see page 89.).

Ryle establishes another point that the negative sentences which are held to be nonsensical by Mabbot are not so but 'state an uninteresting because trivial truth'. "Virtue is not square" is not nonsensical but its meaning is explicated if it is completed by the 'but' clause. "Virtue is it not square but handkerchief and window-panes are". It is an answer to the questions "Is virtue an entity ?" and "Are there some entities which are square ?"

Ryle agrees with Mabbot on the point that negation presupposes a disjunctive set which has a general predicate. Ryle has proved that a particular cannot have a disjunctive predicate or hover between alternatives. The conclusion which Ryle arrives at is that negation is not subjective but an objective fact. But it is not a fact of but a fact about a thing.

Ryle disagrees with Mabbot on the point that there are two classes of negation. He says that a third type of negation should be added to them. The third type of negation consists of negative existentials. The examples of this type are as follows : "Ghosts do not exist", "There is no phlogiston".

Ryle discusses the logical aspect of the problem and holds that the teleological negation is beyond the province of Logic though it is worth discussing in Metaphysics. He also holds that the special province of negation is the method of elimination.

In the conclusion Ryle explains why negative facts do not largely invite our attention. They are 'facts about' but our interest lies in 'facts of'. But negation is determination. This mental state does not refer to itself but to an objective fact beyond itself.

H. H. Price subjects the thesis of Mabbot to a severe criticism and proves that negation is objectively real. His negative criticism of the rival view leads on to the conclusion that there is a negative fact.

We shall now discuss the examination of the arguments of Mabbot by Price.

(1) Mabbot believes that every non-teleological negation is necessarily preceded by a disjunction and forms part of a process of elimination.

Price disbelieves this account of Mabbot. He states reasons for his disbelief.

The subjective view of negation depends upon the truth of Mabbot's hypothesis that disjunctive characteristics do not belong to a particular but to a universal. The disjunctive characteristic expressed by the phrase "either red or green" does not objectively characterise a particular railway signal in Britain but characterizes a universal such as railway signal in general in Britain. According to Mabbot the statement "This particular railway signal round the corner is either red or green" is subjective. Price asks whether this statement is one about the self of an experient or about his mental state such as doubt, ignorance etc. This statement refers to an external object viz., the particular railway signal and such a characteristic feature as qualifies it objectively.

Mabbot holds that a disjunctive characteristic means the hovering of the mind between two alternatives. This hovering is a mental state. As such it does not characterize objectively. Ryle contends that the phrase "either red or green" does not mean the hovering between red and green but signifies something else. Price completes the unfinished task of Rylc. He holds that the object hovers between two alternatives. It is an objective hovering. It is a special kind of being which is explained by the existence of doubt and uncertainty. Price says "The belief in an objective "either—or" seems to necessitate belief in objective possibilities". Price also shows that Ryle also purports to defend the objectivity of disjunctive characteristics. According to both of them the disjunctive characteristic remains unaffected by our knowledge or ignorance of its identity. When we know the particular signal to be red, it is still one of the disjunctive set.

Price then examines the other part of Mabbot's thesis that a disjunctive characteristic characterizes a universal. Let us take an example to see how far Mabbot is right. A hat is either red or green or yellow etc. Here a generic universal is colour. Does the disjunctive characteristic objectively characterize the universal ? It is nonsensical to hold that colour is either red or green or yellow etc. Colour cannot be coloured since it cannot be an instance of itself.

Colour is not identical with redness, greenness etc., but is identical in them. Bu this is not the intended sense of Mabbot. Mabbot may contend that 'is' in the above sentence is to be replaced by 'has for its species'. Colour or colouredness has for its species either redness or greeenness or yellowness etc. But it is not a case of disjunctive species. Colour has for its species redness and greenness and yellowness etc., all these species together. 'It is not a case of *either-or*, but of *and*. Mabbot admits the absence of disjunctiveness in one place. He says that red does not "compete with other colours for the same place in the same system". Those related differents in their different places are the system (p. 78). Thus a disjunction cannot be the condition of negation.

Price draws our attention to another point that 'elimination does not take place merely within the sphere of genus and species (or determinable and determinate), but in many others as well'. The examples given by him are as follows :

(1) The cat is not here (but somewhere else).
(2) It is not tea-time yet (but some other time).
(3) The initial was not B (but some other letter of the alphabet).

In the first example 'here' is a part of space but not a species of the genus space. Space is not determinable and 'here' is not a determinate. In the second example, tea-time is not a species of the genus time. In the third example 'B' is not a species of the alphabet but a member of a series which is not a genus.

The conclusion of Price on this issue is that "there is an infinitely great variety of series in the world, and any of them, so far as I can see, can form the sphere within which an eliminative process moves". Regarding the thesis of Mabbot that elimination takes place within the sphere of genus and specis he remarks that it errs not merely by *supressio veri*, but by *suggestio falsi*, in that it puts the emphasis in the wrong place'. (p. 104).

Price examines the assumption of Mabbot that non-teleological negation occurs only as part of a process of elimination, and that it is always preceded by disjunction. Price remarks that the verbal expression of this thesis is bad since Mabbot uses the negative adverb 'only'. A similar objection has been raised by Pārthasārathi Miśra, the two Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍits etc, against the verbal statement of the thesis of the Prābhākaras who have used negative words such as *kevala*, *tanmātra* and *ekākin*.

Some philosophers hold that negation is subjective. They express their thesis in the following verbal forms viz, "Negative characteristic and other negative entities do not really exist though they seem to us to exist" and "Negation would not exist if minds did not exist". Price points out a serious defect in these expressions that both have "nots" in them.

Mabbot's thesis is far superior to these two theses. Let us examine the thesis of Mabbot. Mabbot's thesis consists of two parts viz, (1) 'every non-teleological negation only occurs as part of an eliminative process and (2) a negation is preceded by a disjunction. Price's objection to the first part is that it is tautological since to negate means to reject and to eliminate. The first amounts to the proposition that a negation is an elimination but negation is another name for elimination. This first part is reduced to the verbal form "a negation is a negation". Therefore the first part of Mabbot is nonsensical.

The second part is the substantial part of his thesis. He says that all non-teleological negation is preceded by disjunction. Price's criticism against it is that 'if it were true it could not provide the differentia of negation ; for affirmations too are frequently preceded by disjunction'. (p. 105.). A particular railway signal is known as red as well as not green. In this case both affirmative and negative propositions are preceded by the disjunctive proposition that is either red or green.

Some logicians hold that negation presupposes a positive suggestion. This view is not true according to Price since it does not supply us with the differentia of negation. Many affirmative propositions also presuppose positive suggestions in the sense that without these positive suggestions these affirmative propositions should never had been possible. Price goes a step further and shows cases where affirmative propositions presuppose negative suggestions. Therefore, it is difficult to arrive at a conclusion as to whether affirmation or negation is prior to the other.

The most damaging criticism against the thesis of Mabbot is that he is involved in a vicious circle. "Every disjunction includes within itself a number of negative propositions". Thus a negation presupposes a disjunction which presupposes a negation. The above disjunctive proposition "The particular railway signal is either red or green" contains within itself a negative proposition that red is not green i.e. red is not identical with green. Mabbot may contend that a disjunctive proposition includes within itself an affirmative proposition that red is different from or other than green since it refers to a positive difference between red and green. But it is really a play upon words since the phrases 'different from' and 'other than' are synonymous with the phrases 'not identical with' and 'not the same as'. Therefore positive difference is a fiction. The proposition that red is different from green is a negative one.

Price also points out that Mabbot is involved in a vicious regress. Price puts a question to Mabbot viz, how can one pass from a disjunctive proposition to a negative proposition without assuming an independent negative premise. We have the premise 'A is either B or C'. The conclusion is that A is not B. But Mabbot may contend that 'A is not B' is directly intuited. In that case, Mabbot's view will be destroyed since this intuition grasps a negative fact directly and it is known to be distinct from both A and B. Mabbot's paper indicates that it is inferred that A is not B. This negative conclusion is possible only if it is supposed that A has some positive characteristic feature D which is incompatible with B.

The verbal form is that no D is B.

No D is B
A is D ∴ No A is B i.e. A is not B.

I shall quote an extract from Price's article which suggests Price's view and represents his negative criticism directed against the subjective view of negation. He says, "Thus the passage from the original disjunction to the eliminative negation cannot possibly occur unless we have an independent negative premise—that is, a negative proposition not in any way presupposed by, or included in the original disjunction, a proposition not arrived at by the process of elimination, because it is presupposed in that process, which cannot move a step without it. And if this negative premise is maintained to be the conclusion of some previous process of elimination, what becomes of that previous process ? It too will require independent negative premises. And where did it get them from ? Either we must stop somewhere or we are involved in a vicious *regressus ad infinitum*". *Knowledge, Experience and Realism*—p. 107).

Mabbot has explained away a large number of genuine negative propositions as mutilated specimens of negation. Price points out that these negations which are quite independent of eliminative processes are genuine ones since they stand on their own feet. The negative proposition that red is not green is the original negative proposition. Mabbot wrongly supposes that negations of this type are 'commands or expressions of wishes but not denials at all'. If we say that yellow is not white then do we command some body to do something or communicate our wish to some person ? Certainly not. Mabbot simply explains away cases of genuine negation.

Price examines the other type of negation. This is really non-eliminational but is teleological negation according to Mabbot. In Logic this question cannot be settled since the negative proposition which refers to teleological negation is really a proposition about what lies beyond the scope of pure logic.

The negative proposition 'this is not a ford' involves the teleological negation of a ford. The meaning of it is that this ford is an objective self-contradiction. Price points out that Mabbot's formulation is defective. When we mistake a stony stretch of river for a ford and correcting our mistake say that this is not a ford then this negative proposition becomes both false and true. It is false because it is a teleological proposition which involves an objective self-contradiction. It is also true because it is not a ford but a stony stretch of river. This is really a non-teleological proposition since a stony stretch of river cannot be even a bad specimen of a ford.

'The number three cannot row' cannot be a teleological proposition since a person who cannot row cannot be an objective self-contradiction of his existence. This proposition does not point to the contradiction of his intentions or the intention of the captain of boats or the rules of good rowing. Intentions and actions cannot be contradicted since a proposition contradicts another proposition but intentions and actions are not propsitions.

A teleological negation cannot differ from a non-teleological negation in their negativeness. There is no difference between the 'nots' of these propositions but there is a good deal of difference in 'what is notted" '.

The thesis of teleological negation has an underlying assumption that things have ends which have been designed by no mind—not even by itself. But this end is not intrinsic in a thing but in a mind which designed it. But this trans-logical question canot be settled 'unless the meaning of the word 'not' has already been at least provisionally settled'.

Price shows that the negative proposition 'the soul is not a fire-shovel' is a perfectly genuine instance of negation. It is also a true one since it necessarily follows from two premises as their logical conclusion. Price says, "these two propositions are 'All fire-shovels are in space' and "The soul is not in space". From this it follows by a syllogism in the second figure that the soul is not a fire-shovel". No body can deny its truth without denying the validity of reasoning. If the truth of it is accepted then everybody will be compelled to accept that this is a genuine proposition.

The Naiyāyikas are in agreement with the spirit of H. H. Price's criticism of the thesis of Mabbot that negation is subjective and of his positive thesis that negation is objectively real. But they differ from Price on the point that a disjunctive characteristic is objectively real. A disjunction is hovering between two alternatives. It is a mental state of uncertainty arising from imperfect perception i.e. from the absence of the perception of the specific character of an object. A disjunctive characteristic does neither belong objectively to a particular nor to a universal. Mabbot is indebted to Bosanquet for this part of his thesis that negation is preceded by a disjunction. Bosanquet is in search of a solid foundation of his theory of significant denial. He finds his safe ground in an antecedent disjunction of positive predicates. Mabbot has unsettled his settled thesis. He argues that negation is subjective because of its subjective origin.

Price has much reliance upon his power of argumentation. He accepts the premise of Mabbot and controverts it. But he does not examine the very assumption of Mabbot. British Railway signal is either red or green. It appears to be disjunctive on the face of it. But the above judgment is not disjunctive in the true sense of the disjunctive judgment. It has a conjunctive sense. It means that British Railway signal is both red and green provided that it is not red when it is green and *vice versa*. An ordinary disjunctive judgment 'this is a man or a post' does not convey the meaning that this is both man and post alternately. Either—or in the above judgment signifies one of the two. This judgment carries certainty whereas a disjunctive judgment conveys uncertainty. Similarly the judgment 'this hat is coloured' implies that this colour is one among the seven colours. 'Either—or' denotes one among many. If the so-called disjunctive judgment were truly a disjunctive judgment then the premise itself being false no logical conclusion would follow. This is either a man or a post. If I know that this is not a post then it does not follow that this is a man since a disjunctive judgment is an illusory experience. But if I know that this is a post then I can say that this is not a man. But this is not a conclusion of a syllogism of which the disjunctive proposition is a premise. The negative judgment 'this is not a man' may be due to an intuition of negation or follow from the two premises viz, (1) no posts are men and (2) this is a post. Moreover, a true judgment which follows a disjunction dispels its antecedent disjunction. But the so-called prior disjunction is never dispelled by the negative or affirmative judgment which follows it. The above disjunctive judgment is true. Its truth is only verified by the successive judgment. The phrase 'either—or' has created confusion in the mind of Bosanquet and Mabbot. Negation is not preceded by a disjunction. Therefore it cannot be subjective. The Naiyāyikas hold that affirmative and negative judgments do not stand on the same level since a negative judgment presupposes the awareness of the object negated, positive or negative, but an affirmative judgment does not necessarily presuppose another judgment. They hold that affirmation is prior to negation.

We shall now try to draw out their difference of opinion on this point more clearly. The Naiyāyikas agree with Price on the point that negation does not presuppose a positive suggestion. A positive suggestion implies the hypothetical presence of the object negated. Price's criticism against this view is that it does not provide the differentia of negation. The Naiyāyikas refuse to accept this common view on the ground that it fails to explain such negative judgments as refer to the negation of transcendental objects. But it is a minor point. The main point of difference lies in this that according to Price 'negation is just as much prior to affirmation as affirmation is to negation' but according to the Naiyāyikas affirmation is prior to negation. Let us take only peeceptual judgments for our consideration. A negative judgment presupposes the awareness of the object negated. Negation is a correlative term. A positive object is non-relative. It is self-sufficient. The object negated may be a positive object or a negative one. If it is a negative object then the awareness of it presupposes the awareness of its correlative term. This correlative term is a positive object. The awareness of not-not-A presupposes that of not-A but the awareness of not-A presupposes that of A. But the awareness of A presupposes that of none. The Naiyāyikas mean to say that positive objects which are relative terms are cognised by us directly in their non-relative character. Their relative character is logical whereas the non-relative character is due to their real nature. Negation involves reference to the object negated by its own nature. Price has failed to realise that the essence of 'not' consists in its dependence upon the 'notted'. The perception of land on the other shore of the Atlantic does not presuppose a positive suggestion asserted by Price. We agree with Price that Columbus set out to discover a new land, being inspired by the positive suggestion that there was land on the other side of the Atlantic. The positive suggestion might have conditioned his intention of a sea-voyage or his sea-voyage. But his perceptual judgment that there is land on the other side of the Atlantic is independent of the above positive suggestion. An affirmative proposition is not conditioned by a negative suggestion though it may be an answer to a negative question. This discussion is useless since the sense of "presupposing" is not clear. The argument of Price directed against the common view does not apply to the view of the Naiyāyikas. The Naiyāyikas prove conclusively that affirmation is prior to negation.

Our account of European Philosophy will be incomplete if we do not take into consideration Bergson's theory of negation. Bergson feels a special need for the solution of this problem since it removes our wrong idea of reality imposed upon our mind by our intellect. The central principle of his philosophy is that reality is movement. Movement signifies change. This change is not the change of something. Change does not presuppose a thing which undergoes a change. Our intellect represents movement as a relation of three immobilities viz, a thing, space and time. We must admit that we are all inclined to place our confidence in the story of reality told by our intellect. The intellect speaks of the schematical reality of things but not of the psychical reality. 'The work of the intellect is to form for us a scheme or diagram against which to present the world as a sphere of our activity and to enable us to have a grasp or hold on it'. The intellect presents before us reality in its static form. We think naturally that matter is prior to life. Bergson holds that matter and life are not two distinct realities. The same indivisible continuous movement assumes two orders viz, matter and life. But a peculiar relation holds between them that 'the presence of one order is the absence of the other'.

The intellect leaves such a deep impression of its record upon our mind that we are led to believe that if this movement—the reality—is not the movement of something then it should be the movement of nothing. If something at rest is not opposed to something in movement then an illusion is created in our mind that nothing is opposed to movement. In other words, the idea of absolute nothing is opposed to the idea of reality. Bergson analyses the idea of absolute nothing in order to know its true character and discusses the problem of negation which follows in its wake.

Bergson holds that nobody can imagine or conceive of a universal void since there must be at least an act of consciousness to witness the void. This reminds us of Descartes's argument against a universal doubt. He holds that the very act of doubting affirms the existence of the subject that doubts. Our imagination always represents an object internal or external. The absence of a particular object is the presence of another object. We cannot think of the absence of all order. When a particular order is thought to be absent, some other order occupies its place. The idea of the universal void or of the annihilation of everything is a mere word—a self-contradictory idea—a pseudo-idea. One may contend that an absolute void is possible when an object is destroyed and its place remains unoccupied. An answer to it is that this void which has sharp outlines is a place—a kind of being. Bergson explains how the idea of partial nothingness springs up in our mind. 'There is absence only for a being capable of remembering and expecting. He remembered an object, and perhaps expected to encounter it again ; he finds another, and he expresses the disappointment of his expectation (an expectation sprung from recollection) by saying that he no longer finds anything, that he encounters "nothing". (*Creative Evolution* p· 296).

'The idea of annihilation or of partial nothingness is therefore formed here in the course of substitution of one thing for another, whenever this substitution is thought by a mind that would prefer to keep to the old thing in the place of the new, or at least conceives this preference as possible' (*Ibid* p. 297).

According to Bergson we cannot think of the disappearance of a thing without substituting another object for it. But the thinking of this substitution may have an indeterminate and confused form. Bergson draws a distinction between affirmation and negation. Affirmation is a complete act of mind whereas negation is but the half of an intellectual act, of which the other half is understood, or rather put off to an indefinite future. Thus by denying All one cannot frame the idea of Nothing.

Bergson's point that negation is but the half of an intellectual act etc, requires explanation. When we say that the table is not white how do we arrive at this judgment ? Do we perceive directly the absence of the white colour as we perceive the black colour of the table ? In the case of an affirmation we express in a judgment what we perceive. But in the case of a negative judgment I judge a judgment. I judge the judgment that this table is white. It may be based upon either a possible or a past or a future belief. But a person who is under such an impression is warned that this judgment is to be replaced by another but the judgment which is to be substituted for it remains indeterminate. Bergson says, "Negation, therefore, differs from affirmation properly so called in that it is an affirmation of the second degree; it affirms something of an affirmation which itself affirms something of an object". (p. 304). A negative judgment refers to the necessity of a substitution. Thus a negative idea has no special content of its own. Therefore the *sui generis* character should be denied to negation.

Negation is subjective since it is relative to the human mind. The artificial character of negation proves that it is relative to the human mind. The act of denial consists of two affirmations of which one is determinate and the other is indeterminate. The first affirmation applies to a certain possible while the second involves a predicate which refers to an unknown or indifferent reality that cancels this possibility.

Negation has a social and pedagogical character since 'it is made to correct or guard against an error—which is rather supposed to be the error of another'. Bergson says, "For such an intellect to reach the point of denying, it must awake from its torpor, formulate the disappointment of a real or possible expectation, correct an actual or possible error—in short, propose to teach others or to teach itself". (p. 308).

Bergson's argument for the subjectivity of negation is that 'in the discovery of a replacement it (negation) takes account only of the replaced, and is not concerned with what replaces. The replaced exists only as a conception of the mind' (p. 310). Bergson says about the double negation that bestriding the positive solid reality to which it is attached, this phantom objectifies itself.

The core of Bergson's theory of negation is that negation is an affirmation of the second degree. A negative judgment affirms something of an affirmation which itself affirms something of an object.

The corollary of it is that negation is not the work of a mind placed before objects and concerned with them alone. When we negate we presuppose another person whom we find mistaken and desire to correct him. Negation implies that he should affirm something else but this positive object should not be specified. Thus the social and pedagogical character of negation is very clear since it presupposes at least two persons, one of whom speaks to the other, opposes and puts him on his guard. Now, the question is why the second affirmative judgment is not specified. The answer to it is that the object referred to by the second judgment is not know, or that the object fails to offer any actual interest since the substance of the first judgment attracts our attention solely.

A serious defect is noticed in this theory. If an object is not known then can we frame a judgment at all since a judgment is always determination ? If the object is held to be known but not specified then our awareness is non-individuating. The corresponding judgment is one which contains a generic predicate. The second affirmative judgment is to be one of the type of the judgment which may be 'This is being' 'this is something', or 'this is an attribute' etc. But this type of judgment cannot replace an affirmative judgment the predicate of which is a species of the genus referred to by the second judgment. Bergson mistakes a generic predicate for something indeterminate. If the predicate is really indeterminate then an awareness which refers to such an object is not surely a judgment. If this awareness is really indeterminate then the prior affirmative judgment cannot be replaced by it. If the object is known definitely then an affirmative judgment springs up automatically in our mind. How is it that a negative judgment comes into being at all ? Bergson holds that this affirmative judgment is equivalent to the negative judgment in question since this affirmative question fails to *offer* any actual interest. This negative sentence is not a logical proposition since its import is extra-logical. It does not refer to the real objective but signifies our mental attitude towards a particular judgment. Can it be expressive of our feeling ? Does a person communicate his feeling towards a judgment to another person ? The self of that person should be the subject of the negative sentence. It should be expressed like this "I am not interested in the judgment" or "I think that this judgment will not serve your interest". The negative sentence "This table is not black" cannot be equivalent to "I think that the affirmative judgment 'this table is black' will not serve the interest of the person addressed to". A sentence denotative of feeling or mental attitude must have 'I' as its subject. Moreover, whenever an object which offers no actual interest is known, our knowledge of it is an affirmative judgment. This judgment cannot replace the prior affirmative judgment unless we know that they are opposed to each other. The affirmative judgment 'the table is black' cannot be replaced by the affirmative judgment 'the table is square or long or hard or rough etc'. We must know that the subject of these two judgments is the same but the predicates of them have mutual contradiction. 'The table is black' is replaced by 'the table is white' because black is not-white and white is not-black. The assumption of the relation of mere otherness holding between them will not solve this difficulty since 'black' is other than 'square' or 'hard', or 'long' or 'rough'. Some predicates may co-inhere in the subject but others cannot. This difference in the relation of predicates to their subject should be explained. Without the assumption of contradiction which is objectively present a real solution cannot be suggested.

Now, let us see whether Bergson has been able to prove the subjective character of negation. He says, "in the discovery of a replacement it takes account only of the replaced, and is not concerned with what replaces. The replaced exists only as a conception of the mind". The purport of his thesis is that negation is subjective because it is an awareness of an idea to the exclusion of an object. But this negative experience takes account of negation over and above the replaced. The use of the adverb 'only' cannot be otherwise justified. If he holds that the exclusion of an idea from an object is constituted by the idea itself then he should acknowledge that the exclusion of an object from an idea is constituted by the object itself by the same logic inasmuch as exclusion is mutual. Therefore the ontological character of negation cannot be denied. S. Alexander suggests that Bergson subscribes to the substantive view of difference and thus brings him into line with Plato. In that case, the view that negation is merely subjective is untenable.

If negation is subjective because the sole object of negative experience is an idea then Bergson implies that negation is identical with the idea. If we expect that there is a table on the floor on the strength of our previous memory and express that there is a table on the floor then is this judgment identical with the judgment 'there is no table on the floor' ? According to Bergson there is no difference between them since the affirmative judgment refers to the concept 'table' which is negation. Bergson may contend that this judgment refers also to an object viz, the floor. The critics of Bergson will further urge that the negative judgment also refers to an object viz, the floor, since a negative judgment does not necessarily consist of concepts. Moreover, if a negative judgment refers to an idea then the judgment should be expressed in the form "I am so and so" but not in the form 'This is not so and so'.

The frustration of an expectation is real negation since it cannot be translated into a positive term i.e. some other expectation. Similarly the negation of utility is also real negation. If he acknowledges the real negation of a subjective fact or of value then there can be no reasonable bar to the assumption of objectively real negation. The very hypothesis of a pseudo-idea is untenable. We have already proved that there are no floating ideas. The essence of consciousness is constituted by its objective reference. Therefore Bergson's theory of negation is not tenable. Negation cannot have a subjective character.

8. *The Conclusion : Negative experience.*

The Naiyāyikas hold that negative judgments or negative ideas refer to negation which is objectively real. There are four types of negative judgments viz, (1) an object will come into being (2) an object has passed away (3) there is no object at this spot and (4) this is not that. These four types of negative judgments refer to four distinct types of negation. The first one refers to pre-negation, the second to post-negation, the third to absolute negation and the fourth to mutual negation.